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East Asia was hit by a severe financial crisis in 1997. The crisis
led to a proliferation of research on the exchange rate regimes and
financial stability in the region. A large literature suggested that East
Asian economies should move toward exchange rate coordination and
monetary integration. However, there is no explicit form of policy
coordination to date. The inconsistency between actual exchange rate
behavior and research that suggested monetary integration comprises the
motivation of this thesis. It may complement the existing literature
about the degree and the pattern of economic integration in the region
and help shed light on how far the region is from being economically
feasible to initiate monetary integration.
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the
Introduction which described the research background, the definition of
monetary integration, the research questions, the methodologies, and the
structure of the thesis. Chapters 2 to 6 are five essays centering on the
topic of exchange rates and monetary integration in East Asia. The main
findings of the five essays are summarized as follows.
Chapter 2 provided a literature review on exchange rates and
monetary integration in the region. Although considerable research has
been devoted to the topic, little attention has been paid to a number of
issues: (i) research on the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the
region after 2004 is relatively rare; (ii) it is still not clear about the
implications of the original sin hypothesis for monetary integration in
the region; (iii) little is known about the impact of vertical intra-industry
trade on the correlation of business cycles, one of the most important
criteria of monetary integration, among East Asian economies.
Chapter 3 explored the evolution of the de facto exchange rate
regimes in the region from 2003 to 2014. Based on a seemingly
unrelated regression model, the empirical results are three-fold: (i) the
exchange rate regimes in the region changed considerably over time; (ii)
the role of the US dollar became more important during the recent
global financial crisis; (iii) average correlation among exchange rates of
East Asian currencies increased over time even after controlling for the
effect of potentially important international and regional currencies
including the US dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen. The results
imply the important unobserved common factor that influenced the daily
movements of exchange rates of East Asian economies, which might
serve as another indicator of increased economic linkages in the region.
Chapter 4 examined the original sin hypothesis and analyzed
whether the elimination of “original sin” through monetary integration
could be viewed as a benefit for monetary integration in East Asia. The
empirical analysis using a panel dataset, based on a random effects tobit
model, revealed that it was rather hard for all East Asian emerging
markets to eliminate “original sin” through domestic policies within the
intermediate term. The relation between “original sin” and currency
mismatch was also checked based on the available data. Although on
average economies with higher levels of “original sin” were likely to
have bigger pressure of currency mismatch over the past decade, there
was no direct relationship between the annual variation of “original sin”
and the annual variation of currency mismatch pressure. Combining the
experience of the 2008 euro area crisis, this research suggests that there
is no direct relationship between monetary integration and strengthened
financial stability through the elimination of “original sin” in the region.
Chapter 5 focused on the impact of vertical intra-industry trade
on the correlation of business cycles in the region. This analysis used
the threshold method to divide trade into inter-industry trade, vertical
intra-industry trade and horizontal intra-industry trade. Using a fixed
effects model and a random effects model, the empirical analysis found
that the rise of vertical intra-industry trade from the 1990s until the
recent global financial crisis strengthened the correlation of business
cycles in the region because it increased total intra-industry trade (not
because it increased the share of vertical intra-industry trade in
intra-industry trade). The recent global financial crisis strongly affected
the region; the average share of vertical intra-industry trade and
intra-industry trade as a whole declined. Moreover, the crisis brought a
temporary halt to the increased synchronization of business cycles
among East Asian economies from 2003 to 2007.
Chapter 6 extended the analysis of the suitability of monetary
integration in East Asia to other evidence by examining other optimum
currency areas criteria and real effective exchange rates. The first part of
the chapter found that capital mobility increased considerably compared
to two decades ago. Nevertheless, capital market integration process
was affected by the recent global financial crisis. The second part of the
chapter evaluated the suitability of monetary integration in the region
using real effective exchange rates. In a vector autoregressive model,
granger causality tests showed that a subgroup of East Asian economies
seemed to be more closely associated.
Chapter 7 presented the conclusions. The thesis concluded that
economic linkages among East Asian economies increased significantly
during the past years. Although there is still no explicit form of
exchange rate coordination and monetary integration in the region to
date, economic forces that increased the desirability of monetary
integration accumulated rapidly in the region.
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11 INTRODUCTION
The economy of East Asia began to take off at the second half of the 20th century.1 The leading Japanese
economy, the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) and the subsequent emerging markets including
China and other Southeast Asian countries, registered high economic growth records. During this process,
individual economies began to develop quickly and regional economic exchanges and linkages reached an
unprecedentedly high level. In 1993, the World Bank report The East Asian Miracle put a spotlight on the
flourishing economy of the region as a whole. However, the region was hit by a severe financial crisis in
1997. The break of the crisis gave momentum to a proliferation of research on exchange rate coordination
and monetary integration in the region (e.g., Kawai and Takagi, 2005; Ogawa and Kawasaki, 2011).
Despite various arguments in research, there is no explicit form of policy coordination in the region
to date. Previous literature on exchange rate regimes in East Asia found no evidence of coordinated
exchange rate behavior (e.g., McKinnon, 2005; Ogawa and Yang, 2008). The inconsistency between actual
exchange rate behavior and the research that suggests monetary integration comprises the motivation of this
thesis. It aims to study exchange rates and re-think monetary integration in the region after the 1997–1998
financial crisis.
East Asian economies recovered quickly from the crisis. Regional economic and trade integration
continued to accelerate in the first decade of the 21st century. As economic linkages strengthen, exchange
arrangements and monetary integration become increasingly important topics of international economic
issues in the region. Moreover, monetary integration is an integral part of complete economic integration.
Urata (2008) mentioned that an idea of the introduction of a regional common currency should be regarded
as a long-term goal in the coordination mechanism of macroeconomic policies. An examination of
monetary integration provides a perspective on the degree and the pattern of economic integration in the
region and helps shed light on how far East Asia is from being economically feasible to formally coordinate
exchange rate policies.
1 This thesis covers thirteen countries including ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and China, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Hong Kong SAR, Macao
SAR and Taiwan (China).
21.1 Research Background
East Asian economies incurred great loss during the 1997–1998 financial crisis. The real economy was
frustrated (e.g., Urata, 2006; Zhang, 1999; Lim, 2008). Economic growth slumped. Foreign direct
investment declined temporarily. A large number of firms closed. Exports growth shrunk in many
economies. Also, a number of currencies depreciated greatly. The Thai baht, the Indonesian rupiah, the
Korean won, the Malaysian ringgit, and the Philippine peso were hit. Financial markets in Singapore and
Hong Kong SAR were under great stress, too. The central banks in several economies failed to maintain
credible fixed exchange rates.
The swiftness and severity of the regional financial crisis was largely unanticipated. Various attempts
to understand the crisis provided a treasure trove of studies on the region’s financial vulnerability in the
1990s. Time before the crisis witnessed a surge of capital flows (e.g., Tsurumi, 2001). McCauley (2003)
pointed out that the region was exporting safer capital and importing higher-risk capital before the break of
the crisis. Private capital, especially short-term flows, was channeled by the deregulated banks from the
world’s rich economies to the region (e.g., Goldstein, 1998; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999; Kawai,
Newfarmer and Schmukler, 2005). Radelet and Sachs (2000) demonstrated that short-term debt in the
ravaged five economies (Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand) quickly multiplied and
far outpaced the growth of national reserves in the years preceding the crisis. At the firm level, Claessens,
Djankov, and Lang (1998) analyzed the fragility of the region’s corporate financial structure which was
partly due to easily available credit from domestic banks before the crisis.
Researchers have identified several sources of such pattern of capital flows in the 1990s. One
incentive concerns exchange rate regimes. Most East Asian economies de facto pegged to the US dollar
before the crisis (e.g., McKinnon, 2005). The existing literature has shown that the rigid exchange rates
played a role in the fermentation of the crisis. Theoretical research has discussed the possibilities of
self-fulfilling balance-of-payments crises under fixed exchange rate regimes (e.g., Krugman, 1979;
Obstfeld, 1986). On the other hand, proponents for the moral hazard view argued that fixed exchange rates
vis-à-vis the US dollar, along with other factors, provided implicit government guarantee for unhedged
risks in the financial and corporate sectors (e.g., Radelet and Sachs, 2000; Dooly, Folkerts-Landau and
Garber, 2004). Recent evidence provided additional support for the moral hazard view. For example,
Patnaik and Shah (2010) revealed that low currency flexibility encouraged firms to hold unhedged
exposure using firm-level data from India.
3Another source of such pattern of capital flows relates to the original sin hypothesis. Eichengreen
and Hausmann (1999) proposed the hypothesis shortly after the break of the 1997–1998 financial crisis.
They initially used the term “original sin” to refer to the difficulty for a country of using its own currency
to borrow abroad or borrow at long maturities even at home. In subsequent work, they narrowed the
definition down to the first problem for reasons described fully in Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza
(2007). In other words, “original sin” signifies the difficulty for an economy of borrowing abroad in its
own currency. Eichengreen and Hausmann argued that many East Asian economies were subject to
“original sin” which provided another incentive for the accumulation of foreign currency debts in the
financial and corporate sectors before the crisis. They also argued that it was not rare for emerging markets
around the world to borrow from the international market using their own currencies. The original sin
hypothesis states that “original sin” is one of the factors that affect currency mismatch and systemic risk in
emerging markets. The currency mismatch problems in emerging markets have attracted wide attention
(e.g., Magud, 2010; Baek, 2013).
Financial liberalization policies in the absence of appropriate regulation paved the way for the
financial vulnerability in the region (e.g., Furman, Stiglitz, Bosworth, and Radelet, 1998). World Bank
(2000) showed that the region’s macroeconomic policies facilitated the inflows of short-term, unhedged,
foreign currency-denominated capital prior to the regional crisis.
A number of researchers attributed the spread of the regional financial crisis to liquidity shortage and
viewed crises in some economies as liquidity crises (e.g., Yamazawa, 1998; Murase, 2007).2 Many East
Asian economies had liquidity difficulties during the peak of the crisis. The annual growth rates of foreign
exchange in East Asia from 1996 to 1997 were: Korea (-36.8%), Malaysia (-9.5%), Indonesia (-3.8%), Lao
(-33.3%) and Myanmar (-57.8%). Although a number of countries such as Thailand, Indonesia and Korea
enrolled in the rescue program of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the conditions attached to the
aiding fund were highly disputable.3 There were criticisms both within East Asia4 and outside the region5
2 According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), a liquidity crisis “occurs when a country that is both willing and able to service
its debts over the long run finds itself temporarily unable to roll over its debts” (p. 59-60). They further stated that a
liquidity crisis was in contrast to an insolvency problem in which the country was perceived to be either unwilling (most
likely due to political factors or economic consideration) or unable to repay in the long run.
3 Ito (1999) documented the timing and process of the borrowing activities.
4 Gochoco-Bautista and Bautista (2005) examined the response of monetary authority of the Philippines at the initial stage of
the financial crisis. Their empirical results showed that the traditional prescription of tightening monetary policy was
useless, if not harmful, in dealing with exchange market pressure. Lee (2001) asserted that the IMF’s emergency operation
in Korea actually intensified the financial crisis instead of preventing complications. Sussangkarn (2010) (Thailand)
summarized the rescue program as “an unwillingness to allow non-market based interventions, such as controls on capital
flows [footnote 5], an imposition of full guarantees for creditors (mostly foreign) of financial institutions, and an
imposition of relatively rapid structural reform measures, such as stringent financial standards and corporate structuring,
privatization of state owned enterprises and asset sales at what many regarded as ‘fire sale’ prices” and argued that “if the
region had had a greater input into the crisis resolution measures, the crisis could have been resolved with much less paid
4about the role of the IMF in the regional crisis. The liquidity perspective gave rise to the later born of a
regional liquidity support mechanism, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI).
The CMI was launched to pool the strength of member countries in the region and establish
mechanisms to get access to liquidity on the threat of another crisis. The CMI contains the bilateral swap
arrangements (BSAs)6 and the ASEAN swap arrangement (ASA)7. The initiative is essentially currency
swap arrangements among ASEAN+3 countries. The mechanism was multilateralized into the Chiang Mai
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) on March 24, 2010 after periodic enlargement in terms of both swap
number and size.8 The total size of the CMI reached US$ 240 billion in 2012. East Asian economies are
now seeking to improve the effectiveness of the CMI through increasing the ceiling of the borrowing and
the IMF-delinked portion of fund.
The financial crisis gave momentum to the discussion of strengthening monetary cooperation and
establishing a different framework of exchange rate policies in the region. Kawai and Takagi (2005)
suggested that effective monetary cooperation in East Asia should include four elements after drawing
experiences from other parts of the world. These elements include a surveillance mechanism, a regional
financing facility, a common unit of account, and exchange rate coordination.9 A large body of research
has proposed further moves toward monetary cooperation in East Asia. For instance, a number of scholars
represented by Mori et al. (2002) and Ogawa and Shimizu (2006) developed the idea of Asian currency
units (ACUs) or Asian Monetary units (AMUs) 10 and suggested that regional surveillance and exchange
rate coordination should be based on ACUs.
A number of studies discussed a new regional exchange arrangement. Oh and Harvie (2001)
than had been the case” (p.3-4). Kawai (2009) is another example.
5 For instance, Radelet and Sachs (2000) said: “The IMF programs up until the end of 1997 apparently added both to the
panic and to the contractionary force of the financial crisis. The IMF programs generally called for six key actions:
immediate bank closures, quick restoratioin of minimum capital adequacy standards (especially in the first Thai and
Indonesia programs), tight domestic credit, high interest rates on central bank discount facilities, fiscal contraction, and
nonfinancial sector structural changes. …Domestic bank lending stopped abruptly in the three countries with IMF
programs (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand). There were widespread anecdotes about firms unable to obtain working capital,
even in support of confirmed export orders from abroad” (p.115-116). Feldstein (1998) is another example.
6 The BSAs are a series of bilateral swap arrangements between ASEAN member countries and the Plus Three countries
(China, Japan, and Korea).
7 The ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) was founded by the ASEAN founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore). All ten ASEAN member countries became the ASA’s participants until May 2000.
8 The form of the multilateralization was indicated in the official document of ASEAN+3 Finance Ministerial Statement: “A
self-managed reserve pooling arrangement governed by a single contractual agreement is an appropriate form of
multilateralization” (Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting, May 2007, Kyoto, Japan).
“CMIM is in nature a multilateral currency swap arrangement which covers all ASEAN+3 members” (Joint Ministerial
Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting, May 2010, Tashkent, Uzbekistan).
9 Nasution (2005) suggested that establishing a regional bond market should be added to the contents of monetary
cooperation in East Asia.
10 Regional currency units (RCUs) and regional monetary units (RMUs) are often used interchangeably with ACUs and
AMUs.
5proposed to establish an Asian exchange rate mechanism, i.e., a target zone system based on ACUs. Ito
(2002) expressed support for the idea of pegging to ACUs and believed that it was much better in
stabilizing real competitiveness among East Asian economies than pegging to the US dollar under the
condition of multiple trading partners.
Suggestions vary on the way of exchange rate coordination. Eichengreen (2006) argued that it would
be better for East Asia to create an ACU (which is constituted as a weighted average of Asian currencies)
than to establish a multilateral currency rid like the European Monetary System on account of low
convergence of policies and the difficulty of maintaining confidence of investors. He suggested that the
ACU should be allowed to circulate across countries alongside national currencies.11 On the other hand,
Watanabe and Ogura (2010) suggested three stages toward monetary integration: (i) adoption of a managed
float based on a country-specific currency basket; (ii) harmonization of the weights of the currencies in the
baskets; (iii) establishment of a currency union. This proposal of moving toward monetary integration step
by step is similar to that made by Ogawa and Kawasaki (2011).12 In other words, there is little general
agreement on the region’s route toward monetary integration.
In spite of these proposals on exchange rate coordination and regional monetary integration, there is
no explicit form of exchange rate coordination in the region to date.13 A number of empirical studies have
explored the evolution of the exchange rate regimes in the region (e.g., McKinnon, 2005; Ogawa and Yang,
2008). There was no evidence of coordinated exchange rates in the empirical literature before 2004.
East Asia developed at a quick pace economically and financially in the new century, thanks to
globalization and opening-up policies. East Asian economies carried out various reforms in domestic
policies including exchange rate policies. International economic environment keeps changing and the
recent global financial crisis severely depressed the world economy. The evolving economic dynamics call
for a re-examination of economic linkages and a re-evaluation of monetary integration in East Asia.
In this context, this thesis examined the exchange rate regimes from 2004 to 2014 and investigated
the desirability of monetary integration in the region. This thesis also revealed the degree and the pattern of
11 Hence the name parallel-currency approach.
12 Ogawa and Kawasaki (2011) suggested five steps toward monetary integration in Asia: “(i) the monetary authorities of
ASEAN+3 initiate policy dialogue concerning exchange rates and exchange rate policies where the ACU should be used to
conduct surveillance on the exchange rates and exchange rates policies as well as macroeconomics policies at the
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) of the ASEAN+3 Financial Deputy Ministers’ Meeting; (ii) the monetary
authorities of ASEAN plus China and Korea adopt a managed floating exchange rate system with reference to their own
individual currency baskets (the US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen); (iii) the monetary authorities of ASEAN plus
China and Korea shift to a managed floating exchange rate system with reference to a common currency basket; (iv) some
ASEAN+3 countries peg to a common currency basket, the ACU and conduct coordinated monetary policies; (v) an Asian
Exchange Rate Mechanism should be established” (p. 278).
13 As noted by Park and Wyplosz (2010), ASEAN+3 discontinued the study of introducing an ACU due to objections from
member countries.
6linkages among East Asian economies.
1.2 Definition of Monetary Integration
The definition of monetary integration was formed in accordance with intellectual exploration on economic
and monetary cooperation in Europe. According to Machlup (1977), the term integration itself had only a
short history in economics literature.14 In fact, the exact meaning of monetary integration in economics
literature had been left obscure before the 1970s.
In 1972, Corden clarified the two essential components of monetary integration: (i) “an
exchange-rate union defined as an area within which exchange rates bear a permanently fixed relationship
to each other even though the rates may vary relative to non-union members in union”; (ii) “convertibility
defined as the permanent absence of all exchange controls, whether for current or capital transactions,
within the area” (p. 2). This definition has been widely accepted in the literature. Wood (1986) used this
definition in reviewing essays on the European monetary integration.
Corden also stressed that the concept of an exchange-rate union or a complete exchange-rate union,
the first component of the monetary integration definition, was distinct from a pseudo-exchange-rate union.
He defined a pseudo-exchange-rate union as “an arrangement where the member countries agree—no
doubt solemnly—to maintain fixed exchange-rate relationships within the union but there is no explicit
integration of economic policy, no common pool of foreign-exchange reserves, and no single central bank”
(p.3). The first component of Corden’s definition is perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of monetary
integration. Corden himself said: “A complete exchange-rate union is literally monetary integration” (p.6).
Balassa (1973) also treated exchange rate fixity as the most important element of the definition of monetary
integration. “The hallmark of monetary integration as defined here is a permanent, unalterable fixity of
parities. It may or may not entail the use of a common currency” (p.101).
On the other hand, Machlup (1977) provided a different definition of monetary integration in
reflecting the role of money in economic integration: Monetary integration is referred to measures, policies,
or processes that facilitate monetary transactions by anybody or for any purpose. He defined the spectrum
of the meaning of monetary integration in the following way: “Absence of restrictions is the minimum
14 Machlup (1977) explored the historical usage of the term integration: “The word ‘Integration’, taken from the Latin, is of
course very old. In Latin, integratio was mostly used in the sense of ‘renovation’. The Oxford English Dictionary gives
1620 as the date for the first use in print of integration in the sense of ‘combining parts into a whole’. …In economics the
word was first employed in industrial organization to refer to combinations of business firms through agreements, cartels,
concerns, trusts, and mergers” (p.2-3).
7meaning of the term; the maximum is monetary unification, the use of a single, uniform currency” (p.23).
He further suggested, just as integration itself could be understood either as a process or as a state of affairs
reached by that process, monetary integration could refer to either a process or a state of affairs as a result
of that process.15 Machlup believed that monetary integration is an integral part of economic integration
and the ultimate goal of monetary integration is to facilitate economic integration.
Monetary integration defined by Machlup is fundamentally different from that defined by Corden. In
Machlup’s definition, by monetary integration is really meant a pseudo-exchange-rate union defined by
Corden. On the second side, the two concepts of monetary integration outlined by Corden and Machlup
overlap with each other. Monetary integration as a state of affairs in Machlup’s definition includes a
complete exchange-rate union, a core element of Corden’s definition. In the literature, monetary integration
and monetary union are often used interchangeably.16 Corden attempted to clarify the multi-layers of the
meaning of monetary integration through making a distinction between a pseudo-exchange-rate union and a
complete exchange-rate union while Machlup tried to view monetary integration as either a state of affairs
or a process. This thesis used Corden’s definition of monetary integration as a complete exchange-rate
union and a state of affairs; but in some cases, monetary integration could also signify a process in
Machlup’s definition.
1.3 Objective
This thesis aims to examine exchange rates and re-think monetary integration in East Asia after the
1997–1998 financial crisis. Research questions include:
1. What are the benefits and costs of monetary integration in East Asia? What does the European
monetary integration process tell besides the theories? [Discussed in Chapter 2]
2. How did exchange rate regimes evolve in East Asia after the 1997–1998 financial crisis?
[Discussed in Chapter 3]
3. Does the original sin hypothesis matter for monetary integration in East Asia? [Discussed in
Chapter 4]
4. Is East Asia suitable for monetary integration? What is the impact of trade integration on the
correlation of business cycles in the region? How about other evidence? [Discussed in Chapter 5
15 Machlup wrote: “It was sometimes ambiguous whether that state has to be the terminal point or any intermediate point in
the process and it is useful to distinguish between complete and incomplete integration” (p.13).
16 “A monetary union implies inside its boundaries the total and irreversible convertibility of currencies, the elimination of
margins of fluctuation in exchange rates, the irrevocable fixing of parity rates and the complete liberation of movements of
capital.” (Werner Report, p.10, taken from Ingram, 1973, p.6)
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5. How is the linkage among East Asian economies revealed by exchange rates and the correlation
of business cycles? [Discussed in Chapter 3, 5 and 6]
1.4 Methodologies & Structure
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the Introduction. It briefly introduced the research
background and made an overview of the thesis.
Chapter 2 provided a literature review on exchange rates and monetary integration in the region. It
reviewed monetary integration theories and paid attention to the European monetary integration process. It
then examined the literature on exchange rate regimes and monetary integration in East Asia. Although
considerable research has been devoted to the topic, little attention has been paid to a number of issues: (i)
the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the region after 2004; (ii) the implications of the original sin
hypothesis for the evaluation of monetary integration in the region; (iii) the impact of vertical intra-industry
trade on the correlation of business cycles, one of the most important criteria of monetary integration,
among East Asian economies.
Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6 were developed based on the findings of the literature review chapter. Chapter
3 investigated the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the region. This chapter reviewed policy changes
in the region after the 1997–1998 financial crisis and made a quantitative analysis. Using time series data,
this chapter conducted structural break tests and divided the whole period into several subperiods. Using a
panel data set, this chapter then illustrated the evolution of exchange rate regimes over time and the pattern
of linkages among East Asian economies based on a seemingly unrelated regression model.
Chapter 4, 5 and 6 discussed the desirability of monetary integration in the region. Chapter 4 checked
the original sin hypothesis and analyzed whether it could be viewed as an appropriate excuse for monetary
integration in the region. This chapter measured “original sin” in the region from 1994 to 2014. Using a
panel data set, this chapter then investigated the influencing factors of “original sin” based on a random
effects tobit model. Also, this chapter explored the relation between “original sin” and currency mismatch
and answered the question about whether the original sin hypothesis mattered for monetary integration in
East Asia.
Chapter 5 focused on the impact of sustained trade integration on correlation of business cycles in the
region. Correlation of business cycles is one of the most important criteria in evaluating the desirability of
monetary integration among a certain group of economies. This chapter first examined the characteristics of
9trade integration in East Asia. Using fixed effects model and random effects model, empirical analysis
investigated the impact of vertical intra-industry trade on the correlation of business cycles in the region.
This chapter also revealed the degree and the pattern of linkages among East Asian economies by
examining correlation of business cycles.
Chapter 6 extended the analysis of the suitability of monetary integration in East Asia to other
evidence by examining other optimum currency areas (OCA) criteria and real effective exchange rates. The
first part of the chapter examined other OCA criteria such as price level, capital mobility and labor mobility
among individual economies. The second part of this chapter evaluated the suitability of monetary
integration in the region using real effective exchange rates based on a vector autoregressive model and
granger causality tests.
Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6 are relatively independent essays. They were different attempts to shed new
light on the common topic of exchange rate regimes and monetary integration in East Asia. Chapter 7
concluded. The following flowchart illustrates the structure of the thesis and the connection between
different essays.
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2 EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND MONETARY INTEGRATION
IN EAST ASIA: A LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction to Chapter 2
Ever since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the dispute on fixed and floating exchange rate
regimes remains at the center of international economics. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) call this unsettled
problem as “the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle” in international macroeconomics (p. 373). In East Asia,
most economies adopted de facto dollar-peg exchange rate regimes in the 1990s (e.g., McKinnon, 2005).
The discussion of devising a different regional exchange arrangement has taken central stage after the break
of the 1997–1998 financial crisis.
This essay sets out to investigate the literature on exchange rate regimes and monetary integration in
East Asia. Specifically, the essay asks the following questions: (i) is it suitable for East Asian economies to
initiate the process of monetary integration from an economic perspective? (ii) what are the benefits and
costs of monetary integration in East Asia? (iii) what does the European monetary integration process tell
besides the theories? (iv) what kind of future research can be done on monetary integration in East Asia?
A review of monetary integration theories show that whether East Asian economies should fix
exchange rates to some extent with each other depends on a certain number of conditions. The European
monetary integration process reveals: (i) the European monetary integration process was not free of market
speculation and financial crises; (ii) political coherence is an important factor; (iii) asymmetry of influence
existed in the European Monetary System (EMS) with Germany being more important than others. This
essay also surveys the literature on exchange rate regimes and monetary integration in East Asia and finds
that a number of issues need to be addressed including: (i) the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the
region after 2004; (ii) whether it is appropriate to take “original sin” as one of the benefits of monetary
integration in the region; (iii) how does vertical intra-industry trade affect the suitability of monetary
integration in the region; (iv) how to evaluate the suitability of monetary integration taken into
consideration of the rapid development in the region.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews monetary integration theories. It
introduces the early optimum currency areas (OCA) theory, reviews the benefit-cost approach, and
examines the important empirical research. Since monetary integration theories are closely related to the
monetary integration process in Europe in the latter half of the 20th century, Section 2.3 reviews the
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experience of monetary integration in Europe from the European Monetary System to the formation of the
eurozone monetary union. Section 2.4 focuses on studies on exchange rate regimes and monetary
integration in East Asia. Section 2.5 discusses the direction of future research.
2.2 Monetary Integration Theories
2.2.1 Early OCA Theory
The optimum currency area theory remains the workhorse in the monetary integration analysis. Early
contributors to the OCA theory tried to find the conditions under which countries should join together to
form a currency union where exchange rates are fixed. Pioneering studies in this field include Mundell
(1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969).
Mundell (1961) discussed the role of flexible exchange rates in the adjustment to global imbalances.
In fact, the priority of fixed and flexible exchange rates was widely discussed in the 1950s. The daylight
savings argument from Friedman (1953) stated that exchange rate, as the relative price between country
price levels, could settle the problem of different shocks to individual countries.17 Friedman believed that
flexible exchange rates could smooth the adjustment to real shocks even when nominal rigidity was
present.
Mundell made the distinction between a country (which is defined by the domain of its currency) and
a region (which is defined by factor mobility). In his model, there are two countries with respective
national currencies, country A and country B. Both countries are divided by two regions producing two
different goods, the East and the West. Mundell revealed that the demand shift between regions would
result in an inefficient result of inflation-unemployment trade-off in both countries due to the inconsistency
in national boundaries and production boundaries. In other words, exchange rates between countries may
be incapable of accommodating asymmetric shocks when factors could not move freely. Mundell then
suggested that a currency area, a domain within which exchange rates are fixed, should be as large as the
domain of factor mobility in order to address the trade-off between the number of exchange rates and the
quality of a currency. His work implies that the higher the level of factor mobility and cross-country
17 “The argument for flexible exchange rates is, strange to say, very nearly identical with the argument for daylight savings
time …it is much simpler to change the clock that guide all than to have each individual separately change his pattern of
reaction to the clock. …This situation is exactingly the same in the exchange market. It is far simpler to allow one price to
change, namely the price of foreign exchange, than to rely upon price changes in the multitude of prices that together
constitute the internal price structure.” (Friedman, 1953, p. 173)
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business cycles synchronization is, the more likely the two countries can form an optimum currency area.
Mundell’s work made the cornerstone for the OCA theory.
McKinnon (1963) defined an optimum currency area as “an area over which it is optimal to have a
single currency regime, or—what is almost the same thing—a fixed exchange-rate system with guaranteed
convertibility of currencies” (p.717). In his work, optimality describes a single currency area within which
monetary-fiscal policy and flexible external exchange rates could be used to give the best resolution of
three objectives: (i) the maintenance of full employment; (ii) the maintenance of balanced international
payments; (iii) the maintenance of a stable internal average price level.18 McKinnon also pointed out that
factor mobility included geographic mobility among regions and factor mobility among industries.
Based on a simple model, McKinnon explored the defining characteristics of an optimum currency
area and discussed its optimum extent in promoting shifts in resources among various industries in terms of
size and structure. He also stressed the relevance of the openness of the economy in affecting the
effectiveness of flexible exchange rates as a control device for the three (sometimes conflicting) objectives
mentioned above.
Kenen (1969) reviewed the work of Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) and pointed out that the
definitions of optimality in the two pieces of work are different. He interpreted the region in Mundell (1961)
as a homogeneous collection of producers that used the same technology, faced the same demand curve,
and sufferred or prospered together as circumstances change. Kenen insisted that the implicit definition of
optimality in the very terse article of Mundell was related to the state of the labor market. He further argued
that marking off domains of perfect labor mobility might be inadequate simply because perfect mobility
rarely prevailed.
Based on a simple model, Kenen suggested that product diversification might be more relevant than
labor mobility. His propositions included: (i) a well-diversified national economy will not have to undergo
changes in its terms of trade as often as a single-product national economy (ii) when it does confront a drop
in the demand for its principal exports, unemployment will not rise as sharply as it would in a
less-diversified national economy; (iii) the links between external and domestic demand especially the link
between exports and investment, will be weaker in diversified national economies, so that variations in
domestic employment “imported” from abroad will not be greatly aggravated by corresponding variations
in capital formation. Kenen concluded that fixed exchange rates are most appropriate or least inappropriate
to well-diversified national economies.
18 McKinnon assumed that any capitalist economy required a stable-valued liquid currency to insure efficient resource
allocation.
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In sum, early OCA theorists found several important criteria for an optimum currency area: Factor
mobility, asymmetric disturbances to output, openness of the economy, product diversification, and the
extent of automatic stabilizers. However, the properties of the criteria are more often than not conflicting in
practice. The line between a feasible currency area and an infeasible currency area is only vaguely drawn.
2.2.2 Benefits and Costs of Monetary Integration
After a short period of relative dormancy, researchers began to attach more attention to breaking the
barriers from theory to policy analysis. The Werner Report of October 1970 to the Council of Ministers of
the European Economic Community re-ignited the intellectual pondering on monetary integration.
Monetary integration is an integral part of economic integration. Ideally, monetary integration would
eliminate obstacles in monetary transactions to facilitate economic integration in a region. As Ingram (1973)
has argued, economic integration leads logically toward fixed exchange rates.19 However, there is no sign
of consensus even until now about the correspondence between the timing of further steps toward monetary
integration and the level of economic integration in the real world. Back in the 1970s, it was not surprising
that the benefit-cost analysis of monetary integration was of significance to economists and policy-makers.
Monetary integration captures a number of gains. Member countries could benefit from reduced
volatility of exchange rates. Consensus is generally reached that exchange rate stability increases bilateral
trade flows. There is ample evidence supporting the positive effect of fixed exchange rates in promoting
trade flows. Based on a gravity model, Alesina and Barro (2001) revealed that currency unions are
associated with higher trade and welfare by abolishing national money as a monetary barrier among
member countries. Frankel and Rose (2002) provided similar evidence using a two-stage approach. Their
findings also indicated no evidence of trade diversion effect with respect to third countries. Gil-Pareja,
Llorca-Vivero, and Martínez-Serrano (2008) showed that monetary arrangements including the Bretton
Woods system, the European Payments Union, the Snake, the European Monetary System and the
Economic and Monetary Union significantly boosted intra-bloc trade based on a sample of 25 OECD
countries over the period of 1950-2004. They also pointed out that all the monetary agreements analyzed
showed evidence of trade-creating effect with third countries. Klein and Shambaugh (2006) suggested that
bilateral trade grew by up to 35% by pegging exchange rate with a base country when country year effects
19 “Once the member nations have forged all these links among their economies, worked their way through the delicate and
difficult negotiations and comprises necessary to reach consensus, and even accepted and accomplished many of the
adjustments required of them, they can hardly allow the solutions reached to be basically and perhaps drastically altered by
exchange-rate changes. Economic integration leads logically toward fixed rates, monetary union, and ultimately a common
currency.” (Ingram, 1973, p.3)
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were included based on a sample of annual data from 1973 to 1999. The effect of exchange rate volatility
on trade flows has attracted substantial research interest. Yet, reported estimates varied considerably. Rose
and Stanley (2005) thought it was difficult to reject the disparate estimates by using a meta-analysis
approach.
In addition, adoption of a single currency also means the elimination of exchange rate risks in the
financial system. Ogawa and Kawasaki (2011) believed that monetary integration would reduce
cross-border transaction cost and increase efficiency of financial transactions.
The second advantage is that pegging exchange rate to a large economy with sound monetary policy
provides discipline. A credible anchor eliminates the inflation-bias problem of discretionary monetary
policy (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). An inflation-prone small economy can benefit from the price
stability in the anchoring country in the long-term and can borrow at a cheaper price from the international
market. 20 Furthermore, monetary integration reduces the possibility of unfair competition through
beggar-thy-neighbour policies. These are the major benefits of monetary integration.
Monetary integration involves costs for member countries. One of the obvious costs is the loss of
seignorage. Ever since Valery Giscard d’Estaing, then the finance minister in France, asserted in 1965 that
the U.S. enjoyed an “exorbitant privilege” due to its central role in the international monetary system
(Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba, and López-Salido, 2010, p.1), the seignorage is considered as a potential cost for
countries which eliminated national currencies. On the other hand, the loss of seignorage is concerned with
a redistribution between countries rather than a social waste for the currency area as a whole. From the
viewpoint of economists, such a cost does not involve distortion of incentives for economic agents, and
therefore ideally can be remedied by reconciliation between member countries.
The main force that opposes monetary integration relates to the fact that fixity restricts the autonomy
of monetary policy in individual nations. Governments with flexible exchange rate regimes can increase
domestic money supply to buffer a negative real economic shock. Ingram (1973) mentioned that full
currency convertibility and capital account liberalization process could greatly limit the ability of a single
nation to pursue a monetary policy that differs appreciably from the other nations. Corden (1972) also
stated that a pseudo-exchange-rate union and a customs union together would make separate
balance-of-payments deficits in member countries insolvable (p.22). At the extreme, national monetary
policy is subordinated to the regional central bank in the monetary union. Monetary integration has the
effect of tying one’s hands in monetary policy.
20 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) showed that inflation performance history is strongly associated with borrowing capacity from
the international market.
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Previous literature also discussed the policy coordination problem associated with incomplete
monetary integration. Corden (1972) said that mandated finance ministers or governors would fight for that
common exchange rate most appropriate to their own countries’ balance-of-payments situation and thus
any decision may involve hard bargaining in the absence of explicit integration of economic policy and a
unified central bank. He also conjectured that each session to reach a hard agreement would be
accompanied by speculation about its outcome. This difficulty to reach an agreement and the consequence
of market speculation is an important causing factor of the severity of the euro area crisis from 2008 to
2012.
The benefit-cost approach provides a useful perspective for viewing monetary integration. However,
it is incapable of articulating the relationships between the different OCA criteria.
2.2.3 Recent Research on Monetary Integration
The exploration on the economics of monetary integration is characterized by a large amount of empirical
research in recent decades. Researchers have used various empirical methods and tried to give an answer to
the theoretical ambiguity. A number of studies have made great attempts.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) used a structural VAR model to evaluate the suitability of
monetary integration among a group of economies by focusing on business cycles. Following Blanchard
and Quah (1989), they decomposed disturbances into demand disturbance and supply disturbance.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen compared the shocks of eleven EC countries with the United States and
evaluated the desirability of monetary integration in Europe.
Researchers have also attempted to integrate the different OCA criteria suggested by early theorists.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) selected several proxies for the OCA criteria including relative output
fluctuation, similarity of commodity composition of exports, bilateral trade size, and relative country size.
They constructed a composite index, the OCA index, and predicted its change in the next few years. Their
results divided European countries into three groups (those exhibiting a high level of readiness, those with
a tendency to converge, and those in which little or no convergence was evident).
Enders and Hurn (1994) provided another method to the evaluation of the desirability of monetary
integration. They developed a theory of generalized purchasing power (G-PPP) and evaluated the
desirability of monetary integration based on the behavior of real exchange rates. The basic tenets of the
theory is stated as: (i) the non-stationarity of real fundamental economic variables led to the general
non-stationarity of real exchange rates; (ii) the fundamentals will share common trends within a currency
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area and will be sufficiently interrelated for the real exchange rates to share a reduced number of common
trends. Enders and Hurn tested the cointegrating relationship of the real exchange rates of Pacific Rim
nations using data from 1973 to 1989. Their results showed that the G-PPP held between each of the Pacific
Rim nations (Australia, India, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and the large
industrialized countries (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) but there was only
mild evidence that the G-PPP held among the Pacific Rim nations as a group. They concluded that the
evidence of the possibility of forming a currency area among the Pacific Rim nations was rather weak if
any at the start of the 1990s.
These empirical studies aimed to solve the conflicting properties of the early OCA criteria and
quantitatively evaluated the suitability of monetary integration.
Another important study during this period that ignited the reflection of the OCA theory was
attributed to Frankel and Rose (1998). They proposed the endogeneity of the OCA criteria, i.e., trade
integration and the symmetry of business cycles were not independent and had an endogenous relationship.
Frankel and Rose argued that trade integration could have ambiguous effect on the cross-country
correlation of business cycles. They conjectured that business cycles might become more asymmetric if
closer trade ties led to inter-industry trade (specialization) but might become more correlated if
intra-industry trade dominated. Using a panel of thirty years of data from twenty industrial countries,
Frankel and Rose showed that greater trade integration was associated with higher level of correlation of
cross-country business cycles. The endogeneity of OCA criteria illuminated the research on monetary
integration.
The literature on fixed versus floating exchange rates also shed light on the desirability of monetary
integration in this period since monetary integration ultimately leads to the fixity of exchange rates between
member countries.
Transition to a fixed exchange rate regime would change the policy toolkit an individual country
could utilize. In studying the history of global capital markets, Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2004)
hypothesized the macroeconomic policy trilemma and argued that all national policy-makers could choose
at most two elements of the “inconsistent trinity” of three policy goals: (i) a fixed exchange rate; (ii) full
freedom of cross-border capital movements; (iii) an independent monetary policy oriented toward domestic
objectives. Shambaugh (2004) demonstrated that pegs followed base country interest rates more than
non-pegs, providing partial evidence on the restrictive effect of fixed exchange rate regimes upon monetary
policy.
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A number of studies have discussed the impact of different exchange rate regimes on the real
economy and provided additional evidence on the desirability of fixed exchange rates and monetary
integration. Based on a sample of 74 countries during the post-Bretton Woods period, Broda (2001) showed
partial evidence supporting the advantage of floats over fixes in the developing countries in coping with
terms of trade adjustment and smoothing the real economy in the short run. Researchers have also
investigated economic growth under different exchange rate regimes. Based on a dataset of 183 economies
over the period from 1974 to 2000, Levy-Yeyatiand and Sturzenegger (2003) found that less flexible
exchange rates were associated with greater output volatility and slower growth in the developing countries
but there was no such association in the industrial countries. In other words, empirical analysis provides
only mixed evidence about the superiority of floating versus fixed exchange rate regimes.
In addition, researchers have studied the country type that would benefit more from fixing exchange
rates to another country or simply substituting domestic currency with a foreign currency. Alesina and
Barro (2001) established a theoretical model and demonstrated that a small open economy with the
following properties was expected to have more gain than others: (i) a history of high inflation; (ii) heavily
trading with and having a business cycle highly synchronized with the potential anchor. The intellectual
exploration on the priority of floating versus fixed exchange rates illuminated the possible gain of an
individual economy from monetary integration.
The introduction of the euro in 1999 ushered in a short period during which debates on monetary
integration seemed to subside. However, the break of the recent euro area crisis from 2008 re-ignited the
reflection on the OCA theory and its application in practice.
2.3 Monetary Integration in Europe: From EMS to Euro Area
Increasing cooperation in real economic activities from the 1960s provided incentives for monetary
cooperation in Europe. Cooperation originated from the coal and steel market and spread to the agricultural
sector. The Common Agricultural Policy spurred an initial wave of intellectual discussion about monetary
integration in the region. In 1978, a group of nine countries initiated the European Monetary System
(EMS).21 It marked a milestone of the European monetary integration.
The EMS was comprised of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the European Currency Unit
(ECU). The ERM was the exchange rate coordination mechanism. It inherited from the preceding snake
21 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland and the United Kingdom.
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system, the common margins arrangement agreed by the European Economic Community (EEC)
countries.22 The ERM was initially intended as a symmetric system with fixed-but-adjustable bilateral
exchange rates where all members were shouldering the same responsibility in maintaining exchange rates
between the limits of the band.23 The central rate of each participant was fixed in terms of the regional
currency unit, i.e., the European Currency Unit. It was a floating basket of the currencies of the EEC
countries.
The EMS was meant to assure short-term exchange rate stability, or, in other words, to create a “zone
of monetary stability in Europe” by setting parity and bilateral exchange rate bands.24 The system also
aimed to achieve long-run flexibility by allowing for realignments.25 The EMS established a mechanism of
credit lines provision for the central banks of the individual countries in order to ensure the intervention
ability of participating countries in the foreign exchange market.26 The system had three layers of
financing: Very short-term, short-term, and medium-term financing assistance. The very short-term
monetary fund was financed out of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (ECMF). The participants of
the EMS initially contributed 20 percent of gold and dollar reserves to the ECMF and got in return or by
way of swap arrangement the equivalent credit in ECUs. The contribution proportion was reduced
significantly later due to limited recourse to credit lines.27 Eichengreen (2006) concluded that the ECU
never acquired a significant role in the business of the European Community and the EMS in particular.28
The use of the ECU by the participating countries fell far short of expectation.
The EMS developed into a fixed exchange rate system with Germany being more important than
22 The United Kingdom, as a member of the EMS, did not join the ERM initially. However, the pound was included in the
ECU basket of currencies. A number of countries opted out the snake system when the dollar started floating in 1973. The
ERM retained the major features of the snake system in exchange rate mechanism and intervention.
23 In 1979, the EMS members could move +2.5% around the central rate and Italy had a wider band of +6%. (“EMS under
Way,” Economic and Political Weekly 14 (12/13, March 24-31, 1979), pp. 604-605) During the 1992-93 ERM crisis, the
United Kingdom and Italy left the EMS in 1992 and the exchange-rate bands for the rest were widened to +15% in 1993.
24 “Four Years of EMS,” Economic and Political Weekly 18(34, August 20, 1983), pp. 1468-1469.
25 Different exchange-rate bands existed in the EMS. Realignment required multilateral agreement. In addition, apart from
the exchange-rate bands, the EMS “indicator of divergence” was also supposed to arrest exchange rates. “(Indicator of
divergence essentially measures the deviation of a weighted average of a country's EMS-currency exchange rates against a
weighted average of its bilateral central rates. When the divergence indicator reaches 75% of its maximum value, a country
is (in principle) obligated to undertake corrective changes in fiscal and monetary policy. In practice, a country often hits a
bilateral limit before the divergence indicator becomes operative.” (Froot and Rogoff, 1992, p.308, footnote 46)
26 Deravi and Metghalchi (1988) believed that the credit lines comprised the first step of creating the European Monetary
Fund that should evolve to a super-national monetary authority with the power to create new international reserves.
27 “Four Years of EMS,” Economic and Political Weekly 18 (34, Aug. 20, 1983), pp. 1468-1469.
28 “In the 1990s, only about 1 percent of trade within the Community was invoiced in ECUs. At their height,
ECU-denominated claims still amounted to less than 10 percent of the nondollar foreign currency claims of banks
reporting to the Bank for International Settlements. ECU bonds never accounted for much more than 20 percent of all
nondollar Eurobonds. Medium-term ECU notes accounted for barely 15 percent of the non-U.S. dollar market in such
notes, and ECU commercial paper for only about 10 percent of all euro commercial paper. As the European Community
grew more integrated, it was at least conceivable that Europe’s residents would have conducted more of their transactions
in ECUs. (However, this was not the case.)” (Eichengreen, 2006, p.433)
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others. The development reversed the symmetry principle initially envisioned when the system was
established. This phenomenon was sometimes referred as the “German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH)”.29
Herz (1992) showed that monetary policy in the other EMS member countries except Germany had a
negligible influence on their respective inflation rates since prices were exposed to both domestic and
foreign real shocks. Baum and Barkoulas (2006) validated the central role of the Germany in the region by
examining intra-EMS interest rates linkages. In fact, the extraordinary influence of the Germany upon the
area was extended to the EMU era. Debrun (2001) built a model and argued that the European Central
Bank (ECB) closely resembled the Bundesbank. It should be noted that the possible asymmetry of
influence associated with monetary integration is also an important factor for politicians to consider
monetary integration in East Asia.
The EMS was consistently under the pressure of market speculation since its establishment. Member
countries utilized their foreign exchange reserves from time to time to guard against the parity.30 Capital
controls relieved speculative pressure upon the EMS in its early years when there were frequent
realignments.31 There were ten times of exchange-rate realignments in the EMS from 1980 to 1987. In the
July of 1987, the twelve EMS members approved the Single European Act in order to create a single
common market before 1992 where all barriers to cross-border movement of goods, labor, and capital
would be abolished. From then on, the role of capital controls was increasingly replaced by the EMS
credibility in maintaining the target zone exchange arrangement. However, crises happened in 1992–1993.
Remaining member countries in the ERM target zone were allowed to move + 15% around the central rates
as a result. This period of the ERM was also known as the soft ERM compared to the hard ERM before the
crisis.
A string of research studied exchange rates and interest rates behavior in the EMS. For instance,
Engel and Hakkio (1995) described the exchange rate behavior using mathematical distribution. Dahlquist
and Gray (2000) examined interest rate behavior using a regime-switching model and found that the
volatility, the level, and speed-of-adjustment were all higher during speculative attacks. Another line of
research focused on the effect of the EMS upon regional economy. For example, Hallett and Anthony (1997)
asserted that the EMS regime had brought nominal stability to the area at the expense of greater real
instability by comparing the EMS currencies with non-EMS ones.
29 Hagen and Fratianni (1990), p.358.
30 For example, France had large foreign exchange losses before the devaluations of 1982 and 1983, and ever larger losses in
1992 and 1993.
31 There were opposite views about whether capital controls in the EMS could undermine central bank credibility. See Lane
and Rojas-Suarez (1992).
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In 1999, the euro was introduced and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was completed. The
European Central Bank (ECB) becomes the sole central bank in the region in charge of monetary policy.32
The primitive objective of the ECB was to maintain price stability in the region during the first decade after
the formation of the euro area. The launch of the euro is a milestone in the monetary history of the 20th
century.
2.4 Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Integration in East Asia
2.4.1 Exchange Rate Regimes in East Asia
Most East Asian economies de facto pegged to the US dollar before the regional financial crisis (e.g.,
McKinnon, 2005). Individual economies benefited in several ways from pegging to the US dollar. First,
pegging to a hard currency disciplined the fiscal expansion and helped control inflation. This benefit should
not be underestimated if one considers the fact that many East Asian economies had a history of inflation
turmoil from the 1800s through 1900s (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Second, pegging to the dollar limited
the volatility of the price, reduced exchange rate risks, and lowered transaction cost in the 1990s because
the US dollar was the most important currency in energy and commodity pricing in international market
and was backed by the world’s largest financial market at that time.
The break of the 1997–1998 crisis, together with the launch of the euro in 1999, gave rise to a
proliferation of research on exchange rate coordination in East Asia. As early as 1996, Williamson argued
that it was to the interest of East Asian economies to peg to a common basket of currencies to maintain
intra-regional exchange rate stability. Shortly after the crisis, the East Asian Vision Group (2001) suggested
that a multiple currency basket would be more appropriate than a single currency dominant basket.33
Besides, a large number of studies argued that East Asia should establish a regional exchange rate
framework based on a common currency unit (e.g., Mori et al., 2002; Oh and Harvie, 2001).
It has been almost two decades since the break of the regional financial crisis. There is no explicit
form of exchange rate coordination to date in the region despite the various proposals in the literature.
Kawai (2008) believed that there must be some convergence of exchange rate regimes in East Asia to
achieve intra-regional exchange rate stability. He argued that East Asia should secure a credible regional
32 The Growth and Stability Pact was formulated at Dublin Summit in 1996 to ensure the independency of the ECB.
33 The East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) was set up in October 1999 by the ASEAN+3 Summit and was composed of experts
and scholars charged with the task of providing vision for mid-to-long term cooperation in East Asia. For more information,
please visit http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/item/asean-plus-three-cooperation.
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monetary anchor through a combination of some form of national inflation targeting and a currency basket
system given the limited degree of the Japanese yen’s internationalization and the lack of the Chinese
renminbi’s full convertibility.
A number of studies have explored the evolution of exchange rate regimes. The period shortly after
the crisis is characterized by the volatility in the foreign exchange market and an attempt toward a more
flexible exchange rate system in a number of economies. It was not rare during this time that governments
struggled to balance financial stability and an effective monetary policy after abandoning fixed exchange
rate regimes. Rahmatsyah, Rajaguru and Siregar (2002) documented that Thailand re-adopted its pre-crisis
rigid exchange rate policy in early 1999 before it finally changed to a more flexible exchange rate
framework. Goh and McNown (2015) described the process in which Malaysia made a series of attempts
before 2004 in improving the effectiveness of its strategy of interest rate targeting after the collapse of its
de jure managed floating regime in the 1997–1998 crisis.
Fukuda and Ohno (2003) observed intra-daily exchange rates of the crisis-hit five East Asian
economies including Singapore, Thailand, Korea, Taiwan (China) and Malaysia from January 7, 1997 to
September 5, 2002. They found that these East Asian currencies kept strong correlations with the US dollar
when East Asian markets were closed. Fukuda and Ohno also found several structural breaks when East
Asian markets were open: (i) when Malaysia adopted fixed exchange rate regime on September 1, 1998; (ii)
when Indonesia and Thailand introduced inflation targeting in the early 2000s, thus suggesting
cross-country monetary and real linkage. Their findings showed that the five East Asian economies began
reverting to the pegs vis-à-vis the US dollar after early 2000. McKinnon (2005) also found that many East
Asian economies moved back to the de facto dollar pegging arrangement shortly after the regional financial
crisis.
The exchange rate regime of China weathered the 1997–1998 financial crisis. Huang and Wang
(2004) briefly reviewed the evolution of China’s exchange rate regime from the 1980s until the early 2000s.
They asserted that the regime of a de facto peg to the US dollar started from 1994 served China’s economy
well in the past. There was no sign of any move toward more flexibility in China shortly after the regional
financial crisis.
Later studies found that East Asian economies began to move away from the dollar pegging
exchange rate regimes. For instance, Ogawa and Yang (2008) suggested that the degree of dollar pegging
decreased in a number of economies using data from 1990 to 2004. These studies investigated the evolution
of exchange rate regimes in East Asia before 2004.
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2.4.2 Benefits and Costs of Monetary Integration in East Asia
Numerous studies on monetary integration in East Asia have provided additional evidence on the general
benefits and costs of forming a currency area.
Quite a few studies have investigated the relationship between exchange rate volatility and
international trade in the region. Thorbecke (2008) presented evidence supporting that exchange rate
volatility decreased the flow of electronic components within East Asia. Hayakawa and Kimura (2009)
demonstrated that intra-East Asian trade was more seriously discouraged by exchange rate volatility than
trade in other regions partly due to the large fraction of intermediate goods trade in production networks.
Based on a gravity model, they also revealed that the discouragement of exchange rate volatility on trade in
East Asia was greater than that of tariffs but smaller than that of distance related costs. These studies
pointed out the importance of exchange rates stability in enhancing trade flows in the long term. Yet in the
short run, the effect of exchange rate volatility on international trade might subject to the depth of the
financial markets and the maturity of exporters (e.g., Nishimura and Hirayama, 2013). Baak (2008) showed
that the degree of the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports from different countries (China and US)
varied using quarterly data from 1995 to 2006.
A string of studies have discussed additional benefits of monetary integration taken into
consideration the characteristics of emerging-market economies in East Asia. Ogawa and Kawasaki (2011)
argued that the introduction of a common currency could facilitate competition among companies because
prices and wages tend to converge among the target economies. They further suggested that the elimination
of exchange rate uncertainty and the facilitation of competition brought by the common currency might
stimulate the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and securities investment, thus promoting the
formation of an integrated financial market.
Monetary integration may also have the benefit of reducing financial vulnerabilities in East Asian
emerging markets. Shortly after the break of the 1997–1998 financial crisis, Eichengreen and Hausmann
(1999) proposed the original sin hypothesis. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the hypothesis stated that many
East Asian economies were subject to “original sin” which led to currency mismatch and financial
vulnerability in the 1990s. Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003, 2007) suggested that the “original
sin” issue was not rare in emerging and developing economies around the world. According to their
research, the European monetary integration successfully reduced “original sin” to an extremely low level,
which saved large economic costs to small emerging markets in the region.
Of course, there are different views toward the causes of the regional financial crisis. For instance,
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Ogawa and Kawasaki (2011) attributed the currency mismatch problem to the de facto dollar-peg system in
the 1990s. They argued that the dollar-peg exchange rate regimes made borrowers and lenders underrate
exchange rate risks. On the other hand, Ito (2002) believed that both the limited use of local currencies in
international lending and the implicit guarantee on exchange rate stability were important sources of the
financial vulnerability in the region on the dawn of the regional crisis.34 Later work on monetary
integration in the region such as Park and Wyplosz (2010) mentioned the “original sin” and the risk of
currency mismatch in emerging markets. It seemed that “original sin” might affect the potential benefit of
monetary integration in East Asia.
What’s more, the existing literature fails to incorporate the recent intellectual efforts on the financial
vulnerability in emerging markets into the discussion of monetary integration in East Asia. For instance,
Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) disagreed with the original sin hypothesis in studying debt,
currency mismatch and financial vulnerability in emerging markets. It remains a question whether it is
appropriate to take it as one of the benefits of monetary integration in East Asia.
As to the cost of monetary integration in East Asia, apart from the general costs discussed in Section
2.2, researchers including Ogawa and Kawasaki (2011) worried that introducing a single currency equaled
to adopt a one-size-fits-all monetary policy in the region and national central banks could no longer assume
the responsibility as a lender of last resort during crises. They argued that this constraint might result in
additional, probably large, initial costs because member states might sometimes need fiscal transfers from
others when facing an asymmetric economic disturbance.
2.4.3 The Suitability of Monetary Integration in East Asia
A large literature has analyzed the suitability of monetary integration in East Asia. Researchers have
considered the OCA criteria in the region. Many studies have used a series of proxies for the OCA criteria
to gauge the suitability of monetary integration in East Asia, including the degree of trade openness and
interdependence, capital and labor mobility, correlation of output shocks, similarities of export structure,
and inflation rates.
A number of researchers have tried to integrate these criteria and calculate an OCA index. For
example, Cai, Song and Xiong (2010) calculated the OCA index developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen
34 “Borrowers think that dollar denominated loans is cheaper with lower interest rate than the local currency loans, while
lenders think that borrowers, often with high growth performance, are safe and free from default risk. It is only after
devaluation that borrowers realize that devaluation makes their debts unsustainable, and that lenders realize that borrowers
default in the midst of currency crisis. This is what happened in Asia from mid-1990s to the crisis in 1997-98.” (Ito, 2002,
p.106)
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(1997). Han and Lee (2010) attempted to develop a different OCA index by selecting twelve proxies for the
OCA criteria and averaging each economy’s grades with equal weight. Their result suggested that three
group of economies could begin forming a monetary union: (i) Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR;
(ii) Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan (China); (iii) Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR,
Taiwan (China), Thailand and Brunei. However, it remains an open question whether it is appropriate to
use the simple average of these rough estimates of different OCA criteria to summarize the feasibility of
monetary integration among a group of economies.
Dozens of studies have shed light on the degree of factor mobility (capital and labor mobility) in East
Asia. Kim, Kim, and Wang (2006) revealed that capital markets played a minimal role and credit markets
played a positive but limited role in consumption risk sharing and in smoothing idiosyncratic output shocks
among economies in the region. Yu, Fung, and Tam (2010) studied financial integration in East Asia using
evidence from equity markets. Their results revealed that, after a slowdown between 2002 and 2006, the
equity market integration picked up again in 2007 and 2008 but the degree of integration between mature
and emerging equity markets was different. Park and Lee (2011) examined equity markets and local
currency bond markets in the region using data from 1990 to 2009. They suggested that equity markets
became integrated during this period but local currency bond markets were largely segmented. Some
studies have examined the degree of labor mobility in East Asia. Artuc, Lederman, and Porto (2015)
explored labor mobility cost in the developing world and found that migration costs were negatively
correlated with various measures of the level of development. Their results showed the migration costs of
Singapore, China, Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines (from low to high). Moon and Rhee (2012)
believed that the degree of labor mobility increased in East Asia using tourist data from the World Tourism
Organization. Consensus is generally reached that factor mobility in East Asia was not as high as that in the
euro area.
The impact of trade integration upon the correlation of business cycles in East Asia has also received
considerable attention. Most studies were inspired by the proposition of Frankel and Rose (1998) that
intra-industry trade was likely to increase the correlation of business cycles between countries. Yoon and
Yeo (2007) found that export structures in China, Korea and Japan became more similar by looking at the
trade specialization indices, the export similarity indices and the share change in the US market from 2000
to 2005. Moon and Rhee (2012) compared intra-industry trade in East Asia and in the European Union
using SITC 3-digit level data in 1990, 2000 and 2009. Their findings revealed that: (i) the share of
intra-industry trade in East Asia grew quickly from 1990 to 2000; (ii) the share of intra-industry trade in
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individual economies changed in different directions from 2000 to 2009.
Even though quite a few recent studies have calculated intra-industry trade intensity in East Asia,
empirical research on the impact of trade integration on the correlation of business cycles is relatively rare.
Besides, the emergence of the international production networks in East Asia is noticeable from the last
quarter of the 20th century. Trade integration in the region has exhibited new properties. However, the
impact of vertical intra-industry trade on the correlation of business cycles in the region has received little
research interest.
A growing number of studies have analyzed the rising role of vertical intra-industry trade in the
region. Fukao, Ishido, and Ito (2003) showed that the share of vertical intra-industry trade in total
intra-regional trade experienced an explosive increase from 1996 to 2000, the rate of which far exceeds that
of the European Union during the same period. They also mentioned that the share of inter-industry trade in
overall trade was declining in East Asia although inter-industry trade still accounted for the majority. Urata
(2008) found that East Asia’s exports had a higher share of parts in its intra-regional trade compared with
its trade with the United States and the European Union using data over 1990–2004. He suggested that this
revealed the fact that East Asia became a factory for the world and China became an increasingly important
country for the location of importing parts from other East Asian economies, assembling finished products
and exporting to the outside world. Other works including Ando (2006) and Kimura, Takahashi, and
Hayakawa (2007) also revealed that the emergence of vertical international production sharing contributed
to the rapid increase of vertical intra-industry trade in the region. These studies pointed out the changing
trade pattern in East Asia. However, empirical work on the impact of such trade pattern on the correlation
of business cycles in the region is relatively rare.
Other studies have empirically investigated the suitability of monetary integration in East Asia. An
increasing amount of research has focused on the correlation of business cycles (or asymmetry of shocks)
in the region. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the correlation of business cycles was viewed by empirical
researchers as the most important condition for the evaluation of monetary integration among a group of
economies.
Several studies followed the structural VAR model of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). For instance,
Lee and Koh (2012) assessed the desirability of forming a monetary union in East Asia by decomposing
economic disturbances into demand and supply shocks. They compared the correlation data of East Asian
economies from 1970 to 2008 to that of Europe from 1960 to 1998 and concluded that the underlying
structural shocks was less symmetric but the speed of adjustment was much faster in East Asia. They also
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found an increased symmetry of shocks in the region after the 1997–1998 financial crisis.
A small number of studies have tested the correlation of business cycles in East Asia using totally
different approaches. For instance, Lee and Azali (2012) assessed the asymmetry of shocks by considering
a model of an economy in which output was influenced by global, regional and country-specific shocks.
They found a rising role of regional factor using a Bayesian State-Space Based approach. Aggarwal and
Muckley (2010) examined the behavior of exchange rate sets with reference to several time-series criteria
including stability, correlations, persistence of correlations, volatility transmission and long run relations,
using a set of member currencies of the European monetary union as a benchmark. They argued that a
basket peg regime was in interest to the region compared to the choice of reverting to a dollar-peg regime.
In addition, recent studies have emphasized the role of political coherence in monetary integration.
De Grauwe (2012) warned that although East Asian economies satisfied the traditional criteria of trade
integration and symmetry of shocks, the region lacked political union that was proved to be essential by the
eurozone crisis. He concluded that political coherence was a condition before any serious movements
toward monetary integration in East Asia.
. In the mean time, the existing literature is insufficient in addressing a number of issues.
2.5 Future Research on Monetary Integration in East Asia
Although previous research has provided ample evidence on the changing economic dynamics and their
implications for the feasibility of monetary integration in East Asia, research can be furthered at least in the
following three aspects.
(1) Exchange rate regimes in East Asia after the regional financial crisis
Although quite a few studies have examined exchange rates shortly after the 1997–1998 financial
crisis, little attention is paid to the latest developments after 2004. Many East Asian economies announced
reforms to allow more fluctuation of exchange rates after the crisis. These reforms may change the actual
exchange rate behavior in the region.
Several factors made research on exchange rates in East Asia more imperative. On one hand, it is
known that the spectrum of exchange rate regimes in emerging and developing economies is much wider
than industrial countries in the second half of the 20th century. Researchers have identified that the
inconsistency between the de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes was not rare, i.e., what governments
alleged were different from what data actually revealed (e.g., Calvo and Reihart, 2002). On the other hand,
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the recent global financial crisis changed the broad international economic environment from 2008 which
might inflict pressure on exchange rates in East Asia. It is propelling for us to first study the exchange rate
regimes now in East Asia before evaluating how far the region is from being economically suitable for
exchange rate coordination and monetary integration.
(2) “Original sin” and the benefit of monetary integration in East Asia
It is still unclear about the exact meaning of “original sin” and whether it is appropriate to take the
reduction of the “original sin” through monetary integration as one of the benefits. Economic and financial
development is tremendous in the region after the 1997–1998 financial crisis. In particular, local currency
bond markets developed quickly. These developments may affect “original sin” in East Asia. Furthermore,
recent research on debt, currency mismatch and financial vulnerability in emerging markets calls for a
re-examination of the original sin hypothesis. It remains a question whether “original sin” is directly
associated with currency mismatch and financial vulnerability in East Asian emerging markets.
(3) Vertical intra-industry trade & correlation of business cycles in East Asia
Although a large body of research considers the correlation of business cycles in the region, most relied on
the conclusions from preceding monetary integration theories that heavily used data from industrial
countries in the last century and European countries in particular. As mentioned, empirical research has
taken central stage in the intellectual exploration in this field from the 1980s. Previous conclusions from
the empirical studies using data in the 20th century may be insufficient to incorporate the new
characteristics of the economic development of East Asia. It would be interesting to examine the impact of
vertical intra-industry trade on the correlation of business cycles in East Asia.
Economic and financial development accelerates in East Asia in the 21st century. So should our
thinking on the issues centering on exchange rates and monetary integration in the region. One way is to
undertake empirical analysis using recent data in East Asia. Efforts in this direction might provide new
evidence to or raise questions about past ideas.
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3 The DE FACTO EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN EAST ASIA
3.1 Introduction to Chapter 3
Most East Asian economies implemented de facto dollar pegs before the 1997–1998 financial crisis. After
the crisis, governments in the region made a series of announcements on exchange rate reforms. These
reforms may bring changes to actual exchange rate behavior in the region. This essay aims to quantitatively
explore the evolution of de facto exchange rate regimes in the region from 2003 to 2014.
Researchers have identified that de facto exchange rate regimes, or the regimes that countries
followed in practice, were often different from what governments had alleged (de jure exchange rate
regimes). In their famous paper of 2002, Calvo and Reinhart illustrated that the flexibility of exchange rates
was limited in quite a few developing economies with de jure floating regimes, proposing the renowned
‘fear of floating’ phenomenon. Similarly, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) showed that the de facto
exchange rate regimes in many countries, especially in the developing world, were different from what they
had officially announced. Other studies such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) revealed that a number of
alleged pegged exchange rate regimes showed considerable flexibility. The widely observed inconsistency
between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes in empirical research comprises the motivation of this
writing.
As mentioned, most East Asian economies de facto pegged to the US dollar before the regional
financial crisis (e.g., McKinnon, 2005). Pegging to the US dollar has certain advantages back in the 1990s.
First, pegging to a hard currency disciplined fiscal expansion and controlled inflation. This benefit should
not be underestimated since many East Asian economies had a history of inflation turmoil from the 1800s
through 1900s (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Second, the US dollar was the most important currency in
energy and commodity pricing in international market and was backed by the world’s largest financial
market. Thus pegging to the dollar limited the volatility of price. Moreover, dollar pegs reduced exchange
rate risks and lowered transaction cost in East Asia during good times.
On the other hand, the dollar-peg exchange rates played a role in the fermentation of the East Asian
financial crisis at the turn of the millennium. Theoretical research has discussed the possibilities of
self-fulfilling balance-of-payments crises under fixed exchange rate regimes (e.g., Krugman, 1979). Other
studies revealed that the rigid exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar, along with other factors, provided
incentives for the financial vulnerability in the 1990s (e.g., Radelet and Sachs, 2000; Dooly,
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Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2004). Recent evidence provided support for this moral hazard view about
exchange rates. For example, Patnaik and Shah (2010) showed that low currency flexibility as a form of
implicit government guarantees encouraged firms to hold unhedged exposure using data from India.
Furthermore, pegging to the US dollar under the condition of multiple trading partners increased the
region’s vulnerability to outside shocks. Ito (2002) mentioned that third currency fluctuations, for example
the euro or the Japanese yen, under the conditions of dollar-peg system and diverse trading partners in the
1990s had profound effects on export competitiveness among East Asian economies vis-à-vis their trade
partners.
The 1997–1998 financial crisis marks East Asia’s transition to a diverse exchange rate system. The
findings in this essay show that both domestic factors and international environment affected exchange rate
behavior of East Asian currencies. During the temporary period of the recent global financial crisis,
economies on the road toward more flexible exchange rates narrowed down their currencies’ fluctuation
vis-à-vis the US dollar.
By using a seemingly unrelated regression model, this essay also showed that average correlation
among exchange rates of East Asian currencies has been increasing after controlling for the effect of the US
dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen, despite changes in the world economy over the last decade. The
results imply important unobserved common factor that influenced the daily movements of exchange rates
of East Asian currencies, which might serve as another indicator of increased economic linkages in the
region.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature. Section
3.3 briefly introduces exchange rate policies in individual East Asian economies after the 1997–1998
financial crisis. Section 3.4 is methodology and data. Section 3.5 analyzes the empirical results. Section 3.6
is a short discussion. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review to Chapter 3
Ever since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the discussion of floating versus fixed exchange
rate regimes remains at the center of international economics. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) called this
unsettled problem as “the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle” in international macroeconomics (p. 373).
In the seminal work of Friedman (1953), the daylight savings argument stated that exchange rate, as
the relative price between country price levels, could settle the problem of different shocks to individual
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countries.35 Friedman argued that flexible exchange rates could smooth adjustment to a negative real shock
by increasing domestic price of exported goods and reducing real wages even when nominal rigidity was
present.
On the other hand, it is undeniable that fixed exchange rates have a number of advantages. Fixed
exchange rates reduce bilateral exchange rate volatility. Consensus is generally reached that exchange rate
stability increases bilateral trade flows in the long-term (e.g., Klein and Shambaugh, 2006; Gil-Pareja,
Llorca-Vivero, and Martínez-Serrano, 2008; Hayakawa and Kimura, 2009). The second major advantage is
that pegging exchange rate to a large economy with sound monetary policy provides discipline in an
inflation-prone economy (e.g., Alesina and Barro, 2001). Small economies with a bad inflation
performance history can benefit from the price stability in the anchoring country in the long run and can
borrow at a cheaper price from the international market.36
Fixed exchange rate regimes involve cost. One of the disadvantages is the loss of seigniorage or
inflation tax. Besides, fixed exchange rates undermine the independence of domestic monetary policy due
to macroeconomic policy trilemma.37 Shambaugh (2004) showed that pegs followed base country interest
rates more than non-pegs, suggesting that the freedom of monetary policy was more restricted under fixed
exchange rate regimes. In addition, research on balance-of-payments crises represented by Krugman (1979)
has suggested the risk of currency crises in economies with fixed exchange rate regimes under certain
assumptions.
In short, there are pros and cons for each exchange rate regime and consensus is lacking among
theoretical researchers on the priority of floating regimes versus fixed regimes. The unsettled dispute gave
momentum to a proliferation of empirical research on exchange rate regimes.
Researchers have identified that de facto exchange rate regimes were often different from de jure
exchange rate regimes. Efforts have been made to reclassify exchange rate regimes around the world on
account of the difference. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) studied exchange rate regimes in 39 economies from
1970 to 1999 by analyzing the behavior of exchange rates, reserves, and interest rates. Levy-Yeyati and
35 “The argument for flexible exchange rates is, strange to say, very nearly identical with the argument for daylight savings
time. …it is much simpler to change the clock that guide all than to have each individual separately change his pattern of
reaction to the clock. … This situation is exactly the same in the exchange market. It is far simpler to allow one price to
change, namely the price of foreign exchange, than to rely upon changes in the multitude of prices that together constitute
the internal price structure.” (Friedman, 1953, p. 173)
36 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) showed that inflation performance history is strongly associated with borrowing capacity from
the international market.
37 In studying the history of global capital markets, Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2004) argued that all national
policy-makers could choose at most two elements of the “inconsistent trinity” of three policy goals: (i) a fixed exchange
rate; (ii) full freedom of cross-border capital movements; (iii) an independent monetary policy oriented toward domestic
objectives.
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Sturzenegger (2003) classified currency regimes (pegged, intermediate, and floating) in 183 economies
from 1974 to 2000 based on the fluctuation of exchange rates and changes in reserves. An important string
of studies have considered the degree of reserves change in response to exchange market pressure (e.g.,
Girton and Roper, 1977; Weymark, 1995; Willett, Kim, and Bunyasiri, 2012). However, it remains an
unsolved problem that reserves can be influenced by a variety of factors apart from exchange market
pressure and it is hard to find a better proxy for official intervention.
Most of the existing literature on de facto exchange rate regimes in East Asia followed the
methodology developed by Frankel and Wei (1993) (e.g., Ogawa and Yang, 2008; McKinnon, 2005). This
method treats actual exchange rates as an equilibrium of shocks and intervention which ultimately reveals
the underlying policy target. Taken into account of the fact that the US dollar used to be the anchoring
currency and remains an important invoice currency38 in the region, this method has the advantage of
being able to check whether individual economies tried to stabilize their currency vis-à-vis the US dollar,
the euro, the Japanese yen, or a basket of these currencies. In addition, there are other studies that relied on
actual exchange rates to investigate exchange rate regimes. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
categorized exchange rate regimes based on parallel exchange rate volatility over a rolling window.
Quite a few studies have examined the impact of exchange rate regimes on the real economy based
on the reclassifications of exchange rate regimes. Broda (2001) showed partial evidence supporting the
advantage of floats over fixes in coping with terms of trade adjustment and smoothing the real economy in
the short run in the developing countries during the post-Bretton Woods period based on a sample of 74
economies. As a second example, Levy-Yeyatiand and Sturzenegger (2003) investigated the association
between exchange rate regimes and economic growth and suggested that less flexible exchange rate
regimes were associated with greater output volatility and slower growth in developing countries (but there
was no such evidence in industrial countries). In other words, empirical analysis provided only mixed
evidence about the superiority of floating regimes versus fixed regimes. Overall, previous research at the
theoretical level and at the empirical level fails to give a satisfactory answer to the desirability of floating
versus fixed exchange rate regimes in East Asia.
An alternative line of research that is closely related to East Asia has considered regional exchange
arrangement. The break of the 1997–1998 financial crisis, together with the launch of the euro in Europe in
1999, gave rise to a large literature on exchange rate coordination in East Asia. In 2001, the East Asian
38 For example, Goldberg and Tille (2008) and Fukuda and Ono (2005) have shown the role of the US dollar as an invoice
currency in a number of East Asian economies.
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Vision Group39 suggested that a multiple currency basket would be more appropriate than a single
currency dominant basket. Besides, a large number of studies have argued that East Asia should establish a
regional exchange rate framework based on a common currency unit (e.g., Oh and Harvie, 2001; Watanabe
and Ogura, 2010).
It has been more than a decade and half since the break of the regional financial crisis. There is no
explicit form of exchange rate coordination in the region to date despite the various proposals in the
literature (e.g., Ogawa, 2004). Kawai (2008) believed that there must be some convergence of exchange
rate regimes in the region to achieve intra-regional exchange rate stability. He argued that East Asian
economies should secure a credible regional monetary anchor through a combination of some form of
national inflation targeting and a currency basket system given the limited degree of Japanese yen’s
internationalization and the lack of the Chinese renminbi’s full convertibility.
A number of studies have explored the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the region after the
crisis. Fukuda and Ohno (2003) observed intra-daily exchange rates of five East Asian economies including
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand from January 1997 to September 2002. They
found that there were several structural breaks in the correlations during this period (when Malaysia
adopted fixed exchange rate regime in September 1998 and when Indonesia and Thailand introduced
inflation targeting in the early 2000s), thus suggesting strong cross-country monetary and real linkage.
Their findings showed that the five East Asian countries began reverting to the pegs vis-à-vis the US dollar
after 2000. McKinnon (2005) also found that many East Asian economies moved back to the dollar
pegging arrangement shortly after the regional financial crisis and further argued that the high frequency
dollar pegging behavior was fundamentally in interest to the region.
Nevertheless, later studies suggested that East Asian economies began to move away from the dollar
pegging exchange rate regimes. For instance, Ogawa and Yang (2008) suggested that the degree of dollar
pegging decreased in the region after the crisis using data over 1990–2004. These studies illustrated the
evolution of exchange rate regimes in East Asia before 2004. However, research on the evolution of
exchange rate regimes from then on is relatively rare. Besides, little is known about the links between
economies revealed by exchange rates changes.
This essay focuses on the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the region in recent years. It takes
into account of the effect of potentially important international and regional currencies. Moreover, by using
a seemingly unrelated regression model, it shows linkages across economies. This research is intended to
39 Please see footnote 33.
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complement the existing literature on exchange rate regimes and economic linkages in the region.
The evolution of exchange rate regimes in East Asia is not only a reflection of the underlying
economic fundamentals but also an important endogenous factor that affects economic dynamics. Exchange
rates are important for a number of issues. Exchange rates affect trade flows (e.g., Baak, 2011). What’s
more, the evolution of exchange rate regimes in different economies strongly affects long-run relationships
of exchange rates, which have important implications for the possibility of monetary integration (e.g.,
Enders and Hurn, 1994; Kim and Jei, 2013). The discussion of exchange rate regimes remains at the center
of the international economic issues in East Asia.
3.3 Recent Developments in Exchange Rate Regimes in East Asia
There are a variety of exchange rate regimes around the world. Before looking into exchange rate regimes
in East Asia, let’s first take a brief look at the development of exchange rate regimes around the world. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) now reports annually exchange rate regimes based on the degree to
which the exchange rate is determined by the market rather than by official action. Tables 3.1 and 3.2
summarize exchange rate regimes in the world. Table 3.3 presents the IMF’s classification of exchange rate
regimes in East Asia and shows that there exists a difference between de facto and de jure exchange rate
regimes for a number of economies in the region.
Many economies in East Asia, particularly the most heavily afflicted economies during the
1997–1998 financial crisis, officially announced to enlarge exchange rate fluctuation vis-à-vis the US dollar
in subsequent years.
Korea changed to a floating exchange rate regime in 1997 and introduced an inflation targeting
framework in later years. The exchange rate of the Korean won was allowed to float freely on December 16,
1997. During the recent global financial crisis, the Korean won underwent sharp depreciation from 2009 to
2010 and the Korean economy was threatened. The Korean government carried out a number of restrictive
measures in capital market to prevent volatile cross-border capital flows.
Indonesia began to adopt a floating arrangement on August 14, 1997, following a series of failure in
defending exchange rates within the intervention band during the regional financial crisis. In the middle of
the recent global financial crisis, the rupiah remained stable vis-à-vis the US dollar (within a 2% band from
June 2010 to February 2011). In July 2005, Indonesia formally adopted an inflation targeting monetary
framework, which replaced the previous target of base money.
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Table 3.1 Exchange Rate Regimes around the World, the IMF Classification, 2008–2013
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hard pegs 12.2 12.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.1
No separate legal tender 5.3 5.3 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.8
Currency board 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.3 6.3 6.3
Soft pegs 39.9 34.6 39.7 43.2 39.5 42.9
Conventional peg 22.3 22.3 23.3 22.6 22.6 23.6
Stabilized arrangement 12.8 6.9 12.7 12.1 8.4 9.9
Crawling peg 2.7 2.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.0
Crawl-Like arrangement 1.1 0.5 1.1 6.3 6.3 7.9
Pegged exchange rate within
horizontal bands
1.1 2.1 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.5
Floating 39.9 42.0 36.0 34.7 34.7 34.0
Floating 20.2 24.5 20.1 18.9 18.4 18.3
Free floating 19.7 17.6 15.9 15.8 16.3 15.7
Residual
Other managed arrangement 8.0 11.2 11.1 8.9 12.6 9.9
Notes: Numbers denote percent of IMF members as of April 30 each year.
Source: The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2013), p. 7, table 2.
Table 3.2 Monetary Policy Frameworks and Exchange Rate Anchors, 2008–2013
US Dollar Euro Composite Other
currency
Monetary
aggregate
Inflation
targeting
Other
2008 33.0 14.4 8.0 3.7 11.7 22.9 6.4
2009 28.7 14.4 7.4 4.3 13.3 15.4 16.5
2010 26.5 14.8 7.9 3.7 13.2 16.4 17.5
2011 25.3 14.2 7.4 4.2 15.3 16.3 17.4
2012 22.6 14.2 6.8 4.2 15.3 16.8 20.0
2013 23.0 14.1 6.8 4.2 13.6 17.8 20.4
Notes: Numbers denote percent of IMF members as of April 30 each year.
Source: The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2013), p. 11, table 4.
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Table 3.3 De Facto and De Jure Exchange Arrangements in East Asia, the IMF Classification, 2013
De facto De jure
Brunei Currency board
(Anchor Singapore dollar)
Currency board
Cambodia Stabilized arrangement
(Anchor US dollar)
Managed float
China Crawl-like arrangement
(Monetary aggregate target)
Managed floating
To keep the exchange rate stable at an adaptive
and equilibrium level based on market supply and
demand with reference to a basket of currencies to
preserve stability of the economy and financial
markets
Hong Kong SAR Currency board
(Anchor US dollar)
Currency board
Indonesia Crawl-like arrangement
(Inflation targeting)
Free floating
Japan Free floating
(Inflation targeting)
Free floating
Korea Floating
(Inflation targeting)
Free floating
Lao Stabilized management
(Other)
Managed floating
Malaysia Other managed arrangement
(Other)
Managed float with reference to a currency basket
The composition of the basket is undisclosed
Myanmar Other managed arrangement
(Other)
Managed float
Philippine Floating
(Inflation targeting)
Floating
Singapore Crawl-like arrangement
(Anchor composite)
Floating
Thailand Floating
(Inflation targeting)
Floating
Vietnam Stabilized arrangement
(Anchor composite)
Managed floating
Managed floating exchange rate regime based on
a currency basket of countries with trade,
financing, and investment relationships with
Vietnam
Notes: De facto exchange arrangements as of April 2013. Monetary policy framework in parentheses.
Source: Compiled by the author based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (2012, 2013).
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Malaysia was also affected seriously by the 1997–1998 financial crisis. The country switched to a
dollar-peg arrangement on September 2, 1998. The regime maintained for several years (at 3.80 RM/USD)
and was replaced in 2005. On July 21 of that year, the Bank Negara Malaysia announced a managed float
for the ringgit with reference to a currency basket.
Thailand and the Philippines floated their currencies shortly after the financial meltdown in 1997.
The Thai baht was allowed to float on July 2, 1997. An inflation targeting monetary framework was
introduced in Thailand on April 5, 2000. The Philippine peso was allowed to float more freely on March 15,
1998. The Philippines adopted an inflation targeting monetary framework in January 2002.
Vietnam increased the dollar-dong trading band from January 1, 2007 to March 24, 2009 (from ±0.5%
to ±5% around the rate quoted by the State Bank of Vietnam). However, the trend of widening exchange
rate band for the dong was reverted from November 2009 through 2011 because the dong was under great
stress of depreciation.
The fluctuation of the Singapore dollar and the Brunei dollar were allowed to increase after the
regional financial crisis, too. The Singapore dollar fluctuates within a targeted policy band and is managed
against an undisclosed basket of currencies from 1998. Since Brunei maintains a regime of currency board
vis-à-vis the Singapore dollar, the movement of the Brunei dollar corresponds to that of the Singapore
dollar.
Myanmar announced a reform in exchange rate regime recently. Its (de jure) exchange rate regime
has changed to a managed float from a conventional peg to the special drawing rights, effective April 2,
2012.
China stayed relatively safe during the regional financial crisis but its exchange rate regime was
undergoing gradual change in the 2000s. The renminbi (RMB) was pegged to the US dollar (at 8.28
RMB/USD) from 1997 until July 21, 2005. On that day, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) announced a
reform indicating that the RMB would be determined with reference to a basket of currencies and the RMB
was revaluated to 8.11RMB/USD.
On September 15, 2008, the Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection following drastic loss,
marking the breakup of the global financial crisis. The world economy was enmeshed in economic
depression for several years and the economy of the European Union and the United States remained weak
until 2010. The RMB stopped appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar. On June 19, 2010, the PBC announced
that China began to seek a more flexible exchange rate regime in order to enhance the effectiveness of
monetary policy. As a result, the RMB again appreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar gradually. In 2012, the
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PBC renewed its commitment to promote price discovery and enhance the flexibility of the RMB by
allowing for increased fluctuations in both directions.40 In September 2013, China’s premier Li Keqiang
expressed the commitment to deepening financial reform including further loosening capital account and
making the RMB convertible. China approved the establishment of a pilot zone in Shanghai in July 2013 to
test a series of the government’s reforms, including interest rate liberalization and the convertibility of the
RMB. These moves could be a starting point for a nationwide financial overhaul.
Japan has one of the most sophisticated financial markets in East Asia and the Japanese yen used to
be widely discussed in academia as a candidate for major regional and international currency. Japan has
adopted a floating exchange rate regime for a long time. Recently, it has showed signs of noticeable change
in monetary policy. Government intervention in the foreign exchange market became common. Japan’s
Ministry of Finance (MOF) intervened in the foreign exchange market for the first time since 2004 on
September 15, 2010. In March 2011, the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami (the Great East Japan Earthquake)
hit. The MOF intervened in the foreign exchange market (¥692.5 billion) one week after the earthquake.
The MOF again intervened in the market by selling ¥4,512.9 billion on August 4 and by selling ¥9,091.6
billion from October 31 through November 4 at the same year.
The Japanese government aims to curb yen strength and revive the long stagnant economy; the
exchange rate of the Japanese yen was under great stress. At the start of 2013, the Liberal Democratic Party
led by Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe carried out a whole package of economic stimulus package
widely known as “Abenomics”. Japan declared a monetary regime change in January 2013. The Bank of
Japan (BOJ) set the 2% inflation target aiming at increasing the competitiveness and the growth potential of
the Japanese economy.41 The BOJ introduced the quantitative and qualitative monetary easing on April 4,
2013.42 The Japanese yen depreciated to about 115 JPY/USD in the last quarter of 2014 from its peak of
about 80 JPY/USD in 2012. Nevertheless, the de facto and de jure exchange rate regime for Japan
classified by the IMF remains a floating framework.
40 Effective April 16, 2012, the floating band of RMB’s trading prices against the US dollar in the interbank FX market has
been widened from 0.5% to 1%, i.e., on each business day, the trading prices of the RMB against the US dollar in the
interbank FX market may fluctuate within a band of ±1% around the central parity released on the same day by the China
Foreign Exchange Trade System.
41 Bank of Japan (BOJ), “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving
Sustainable Economic Growth,” 22 January 2013 (available at
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf, September 10, 2013)
42 To pursue quantitative monetary easing the main operating target for monetary market operations is changed from the
uncollaterized overnight call rate to the monetary base. The BOJ will increase the monetary base at an annual pace of
about 60-70 trillion yen for about two years. In addition, it will encourage a decline in interest rates through purchase of
Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) and in risk premia of asset prices through purchase of exchange-traded funds (ETFs)
and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITs). From BOJ,
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf. (September 10, 2013)
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East Asian economies varied significantly in the timing of exchange rate policies changes. This is
largely due to a lack of macroeconomic policy coordination and the fact that reforms in individual
economies depended heavily on domestic economic conditions and political needs.
These policy changes strongly affected the behavior of exchange rates. Figure 3.1 presents daily
exchange rates of eight East Asian economies vis-à-vis the US dollar. It is clear that the volatility of daily
exchange rates varied by economy and over time. What’s more, most East Asian currencies were pressured
to appreciate against the US dollar from 2009 to 2012 due to large monetary quantitative easing in the
United States.
Figure 3.1 Daily Exchange Rates vis-à-vis the US Dollar (Currency Units per US Dollar)
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Figure 3.1 Continued
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Federal Reserve.
3.4 Methodology and Data
This analysis estimates exchange rate regimes in East Asia based on equation (1). The equation was firstly
used by Frankel and Wei (1993) to check whether a country/region tried to stabilize their currency against a
major currency or a basket of currencies. Researchers have frequently used this equation to approximate
exchange rate regimes in East Asia (e.g., Ogawa and Yang, 2008; McKinnon, 2005). Let ܥ௜,௧ denotes
exchange rate of an East Asian currency i at time t, then the equation can be expressed as:
∆ log൫ܥ௜,௧൯=ߙ௜+ߚଵ,௜∆log(ܷ ܵܦ௧) + ߚଶ,௜∆log(ܧܷܴ௧) + ߚଷ,௜∆log(ܲܬ ௧ܻ) + ߝ௜,௧ (1)
This analysis takes into account of the possible correlation between East Asian currencies by using a
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model. The SUR concept was firstly proposed by Zellner (Zellner,
1962; Zeller and Huang, 1962). The SUR specifies the t th of T equations for the i th of N units to be given
by yit =βi Xit + uit, where t = 1, ..., T and i = 1, ..., N; β is the parameter vector; and Xit denotes regressors
that are assumed to be exogenous. The equations in the system are related if the error terms are
contemporaneously correlated, i.e., E(uitujs) = σij, t = s, and otherwise zero. The SUR estimator may be
considered a multiple time-series estimator for it is based on the large-sample properties of “large T, small
N” dataset in which T → ∞. The SUR model estimates the system of equations jointly.43 It is expected that
East Asian exchange rates might correlate with each other.
Furthermore, to show the evolution of exchange rate regimes in East Asia, this section first uses
43 Since the independent variables in each equation are the same, the SUR estimation does not affect efficiency.
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rolling-window estimation and chow tests to explore structural breaks in the formation of exchange rates.
The rolling-window estimation repeatedly excutes the ordinary least squares regression within consecutive
subsets of the sample data. It is used for the possibility of changed parameters over different windows. The
rolling-window estimation only provides a basic reference. Thus chow tests are implemented in order to
determine a precise structural change. The chow test is named after Gregory Chow. The test can be
illustrated by the following equation:
∆ log൫ܥ௜,௧൯= ߙ୧+ ෍ ߛ௜,ఛ ௜݀,ఛ௣
தୀ଴
+ ൬βଵ,୧+ ෍ ߜଵ,௜,ఛ ௜݀,ఛ௣
தୀ଴
൰∆log(ܷ ܵܦ௧)
+ ൬βଶ,୧+ ෍ ߜଶ,௜,ఛ ௜݀,ఛ௣
தୀ଴
൰∆log(ܧܷܴ௧) + ൬βଷ,୧+ ෍ ߜଷ,௜,ఛ ௜݀,ఛ௣
தୀ଴
൰∆log(ܲܬ ௧ܻ) + ߝ௜,௧
where p is a non-negative integer; p is positive if there are at least one possible structural break; ௜݀,ఛ is the
dummy variable of period ߬ and ௜݀,଴= 0; ߛ and ߜ are the coefficients of the dummy variables and the
interactive terms respectively. Rearrange terms in the right-hand side of the equation, then
∆ log൫ܥ௜,௧൯= ߙ୧+ ෍ ߛ௜,ఛ ௜݀,ఛ௣
ఛୀ଴
+ βଵ,௜∆ log(ܷ ܵܦ௧) + βଶ,௜∆ log(ܧܷܴ௧) + βଷ,௜∆ log(ܲܬ ௧ܻ)
+ ෍ ߜଵ,௜,ఛ ௜݀,ఛ∆log(ܷ ܵܦ௧)௣
தୀ଴
+ ෍ ߜଶ,௜,ఛ ௜݀,ఛ∆log(ܧܷܴ௧)௣
ఛୀ଴
+ ෍ ߜଷ,௜,ఛ ௜݀,ఛ∆log(ܲܬ ௧ܻ) +௣
ఛୀ଴
ߝ௜,௧
If the null hypothesis that ߛ௜,ఛ = ߜଵ,௜,ఛ = ߜଶ,௜,ఛ = ߜଷ,௜,ఛ = 0 is rejected for a particular period ,߬ there
exists a structural break.
Daily data on exchange rates of East Asian currencies (per Norwegian krone) is taken from the
Norges Bank, the central bank of Norway. Norwegian krone serves as a good numeraire for two reasons.
First, Norway is one of the countries with the highest degrees of exchange rate flexibility in the world. Its
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central bank seldom intervened in the foreign exchange market ever since January 1999 until the middle of
2014. Second, Norway is a small, distant economy for the East Asian region and is not a major trading
partner of East Asian economies.44 Exchange rates data for Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan (China), Japan, United States, and the euro area ranges from
January 1, 2003 through May 31, 2014. Data for China is from January 3, 2005 until May 31, 2014 due to
missing data from 2003 to 2004. Regression uses the first difference of the logarithm form of nominal
exchange rates.
Table 3.4 presents a summary. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron unit
root test checked whether all variables in the equation were stationary. These tests cannot reject the
presence of unit-root processes for level data but strongly reject for the first-differenced data at the 5
percent level. Cointegration tests are also conducted using level data; no cointegraing relationship is found.
Based on the analysis of the official announcements in exchange rate policies in the previous section,
three possible structural break dates are tested: (i) July 21, 2005; (ii) September 15, 2008; (iii) June 19,
2010. The Appendix plots parameter estimates from the rolling estimation over a rolling window of 50 days,
which shows a rough picture of exchange rate behavior over time. The chow test results indicate that there
is at least one structural break in each East Asian economy (table 3.5). Thus, time duration is divided into
four periods based on these three break dates in order to show the contemporaneous correlation between
different currencies in East Asia over time.
44 According to previous studies (e.g., Frankel and Wei, 1993; McKinnon, 2005), the numeraire currency does not change
regression result. The pound sterling as an alternative numeraire is also tested because of the United Kingdom’s free
floating regime and its good properties as a small distant economy and small trading partner to East Asia. Results show
that it does not make much difference.
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics
Level data 1st differenced data
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max ADF Test Obs. ADF Test
CHY 2370 0.15 0.10 -0.05 0.34 (0.554) 1858 (0.000)
HKD 2876 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.45 (0.178) 2255 (0.000)
IDR 2876 7.34 0.12 7.01 7.60 (0.055) 2255 (0.000)
KRW 2876 5.18 0.11 4.95 5.43 (0.093) 2255 (0.000)
MYR 2876 -0.58 0.06 -0.71 -0.43 (0.058) 2255 (0.000)
PHP 2876 2.05 0.07 1.88 2.23 (0.284) 2255 (0.000)
SGD 2876 -1.44 0.08 -1.61 -1.30 (0.645) 2255 (0.000)
THB 2876 1.73 0.07 1.58 1.90 (0.216) 2255 (0.000)
TWD 2876 1.64 0.06 1.49 1.82 (0.062) 2255 (0.000)
JPY 2876 2.79 0.13 2.52 3.08 (0.539) 2255 (0.000)
USD 2876 -1.81 0.09 -2.04 -1.60 (0.166) 2255 (0.000)
EUR 2876 -2.08 0.05 -2.30 -1.98 (0.140) 2255 (0.000)
Notes: MacKinnon approximate p-value in parentheses. Abbreviation (CHY-Chinese renminbi, HKD-Hong Kong dollar,
IDR-Indonesian rupiah, KRW-Korean won, MYR-Malaysian ringgit, PHP-Philippine peso, SGD-Singapore dollar,
THB-Thai baht, TWD-New Taiwan dollar, JPY-Japanese yen, USD-US dollar, EUR-euro).
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 3.5 Chow Tests Results
July 21, 2005 September 15, 2008 June 19, 2010
China *** ***
Hong Kong SAR * *
Indonesia *** **
Korea *** *** ***
Malaysia *** *** ***
Philippine *** ***
Singapore *** *** ***
Thailand *** ***
Taiwan (China) *** *** ***
Notes: ***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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3.5 Estimation
3.5.1 The Roles of International and Regional Currencies in East Asia
Table 3.6 shows the coefficient estimates. Due to missing exchange rates data for China from 2003 to 2004,
analysis of contemporaneous correlation of the error terms is possible from January 2005. Thus the total
number of observations is 1,858 (=107+626+346+779). Using the total 2255 observations starting from
January 2003 for other East Asian currencies does not affect the results. Regression over the whole period
shows that exchange rate behavior in individual economies varied. On average, the coefficients of the US
dollar for Hong Kong SAR and China were higher while the coefficients for Singapore, Korea and
Thailand were lower.
On the other hand, analysis focusing on the four consecutive time periods reveals change over time.
In the first period before July 2005, the exchange rates of the RMB, the Hong Kong dollar and the
Malaysian ringgit were pegged to the US dollar. Other East Asian currencies correlated with the US dollar
but showed flexibility of varied degrees. In the second period from July 2005 to September 2008, the RMB
and the Malaysian ringgit started to deviate from the dollar-peg regimes. This corresponds to the fact that
the two countries carried out exchange rate reforms in July 2005. Other East Asian economies exhibited
variation from the preceding period except for Hong Kong SAR. It successfully maintained its exchange
rate regime unchanged throughout the four periods. The last column of table 3.6 shows that the R-squared
for Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand were much lower; no evidence is found that exchange
rates of these economies were pegged to other currencies.
In the third period starting from the onset of the global financial crisis, most of the East Asian
economies listed in the table reduced their degree of variability vis-à-vis the US dollar. Table 3.6 shows that
many economies had higher coefficients of the first independent variable, the US dollar, in this period.
Table 3.7 lists the coefficients of the interactive terms ௜݀,ఛ∆log(ܷ ܵܦ௧) for individual economies based on
chow test results. It can be seen that the coefficients of the US dollar were significantly higher for China,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan (China) in the third period.
In addition, it should be noticed that the won underwent a long period of volatility and depreciation
around the global financial crisis. Furthermore, the parameters for the Japanese yen during period 3 were
negative for many East Asian economies. This is in part due to the quickly rising yen in this period. The
impact of the recent global financial crisis is only temporary. In the fourth period after the worst time of the
global financial crisis, East Asia reverted to increased variability vis-à-vis the US dollar.
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The coefficients of the US dollar variable in the model are all significant and economically large
compared to previous empirical research using monthly data. However, it should be reminded that only
when the equation is “exceptionally well specified” (i.e., the coefficients should be highly significant and
the R-squared value should be close to unity) does it signify the exchange rate is determined based on a
basket peg according to Frankel and Wei (1993). Therefore, the empirical results listed in table 3.6 are not
inconsistent with, for example, the IMF’s de facto classification of exchange rate regimes.
Table 3.6 SUR Model Estimates, Coefficients
Period USD EUR JPY _cons Obs. R-sq
China 1 1.01*** -0.02 -0.00 4.32E-05 107 0.997
2 0.91*** 0.03* 0.04*** -2.40E-04*** 626 0.966
3 0.97*** 0.04*** -0.01 -9.10E-05* 346 0.994
4 0.94*** 0.05*** 0.01 -9.00E-05** 779 0.974
Total 0.94*** 0.04*** 0.01*** -1.37E-04*** 1858 0.981
Hong Kong SAR 1 0.97*** 0.01 0.02*** -4.40E-05** 107 0.999
2 0.98*** 0.01 0.01*** 2.04E-06 626 0.998
3 0.99*** 0.02*** -0.00 -1.50E-05 346 0.997
4 0.99*** 0.00 0.00 -5.51E-06 779 0.997
Total 0.98*** 0.01*** 0.00** -4.83E-06 1858 0.997
Indonesia 1 0.70*** -0.08 0.35*** -3.30E-05 107 0.806
2 0.80*** 0.19*** -0.06** -5.00E-05 626 0.620
3 0.98*** 0.14* -0.24*** -5.90E-04 346 0.595
4 0.81*** -0.01 0.01 2.45E-04 779 0.600
Total 0.85*** 0.08** -0.09*** 1.92E-05 1858 0.600
Korea 1 0.47*** 0.33** 0.29*** -2.70E-04 107 0.658
2 0.76*** 0.20*** -0.05 6.88E-05 626 0.593
3 0.89*** 0.34*** -0.58*** -4.10E-04 346 0.242
4 0.58*** 0.10** -0.00 -1.60E-04 779 0.517
Total 0.71*** 0.21*** -0.23*** -1.15E-05 1858 0.337
Malaysia 1 1.00*** 0.01* -0.00 -7.21E-06 107 1.000
2 0.78*** 0.17*** -0.02 -1.40E-04 626 0.812
3 0.84*** 0.17*** -0.13*** -2.90E-04 346 0.881
4 0.68*** 0.08** -0.02 -5.00E-05 779 0.687
Total 0.77*** 0.14*** -0.06*** -1.11E-04 1858 0.800
Philippine 1 0.74*** 0.02 0.25*** -2.10E-04 107 0.847
2 0.85*** 0.12** -0.10*** -1.40E-04 626 0.660
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Table 3.6 Continued
Period USD EUR JPY _cons Obs. R-sq
Philippine 3 0.92*** 0.05 -0.12*** -3.80E-04 346 0.847
4 0.73*** 0.09*** -0.02 -7.40E-05 779 0.755
Total 0.83*** 0.08*** -0.07*** -1.49E-04* 1858 0.767
Singapore 1 0.46*** 0.19*** 0.33*** -1.50E-04 107 0.924
2 0.58*** 0.34*** 0.06*** -1.50E-04* 626 0.853
3 0.66*** 0.29*** -0.04** -2.70E-04* 346 0.924
4 0.53*** 0.19*** 0.08*** -1.20E-04 779 0.785
Total 0.58*** 0.26*** 0.04*** -1.31E-04** 1858 0.856
Thailand 1 0.54*** 0.13 0.43*** 1.93E-04 107 0.900
2 0.76*** 0.22** -0.02 -4.10E-04* 626 0.477
3 0.80*** 0.15*** 0.02* -3.10E-04*** 346 0.962
4 0.71*** 0.11*** 0.04** -4.30E-05 779 0.826
Total 0.75*** 0.15*** 0.03** -1.91E-04** 1858 0.762
Taiwan (China) 1 0.71*** 0.06 0.21** -2.30E-04 107 0.765
2 0.80*** 0.07** 0.05*** 4.83E-05 626 0.856
3 0.89*** 0.13*** -0.08*** -1.90E-04 346 0.930
4 0.79*** 0.07*** 0.03** -8.40E-05 779 0.892
Total 0.82*** 0.10*** 0.00 -4.27E-05 1858 0.890
Notes: Periods 1 to 4 stand for 1/1/2005–7/20/2005, 7/21/2005–9/14/2008, 9/15/2008–6/18/2010 and
6/19/2010–5/31/2014 respectively; “total” denotes regression over the whole sample.
***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 3.7 Chow Tests Estimates, Coefficients of the Interactive Terms d_(i,τ) ∆log(〖USD〗_t)
Break date 1
July 21, 2005
Break date 2
September 15, 2008
Break date 3
June 19, 2010
China -0.10*** 0.06*** -0.03**
Hong Kong SAR -0.00 0.01 -0.00
Indonesia 0.42*** 0.18 -0.17
Korea 0.15* 0.14* -0.31***
Malaysia -0.22*** 0.06* -0.16***
Philippine -0.04 0.08* -0.19***
Singapore 0.03 0.07*** -0.13***
Thailand 0.12*** 0.04 -0.09**
Taiwan (China) -0.01 0.09*** -0.10***
Notes: ***significant at the 1 percent level.
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**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
3.5.2 The Correlation of Residuals
Tables 3.8 to 3.11 present the correlation matrices of residuals in the four consecutive time periods. In each
table, the number of bilateral correlation coefficients for the nine economies under inspection is 36
(=௡×(௡ିଵ)
ଶ
= ଽ×଼
ଶ
). In sum, there are 144 (=36×4) bilateral correlation coefficients for analysis.
Table 3.8 SUR Model Estimates, Correlation Matrix of Residuals, 1/1/2005–7/20/2005
CHY HKD IDR KRW MYR PHP SGD THB TWD
CHY 1.00
HKD -0.22 1.00
IDR -0.13 0.04 1.00
KRW 0.29 -0.01 0.02 1.00
MYR -0.83 0.17 0.14 -0.35 1.00
PHP -0.02 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.06 1.00
SGD -0.19 0.02 0.17 0.15 0.05 0.17 1.00
THB -0.08 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.21 1.00
TWD 0.02 0.18 0.05 0.44 -0.08 0.19 0.17 0.15 1.00
Notes: Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(36) = 171.66, Pr = 0.000.
Table 3.9 SUR Model Estimates, Correlation Matrix of Residuals, 7/21/2005–9/14/2008
CHY HKD IDR KRW MYR PHP SGD THB TWD
CHY 1.00
HKD 0.10 1.00
IDR 0.03 -0.02 1.00
KRW 0.07 -0.05 0.23 1.00
MYR 0.09 -0.02 0.40 0.29 1.00
PHP 0.00 -0.03 0.35 0.28 0.40 1.00
SGD 0.25 0.08 0.33 0.32 0.51 0.25 1.00
THB 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.20 1.00
TWD 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.38 0.32 0.22 0.34 0.13 1.00
Notes: Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(36) = 1175.48, Pr = 0.000.
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Table 3.10 SUR Model Estimates, Correlation Matrix of Residuals, 9/15/2008–6/18/2010
CHY HKD IDR KRW MYR PHP SGD THB TWD
CHY 1.00
HKD 0.59 1.00
IDR -0.04 -0.05 1.00
KRW -0.02 0.02 0.18 1.00
MYR 0.11 0.17 0.31 0.29 1.00
PHP 0.02 -0.04 0.37 0.41 0.45 1.00
SGD 0.11 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.54 0.26 1.00
THB 0.35 0.35 0.10 0.07 0.33 0.15 0.31 1.00
TWD 0.04 0.03 0.20 0.31 0.42 0.28 0.35 0.24 1.00
Notes: Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(36) = 945.86, Pr = 0.000.
Table 3.11 SUR Model Estimates, Correlation Matrix of Residuals, 6/19/2010–5/31/2014
CHY HKD IDR KRW MYR PHP SGD THB TWD
CHY 1.00
HKD 0.12 1.00
IDR 0.05 0.06 1.00
KRW 0.14 0.22 0.18 1.00
MYR 0.14 0.24 0.27 0.47 1.00
PHP 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.49 0.50 1.00
SGD 0.12 0.29 0.21 0.57 0.64 0.45 1.00
THB 0.12 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.50 0.40 0.47 1.00
TWD 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.50 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.25 1.00
Notes: Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(36) = 2969.94, Pr = 0.000.
The interpretation of the correlation matrices of residuals is that there may be unobserved common
factor that influenced the daily movements of exchange rates of East Asian currencies even after
controlling for the effect of major international and regional currencies (especially the US dollar).
Figure 3.2 shows the mean values of correlation coefficients for all pairs of economies over the four
periods. The number increased continuously over time. The biggest rise of average correlation in East Asia
happened from period 1 to period 2 (from the beginning of 2005 until the break of the recent global
financial crisis). The pace became a bit slower when the recent global financial crisis threatened the world
economy in the third period from September 2008 to June 2010. Nevertheless, East Asia maintained the
momentum of increased inter-correlation while weathering the recent global crisis.
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Figure 3.2 Mean Values of Correlation Coefficients in Each Period
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 3.3 presents the mean values of correlation coefficients for each economy in the four periods.
Generally speaking, the mean value curves kept shifting up over the four periods, indicating the trend of
increased average correlation for each East Asian economy. Indonesia is slightly different; its mean value
of correlation coefficients increased from period 1 to period 2 with a speed comparable to that of Korea, the
Philippines, and Taiwan (China) but failed to keep pace with other economies entering period 3.
Second, six economies including Korea, Taiwan (China) and four ASEAN economies (Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) had higher mean values of correlation especially in the fourth period
from June 2010 to May 2014. Economies with pegged exchange rate regimes, such as Hong Kong SAR
with a currency board, had lower correlation with other economies compared to other types of regimes after
controlling for the impact of the US dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen. China and Malaysia in the first
period before July 2005 maintained de facto dollar-peg regimes and had very low correlation coefficients
with other economies in the region. However, the exchange rate reforms in these two countries taken in
July 2005 increased their correlation with other economies in the region remarkably. Malaysia had one of
the highest mean correlation values over the last period. On contrary, the mean correlation values of China
with other economies did not change much since the second period from July 2005.
All of the bilateral correlation coefficients turned positive in the fourth period after the worst time of
the recent global financial crisis, pushing intra-regional correlation to record high. Daily exchange rates of
East Asian currencies were inter-correlated more than any time during this period after controlling for the
possible effect of international and regional currencies like the US dollar.
The results also showed that correlation coefficients among a certain group of economies were much
higher compared to others. On average, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
period 1 period 2 period 3 period 4
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Thailand were inter-related more closely than other pairs of economies. Just for illustration, choose the
mean value (=0.29) of correlation coefficients in period 4 as the threshold for dividing countries into
high-correlation group and low-correlation group. The number of economies in the high-correlation group
increased quickly over time from 2 to 15 and the number in the low-correlation group decreased. Years
after the worst time of the recent global financial crisis showed a clear pattern of closer ties among Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand. Figure 3.4 illustrates their links. Hong
Kong SAR was only loosely tied to this group of economies.
Figure 3.3 Mean Values of Correlation Coefficients for Each Economy in Each Period
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 3.4 Correlation Coefficients over 0.29 in Period 4 (6/19/2010–5/31/2014)
Notes: Bold lines denote pairwise correlation coefficients over 0.40; dash lines denote correlation coefficients between
0.29 and 0.40.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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3.6 Discussion
Time from 2003 until 2014 is a particular historical period for a number of reasons. First, East Asian
economies experienced a sustained period of high economic growth and financial stability after the
1997–1998 financial crisis. Second, the recent global financial crisis from 2007 that originated from
advanced economies hit the world economy heavily. Fortunately, regional economies stayed largely safe
during the crisis albeit exports were frustrated. Third, China, as a large economy in the region, an important
player in regional production networks and exporting destination of parts and intermediate goods from
other East Asian emerging markets, departed from the fixed dollar price and experienced a long-run
appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar from 2005 to 2007 and from 2009 to 2013. The decade provides a
special opportunity for an examination of East Asian economies through the lens of exchange rates.
The results in the preceding section illustrate increased correlation between the movements of
exchange rates of East Asian currencies, even after excluding the possible effect of the US dollar, the euro
and the Japanese yen. This trend becomes clear in the post period of the global financial crisis. It implies
unobserved common factor that influence daily movements of exchange rates of East Asian economies. The
increased contemporaneous correlation among East Asian economies is in accordance to the fact that East
Asian economies have become more and more integrated in the 21st century. In particular, regional
production networks in East Asia have been expanding and deepening continuously, making regional
economies combined closely (e.g., Urata, 2008). The increased inter-correlation among East Asian
economies mirrors the strengthened linkages.
Furthermore, East Asian economies maintained relative stability in competitiveness vis-à-vis each
other shortly after a volatile period in 2008, overcoming the negative shocks of the global financial crisis.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 depict the nominal effective exchange rates and real effective exchange rates in ten East
Asian economies. Effective exchange rates and real effective exchange rates in particular are important
indicators of the overall strength of a currency. Previous literature such as EAVG (2001) and Kawai (2008)
all made arguments based on effective exchange rates. The two figures illustrate that, except for Japan,
effective exchange rates of East Asian economies largely co-moved with each other from 2009 to 2012,
reverting to the pre-crisis level. The yen was volatile over this period; it began a sustained period of
depreciation from the middle of 2012 after a sharp appreciation from 2011. Entering into the latter half of
2013, Indonesia followed Japan’s step of depreciation vis-à-vis its trading partners.
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Figure 3.5 Nominal Effective Exchange Rates in East Asia, 2000–2014
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Bank for International Settlements.
Figure 3.6 Real Effective Exchange Rates in East Asia, 2000–2014
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Bank for International Settlements.
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3.7 Chapter Conclusion
Exchange rate regimes adopted by individual countries tend to persist. However, regime transition
happened from time to time in history. Exchange rate regime transition in developing economies often
happened after serious crises. Famous examples include exchange rate regime change of Brazil and
Argentina after severe currency crises in the 20th century. Another instance is East Asia after the 1997–1998
financial crisis.
The effect of reforms in exchange rate policies taken by emerging markets in East Asia over the past
decade is considerable. Exchange rate variability of a number of East Asian currencies vis-à-vis the US
dollar increased. Nevertheless, the role of the US dollar became more important in East Asia during periods
of fragile market confidence. Exchange rates of East Asian economies reversed to higher level of stability
with the US dollar from 2008 to 2010. However, the impact of the global crisis on exchange rates of East
Asian economies is only temporary. As the crisis subsided, East Asian currencies increased variability (the
level of variability was very high for countries such as Korea) vis-à-vis the US dollar.
The results in this essay point to the new characteristics of exchange arrangement in East Asia in the
post-crisis era. The results found increased correlation between the movements of exchange rates of East
Asian economies, after excluding the possible effect of international and regional currencies (the US dollar,
the euro, and the Japanese yen). In the absence of any strict agreements in exchange rate coordination, East
Asian economies avoided the troubled situation of beggar-thy-neighbour policies and maintained a
relatively stable monetary order in spite of the negative shocks over the last decade.
53
Chapter Appendix
Appendix 3.1 Rolling Estimation Results
Figure A3.1.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
Figure A3.1.2
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
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Figure A3.1.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
Figure A3.1.4
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
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Figure A3.1.5
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
Figure A3.1.6
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
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Figure A3.1.7
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
Figure A3.1.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
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Figure A3.1.9
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Norges Bank.
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4 THE ORIGINAL SIN HYPOTHESIS AND THE BENEFIT OF
MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA
4.1 Introduction to Chapter 4
Shortly after the 1997–1998 financial crisis, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) proposed the original sin
hypothesis. “Original sin” is defined as the inability of a country to borrow abroad in its own currency.45
The hypothesis stated that many East Asian economies were subject to “original sin” which gave incentives
to the accumulation of foreign currency debts in the corporate and financial sectors in the 1990s. “Original
sin” traces the difficulty that emerging markets experienced in servicing and repaying external debts to the
limited acceptance of their own currencies in the portfolios of global investors. The intuition behind
“original sin” is that people are incentived to borrow using foreign currencies, the US dollar for example,
due to financial products variety and liquidity. Bordo and Meissner (2006) showed that the severity of
financial crises was particularly high in the club of economies with “original sin” over 0.8 in history
although there was a considerable variance in their experience (figure 4.1).
There are certainly different views about the causes of the financial vulnerability on the dawn of the
regional financial crisis. In studying monetary integration in East Asia, Ogawa and Kawasaki (2011)
attributed the currency mismatch problem during the crisis to the de facto dollar-peg system in the 1990s.
They argued that the dollar-peg exchange rate regimes made borrowers and lenders underrate exchange rate
risks. However, consensus is generally reached that both the limited use of local currencies in international
lending (“original sin”) and the implicit guarantee on exchange rate stability were sources of the financial
fragility in the region prior to the crisis (e.g., Ito, 2002).46
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003, 2007) suggested that “original sin” was not rare in
emerging and developing economies around the world. According to their research, the European monetary
integration successfully reduced “original sin” to an extremely low level, which saved large economic costs
for small emerging markets in the region. Researchers on monetary integration in East Asia have cited
“original sin” as one of the potential benefits for emerging markets in the region to opt for monetary
integration (e.g., Park and Wyplosz, 2010).
45 In earlier work, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) used the term to refer to the inability of a country to borrow abroad in
its own currency and the difficulty to borrow at home at long maturities. In subsequent work, they narrowed the definition
down to the first problem for reasons described fully in Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2007).
46 Please see footnote 34.
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Figure 4.1 Crisis Frequencies and the Average Level of “Original Sin”
Source: Bordo and Meissner (2006), figure 5, p.3308.
The existing studies have posited several causing factors of “original sin”. Domestic factors in
emerging markets are suggested to be important in explaining the low acceptance of their currencies in
international lending. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) argued that it is impossible for emerging
markets to get free from “original sin” without overcoming the institutional weaknesses.47 A few number
of studies have emphasized that a developed local currency bond market is a necessary condition for the
elimination of “original sin”. Burger and Warnock (2003) believed that stronger institutions and better
inflation performance mattered for “original sin” since they were important for local currency bond markets
and a mature local currency bond market was needed for the elimination of “original sin”. Goldstein and
Turner (2004) held a similar view. They argued that local currency bond markets could create a natural
demand for hedging currency risk and provide a source of local-currency finance that would otherwise be
smaller if emerging-market borrowers had recourse only to external lenders.
East Asian economies have been developing rapidly over the last two decades. Governments have
taken great efforts to promote the development of local currency bond markets. Bond markets in East Asia
were highly underdeveloped until the 1990s but began to develop quickly after the 1997–1998 financial
crisis. Governments in the region have worked together under the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) to
improve bond market infrastructure, invent new bond market products and enlarge international bond
market over the years. The Appendix shows the development of local currency (LCY) bond market in the
47 Reinhart et al. (2003) argued that emerging markets should carry out the necessary reforms in order to change weak
institutions, a lack of political comity in part associated with an unequal distribution of income, and a capricious attitude
toward the rule of law to strengthen financial stability.
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region. Most economies had larger LCY bond markets. Even though much research interest has been
devoted to bond markets development in the region, little attentions has been paid to the possible change of
“original sin” over the last two decades.
Researchers have also suggested the importance of external factors that are not directly related to
domestic policies within the intermediate term in determining “original sin”. For example, Bordo, Meissner,
and Redish (2005) examined “original sin” from a historical perspective by studying five countries (the
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) from 1800 through 2000. They stressed
the important role of shocks such as wars, massive economic disruption and the emergence of global
markets in explaining the common reduction of “original sin” in the five countries. Hausmann and Panizza
(2003) investigated the determinants of “original sin” using cross-sectional data and found only weak
support for the idea that the level of development, institutional quality, or monetary credibility were
correlated with “original sin”.
Proponents for the original sin hypothesis admitted that “original sin” was only one of the factors that
affected financial vulnerability in emerging markets. In an empirical study, Bordo and Meissner (2006)
found that although “original sin” by itself did contribute to crises, currency mismatch was a much more
robust determinant of financial crises using a dataset from 1880 to 1913 and from 1972 to 1997. They
concluded that foreign currency debt induced by “original sin” was only dangerous when mismanaged.
Eichengreen et al. (2007) argued that governments might use macroeconomic and regulatory policies to
limit foreign borrowing but by doing the free flow of capital across countries was hindered. They also said
that these governments might resort to foreign reserves accumulation as an alternative but this strategy was
also costly.
This essay seeks to investigate the “original sin” issue and asks whether it matters for monetary
integration in East Asia. Using a panel data set, the essay empirically tests the impact of domestic
institutional factors on “original sin”. This research also explores the relation between “original sin” and
currency mismatch using available data and discusses the experience from the recent euro area crisis. This
essay may complement the existing literature on the “original sin” issue in emerging markets and clarify
the role of “original sin” in rethinking monetary integration in East Asia. Besides, since “original sin”
inherently implies the use of emerging-market currencies in international financing and investment, this
research is also related to the existing literature on the attractiveness of emerging-market currencies in
global portfolio. For example, studies such as Burger and Warnock (2007) analyzed this issue from the
perspective of foreign participation in local currency bond markets.
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The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 4.2 investigates “original sin’ in East
Asia. Section 4.3 does an empirical test. Section 4.4 examines the relation between “original sin” and
currency mismatch. Section 4.5 discusses “original sin” and regional monetary integration. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 “Original Sin” in East Asia
The measure of “original sin” is taken from Eichengreen et al. (2007).48 The level of “original sin” for
economy i is expressed in the following equation. This index is formulated because if residents of
economies different from i issue bonds in currency i, these bonds can then be used by residents of economy
i to swap their foreign currency obligations into domestic currency obligations. The index is bounded at 0
because economies with a ratio (securities in currency i / securities issued by economy i) larger than 1
cannot hedge more debt than they have. This formulation suggests that the lower the value the more
attractive a particular currency is in the international debt market. In other words, high value indicates high
degree of “original sin”.
Data are taken from the Bank for International Settlements Securities Statistics. The outstanding
amount of international bonds and notes plus that of international money market instruments is the total
outstanding amount of international debt securities. The international debt market is dominated by several
international currencies. As shown in table 4.1, the currency share of the five most used currencies is
around 95%, which means that all other currencies around the world compete for the remaining 5%. In fact,
the share of the international debt securities issued by residents of the five economies, no more than 75%
throughout the years, is significantly less than the share of the international debt securities denominated in
the five currencies. It is clear that the attractiveness of these currencies in international funding surpasses
what is implied by the distribution of the international debt market across national borders. Such contrast
reveals in part their properties as the so-called “international currencies”.
48 There are several indicators of “original sin” in their early works (e.g., Eichengreen et al., 2003); however, the indicator
listed here is the most widely used one.
OSIN = Max ( 1 - International debt securities in currency i , 0 )International debt securities issued by economy i
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Table 4.1 Share of Top Five Currencies in Total Outstanding International Debt Securities (%)
Economy 1994 2007 2014 Currency 1994 2007 2014
Euro area 25.55 42.68 41.15 Euro 23.60 48.11 43.30
United States 8.51 14.27 9.21 US dollar 41.86 31.74 37.39
United Kingdom 8.05 17.05 15.09 Pound sterling 6.85 10.36 9.88
Japan 11.72 0.89 0.98 Yen 15.07 3.19 2.17
Switzerland 0.05 0.09 0.19 Swiss franc 6.90 1.72 1.52
Total 53.87 74.98 66.63 Total 94.28 95.12 94.26
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Bank for International Settlements (2014).
Table 4.2 International Debt Securities Issued by Residents of East Asian Emerging Markets, Amount
Outstanding (US$ Billion)
Economy Currency 1994 2007 2014
Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%)
Hong Kong
SAR
Hong Kong
dollar
13.00 0.57 45.16 0.26 182.29 0.80
Korea Won 17.34 0.76 99.80 0.58 177.68 0.78
Singapore Singapore
dollar
1.74 0.08 53.40 0.31 114.15 0.50
Indonesia Rupiah 3.32 0.15 10.01 0.06 56.18 0.25
China Renminbi 10.73 0.47 17.21 0.10 54.80 0.24
Philippine Philippine peso 5.80 0.25 32.94 0.19 45.16 0.20
Malaysia Ringgit 5.30 0.23 24.03 0.14 37.04 0.16
Thailand Baht 4.97 0.22 8.94 0.05 10.21 0.04
Taiwan
(China)
New Taiwan
dollar
1.58 0.07 15.96 0.09 9.31 0.04
World 2289.02 100 17276.70 100 22781.27 100
Notes: Quarterly data are taken from the Bank for International Settlements Statistics (2014). Data are averaged annually;
the year 2014 only covers the first three quarters for which data are available at the time of writing.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Bank for International Settlements (2014).
Table 4.3 International Debt Securities Denominated in East Asian Emerging-Market Currencies, Amount
Outstanding (US$ Billion)
Economy Currency 1994 2007 2014
Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%)
China Renminbi 0.12 0.01 3.27 0.02 109.04 0.48
Hong Kong
SAR
Hong Kong
dollar
3.51 0.15 80.05 0.46 61.63 0.27
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Table 4.3 Continued
Economy Currency 1994 2007 2014
Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%)
Singapore Singapore
dollar
0.10 0.00 23.88 0.14 40.78 0.18
Indonesia Rupiah 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.01 10.43 0.05
Thailand Baht 1.34 0.06 1.84 0.01 5.25 0.02
Malaysia Ringgit 0.13 0.01 1.46 0.01 4.90 0.02
Philippine Philippine
peso
0.05 0.00 0.20 0.00 4.08 0.02
Taiwan
(China)
New Taiwan
dollar
0.00 0.00 1.95 0.01 0.61 0.00
Korea Won 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.57 0.00
World 2289.02 100 17276.70 100 22781.27 100
Notes: Quarterly data are taken from the Bank for International Settlements Statistics (2014). Data are averaged annually;
the year 2014 only covers the first three quarters for which the data are available at the time of writing.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Bank for International Settlements (2014).
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 list the international debt securities that are issued by residents of East Asian
emerging markets or denominated in East Asian emerging-market currencies in 1994, 2007 and 2014. Both
tables sort economies on the last column in descending order. It is clear that the international debt securities
involving East Asia multiplied quickly as the size of the world’s international debt market expanded over
the last two decades. The share of a number of East Asian emerging-market currencies in the international
debt market increased greatly (and the Chinese renminbi, the Hong Kong dollar, and the Singapore dollar
in particular), at a rate far exceeding the share of the international debt securities issued by residents in the
region.
Table 4.4 calculates “original sin” for East Asian emerging markets. The table sorts economies on the
last column in ascending order. The levels of “original sin” diminished significantly from 1994 to 2007 for
Hong Kong SAR and Singapore both of which are offshore financial centers. The levels of “original sin”
also decreased during the same period for China and Taiwan (China), but to a lesser extent. During the
recent years over 2007–2014, the performance of different East Asian emerging-market currencies varied.
The levels of “original sin” for China, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines declined to
varying degrees; the degree of the decrease for China is exceptionally high. On the other hand, the level of
“original sin” for Korea did not change much by comparing year 2007 with 2014 and the levels of “original
sin” actually grew for Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and Taiwan (China).
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Table 4.4 "Original Sin" for East Asian Emerging Markets, 1994–2014
Economy 1994 2000 2007 2014 1994–2000 2001–2007 2008–2014
China 0.99 0.99 0.81 0.00 0.99 0.96 0.22
Hong Kong SAR 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.47 0.00 0.25
Thailand 0.73 0.93 0.79 0.49 0.86 0.88 0.50
Singapore 0.94 0.68 0.55 0.64 0.90 0.61 0.50
Indonesia 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.81 0.95 0.97 0.78
Malaysia 0.98 1.00 0.94 0.87 0.99 0.98 0.82
Taiwan (China) 1.00 0.55 0.88 0.94 0.84 0.75 0.85
Philippine 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.99 1.00 0.94
Korea 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Bank for International Settlements (2014).
4.3 An Empirical Test
This section empirically tests the levels of “original sin” with respect to a series of domestic
macroeconomic factors. On one side, the empirical test considers the role of institutional factors. Reinhart
et al. (2003) stressed the irreplaceable importance of the strength of institutions to the solution of the
difficulties faced by emerging markets in international borrowing using their own currencies. They argued
that emerging markets should carry out the necessary reforms, for example, in the rule of law, to strengthen
financial stability and thus attract global investors to hold local currency denominated debts. On the other
hand, this analysis takes into account the heterogeneity across groups. As suggested by Eichengreen et al.
(2003) and Bordo et al. (2005), there exist factors that are not directly related to the strength of institutions
but contribute to the variation of currencies’ acceptance in the international capital market across
economies. This section introduces the model, the variables and the data of the estimation.
The empirical test uses a random effects (RE) tobit model. It is double-censored on account of the
fact that the dependent variable (OSIN) is bounded between zero and one. Unlike the (pooled) tobit model,
the random effects tobit model captures heterogeneity across groups and serial correlations within group.
The model can be written as: ݕ௜௧∗ =ܠ௜௧ࢼ+ ߭ ௜+ ߳௜௧ where i = 1, …, n and t = 1, …, T. The observations
on the dependent variable, ݕ௜௧∗ , are the levels of “original sin”. ܠ௜௧ denotes the 1×k row vector of
observations of the independent variables. ࢼ is k×1 coefficient vector of ܠ௜௧. ௜߭~N (0, ߪ௩ଶ) is the random
effects and is independent and identically distributed. ௜߳௧~N (0, ߪఢଶ) is the disturbance term, which is
independent of ௜߭ and independent and identically distributed. The random effects capture the factors that
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are largely beyond the control of domestic policies within the intermediate term.
The random effects tobit model calculates the percentage contribution of the panel-level variance
component to the total variance using the ߩ (rho) statistic, i.e., = ఙೡమ
ఙೡ
మାఙച
మ . The rho statistic is between
zero and unity. A higher rho value indicates that a larger proportion of the variance is due to the difference
between groups and thus suggests that the panel estimator using the random effects tobit model is different
from the pooled estimator using the tobit model.
The dependent variable is “original sin” (OSIN). The independent variables are as follows. The first
independent variable relates to economic size. Technical (supply) economies of scale in financial
management generate cost advantages in large economies (e.g., Lim, 2006). The international currencies in
history, including the pound, the US dollar and the euro, were born in the leading global economy at the
time. Gross domestic product (GDP) is a commonly used proxy measure of economic size.
The second independent variable concerns inflation. As suggested by Reinhart et al. (2003), the
stability of currency value is an important consideration for global investors in holding financial assets
even though the inflation-indexed securities have greatly reduced the risks. The data set reveals that
economies with annual inflation rate over 15% all had extremely high degree of “original sin”. Consumer
prices, the GDP deflator and broad money growth are three widely used estimates of price level.
Research in currency crises has suggested the possible role of fiscal policy (e.g., Corsetti and
Mackowiak, 2003). The intuition is that weak public finances give governments the incentive to depreciate
currencies. Besides, the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) suggests that fiscal solvency might have
influence on price level (e.g., Sims, 2013). One widely used proxy measure of fiscal solvency is the central
government debt to GDP ratio.
Another category of independent variables concern the level of development. GDP per capita is one
commonly used proxy for the level of development. This analysis also tests the variables that measure the
different aspects of the strength of institutions that are directly related to macroeconomic stability.49 These
variables include the rule of law, political stability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality.
The integration of global capital markets also played an important role in shaping global portfolio in
recent decades. During this process, more and more economies that used to be segmented from the global
market got access to it. Accession to global market makes borrowing in these emerging markets easier and
cheaper. De Nicolò and Juvenal (2014) found a positive impact of financial integration on macroeconomic
stability through improvements in corporate governance. On the other hand, some other emerging markets
49 Burger and Warnock (2007) suggested the importance of macroeconomic stability in affecting the attractiveness of
different emerging markets currencies in global portfolio.
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still have low financial integration; the development of financial markets in these economies is identified as
the major obstacle. This analysis tests the impact of financial sector development. Foreign banks among
total banks, number of listed companies per 1 million people and stock market total value traded to GDP
ratio are used as rough measures of financial openness and sophistication.
In addition, the experience of the US dollar and the pound suggests that country/region with
extensive and intensive trading relations with the rest of the world are likely to have an international
currency. The rise of emerging markets in global trade in recent decades is palpable (e.g., Hanson, 2012;
Urata, 2008). It would be interesting to see whether the change of “original sin” in the region relates to
growing international trade (trade to GDP ratio).
These independent variables evolved considerably in East Asia over the last two decades. Economic
size of emerging markets in the region increased quickly. China, Indonesia and Korea are among the largest
economies. Their GDP (PPP) volumes in 2013 were as follows: 15.6 trillion (China), 2.3 trillion
(Indonesia), and 1.6 trillion (Korea). The GDP volumes of Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand in 2013 was between 0.37 trillion and 0.93 trillion. On the other hand,
East Asian emerging markets varied significantly in the level of development. Hong Kong SAR and
Singapore scored higher in all dimensions including GDP per capita, the rule of law, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality and political stability. Economies such as the Philippines lag behind in
GDP per capita, below 6.5 thousand dollars (constant 2011 international $) until 2013. Furthermore,
financial sector development differed. Hong Kong SAR and Singapore as offshore financial centers have
much opener and more sophisticated financial markets. For example, the number of listed companies per
one million people for Hong Kong SAR in 2011 was 208.16 and the number for Singapore was 89.13. On
the other hand, the numbers of listed companies per one million people in many East Asian emerging
markets were small: 1.74 (China), 1.80 (Indonesia), and 2.82 (the Philippines).
Data on the dependent variable are taken from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Securities Statistics. Data spans from the first quarter of 1994 to the fourth quarter of 2013. Quarterly data
are averaged annually. Data on the independent variables are taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) database, Global Financial Development (GFD) database, and Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI) database. Annual data ranges from 1994 to 2013. Observations on different
independent variables vary due to missing data. As a result, the number of observations in regression is
much smaller than that for each variable.
The empirical test first uses a general data set that covers all the currencies available from the BIS
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Securities Statistics. Table 4.5 provides a data summary. The general data set covers 29 economies which
include 11 developed economies (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States), 7 East Asian emerging markets (Hong
Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), and 11 other emerging
and developing economies (Colombia, Czech, Hungary, India, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland,
Russia, South Africa, and Turkey). Data on financial variables are missing for Iceland and Korea. The
analysis then focuses on a smaller sample that only covers the emerging and developing economies.
Table 4.6 lists the regression results using the general data set. The table is divided into three groups
of regression. Each group includes the result using the random effects (RE) tobit model and the result using
the tobit model.
In the first group of the regression, the GDP variable, the inflation variable and the GDP per capita
variable all have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Noticeably, the GDP variable is
economically large. East Asian emerging markets maintain relatively high economic growth in recent years.
It implies that growing economic size is likely to continue contributing to the further decrease of the levels
of “original sin” in a number of East Asian economies. As to inflation, although the data set shows that
economies with inflation rate over 15% all have very high degree of “original sin”, the impact of the
inflation variable measured by consumer prices is minimal in scale. Using other proxies for price level
including the GDP deflator and broad money growth does not affect the results. Third, the GDP per capita
variable is statistically and economically significant. The central government debt/GDP variable is
insignificant despite that the data set shows that economies with exceptionally high central government
debt all have high degree of “original sin”. Little evidence is found about any association between the
levels of “original sin” and trade openness. The trade/GDP variable is statistically insignificant. Using
exports to GDP ratio instead of trade to GDP ratio does not change the results. The last row of the table
shows the ߩ (rho) value of the random effects tobit model. It suggests that the panel-level variance
component was vital to the total variance. In other words, a very large proportion of the total variance could
not be explained by the economic size, the level of development measured by GDP per capita, the price
level, the fiscal solvency or the trade openness. Rather, the external factors that could not be explained by
domestic policies within the intermediate horizon were important.
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Table 4.5 Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Notes
IDS (Currency) 882 280.69 1230.40 0.00 10290.52 IDS denominated in a particular
currency; US$ billion; BIS.
IDS (Residence) 861 248.79 1006.52 0.00 9641.23 Issued by residents of a
particular economy;
US$ billion; BIS.
OSIN 792 0.69 0.37 0.00 1.00 [0,1].
GDP 917 1.39 2.83 0.01 16.20 At purchasing power parity;
trillions of constant 2011
international $; WDI.
Inflation_consumer 888 14.74 106.42 -4.02 2075.89 Consumer prices; percentage;
WDI.
Broad money growth 919 18.58 49.13 -25.34 1102.38 Growth rate; percentage; WDI.
Inflation_deflator 928 14.52 101.76 -27.63 2251.70 GDP deflator; percentage; WDI.
Central gov. debt 376 50.23 28.59 6.50 195.99 Central government debt/GDP;
percentage; WDI.
GDP per capita 896 26.55 21.91 1.89 138.02 At purchasing power parity;
thousands of constant 2011
international $; WDI.
Trade of GDP 921 87.39 69.47 0.31 458.33 Percentage; WDI.
Export of GDP 921 45.36 37.02 0.18 230.27 Exports of goods and services;
percentage; WDI.
Rule of law 658 0.50 0.94 -1.68 2.00 A higher number indicates
better law environment; WGI.
Political stability 658 0.18 0.89 -2.39 1.54 Political Stability and Absence
of Violence/Terrorism; a higher
number indicates more stability;
WGI.
Gov. effectiveness 658 0.68 0.90 -1.65 2.43 Government effectiveness; a
higher number indicates more
effectiveness; WGI.
Regulatory quality 658 0.62 0.87 -2.34 2.25 A higher number indicates
better regulatory quality; WGI.
Foreign banks ratio 637 32.23 22.01 1.00 93.00 Foreign banks among total
banks; percentage; GFD.
Stock market total
value traded/GDP
765 50.01 75.83 0.00 726.54 Stock market total value traded
to GDP; percentage; GFD.
No. of listed
companies per 1
million people
806 28.50 37.86 0.20 231.15 Number of listed companies per
1 million people; GFD.
Notes: The rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the
government's commitment to such policies. Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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In order to find whether specific aspects of the strength of institutions could help explain the
difference of “original sin” among economies, the second group of the regression in table 4.6 shows the test
results using other independent variables including the rule of law variable, the political stability variable,
the government effectiveness variable, and the regulatory quality variable. Replacing the GDP per capita
variable by these four institutional factors does not affect the results with respect to the GDP variable.
Using random effects tobit model, the rule of law variable has the expected sign and is statistically
significant. This is in part consistent with the argument of Reinhart et al. (2003) that emerging economies
should carry out the necessary reforms in the rule of law. However, the results did not find any direct
association between the other three institutional variables (political stability, government effectiveness and
regulatory quality) and the levels of “original sin” using the random effects tobit model. Similar to the
above results, high rho value signifies that a large portion of variance is due to difference between panels
and that the panel estimator is different from the pooled estimator.
The third group of the regression shows the results by adding the three financial variables. Three of
the four institutional variables (the political stability variable, the government effectiveness variable and the
regulatory quality variable) are dropped because they are statistically very insignificant and dropping them
does not affect the results. The GDP variable and the rule of law variable have the expected signs and
remain statistically and economically significant. Using the random effects tobit model, the inflation
variable and the fiscal solvency variable have the expected signs but are statistically insignificant. The
foreign banks among total banks variable and the number of listed companies per one million people
variable have the expected signs and are statistically significant; the stock market total value traded to GDP
variable is minimal in scale and statistically insignificant.
Table 4.6 Random Effects Tobit Model and Tobit Model Estimates, A General Data Set
Dependent variable: OSIN
(1) (2) (3)
Tobit RE Tobit Tobit RE Tobit Tobit RE Tobit
GDP -0.091
(-5.52)***
-0.028
(-1.72)*
-0.122
(-5.26)***
-0.069
(-4.67)***
-0.077
(-3.44)***
-0.050
(-3.08)***
Inflation_consumer 0.019
(4.32)***
0.004
(2.17)**
0.014
(2.78)***
0.002
(0.97)
0.010
(1.85)*
0.001
(0.86)
Central gov. debt 0.001
(1.41)
-0.001
(-0.97)
0.001
(0.67)
0.000
(0.44)
0.002
(1.54)
-0.001
(-1.53)
GDP per capita -0.009
(-5.70)***
-0.015
(-7.10)***
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Table 4.6 Continued
Dependent variable: OSIN
(1) (2) (3)
Tobit RE Tobit Tobit RE Tobit Tobit RE Tobit
Trade of GDP 0.000
(-0.43)
0.001
(1.82)*
Rule of law 0.031
(0.29)
-0.228
(-3.00)***
-0.153
(-3.62)***
-0.179
(-2.81)***
Political Stability -0.049
(-0.89)
0.021
(0.55)
Gov. effectiveness 0.303
(2.74)***
0.069
(1.01)
Regulatory quality -0.592
(-6.40)***
-0.038
(-0.62)
Foreign banks ratio -0.006
(-5.40)***
-0.003
(-1.66)*
No. of listed
companies per 1
million people
0.001
(0.61)
-0.001
(-2.11)**
Stock market total
value traded/GDP
-0.002
(-3.80)***
0.000
(-0.66)
_cons 0.866
(12.37)***
0.923
(7.68)***
0.908
(11.52)***
0.781
(6.10)***
1.037
(12.08)***
0.920
(7.17)***
Obs. 338 338 271 271 200 200
Pseudo R2 0.269 0.342 0.371
No. of groups 29 29 27
Obs. per group Min=1
Avg=11.7
Max=20
Min=1
Avg=9.3
Max=14
Min=1
Avg=7.4
Max=11
rho 0.938 0.941 0.955
Notes: Using different number of integration points does not affect the result using the random effects tobit model. t
statistics are in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10% level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Since this essay focuses on emerging markets in East Asia, it would be interesting to do an empirical
test using only emerging markets data. Table 4.7 shows the results. The table is divided into three groups of
regression. Each group includes the results using the random effects (RE) tobit model and the results using
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the tobit model. The last row of the table shows the ߩ (rho) value of the random effects tobit model.
In the first group of the regression where the GDP per capita variable is used, the GDP variable, the
inflation variable and the central government debt variable all have the expected signs but are statistically
insignificant using the random effects tobit model. The trade openness variable remains minimal in scale
and statistically insignificant. On contrary, the GDP per capita variable remains important; it is statistically
significant and economically large.
In the second group of the regression, the rule of law variable is statistically significant and
economically large. However, the political stability variable does not have the expected sign after
controlling for the rule of law variable. In the third group of the regression, all the three proxies for
financial sector development have the expected signs and are statistically significant using the random
effects tobit model. What’s more, all other variables become insignificant after controlling for the financial
variables. The results using the emerging markets data showed that the levels of “original sin” among
different emerging markets was closely related to their difference in the levels of financial sector
development.
The results signified that a large portion of the total variance was due to panel-level difference.
Macroeconomic variables including the economic size, the level of development, the price level, the fiscal
solvency and the trade openness were much less important in explaining the difference of “original sin”
across economies compared with serial correlation within groups.
Table 4.7 Random Effects Tobit Model and Tobit Model Estimates, Emerging and Developing Economies
Dependent variable: OSIN
(1) (2) (3)
Tobit RE tobit Tobit RE tobit Tobit RE tobit
GDP 0.006
(0.25)
-0.014
(-0.67)
-0.031
(-1.09)
-0.053
(-2.32)***
0.012
(0.33)
0.021
(0.88)
Inflation_consumer 0.012
(2.91)***
0.003
(1.46)
0.002
(0.47)
0.001
(0.55)
0.001
(0.23)
0.001
(0.52)
Central gov. debt 0.006
(5.42)***
0.001
(0.92)
0.010
(7.09)***
0.002
(1.85)*
0.009
(6.15)***
0.000
(-0.44)
GDP per capita -0.015
(-4.38)***
-0.019
(-6.22)***
Trade of GDP 0.000
(0.53)
0.001
(0.85)
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Table 4.7 Continued
Dependent variable: OSIN
(1) (2) (3)
Tobit RE tobit Tobit RE tobit Tobit RE tobit
Rule of law -0.361
(-2.99)***
-0.358
(-3.39)***
-0.267
(-3.37)***
-0.014
(-0.21)
Political Stability 0.269
(4.08)***
0.115
(2.08)**
Gov. effectiveness 0.063
(0.59)
-0.128
(-1.31)
Regulatory quality -0.456
(-3.76)***
0.096
(1.15)
Foreign banks ratio -0.001
(-0.59)
-0.006
(-3.21)***
No. of listed
companies per 1
million people
-0.001
(-1.08)
-0.002
(-2.13)**
Stock market total
value traded/GDP
-0.002
(-1.50)
-0.002
(-3.82)***
_cons 0.653
(9.03)***
0.964
(8.29)***
0.681
(7.90)***
0.787
(6.64)***
0.533
(4.37)***
1.031
(7.88)***
Obs. 179 179 138 138 109 109
Pseudo R2 0.294 0.484 0.476
No. of groups 18 18 17
Obs. per group Min=1
Avg=9.9
Max=19
Min=1
Avg=7.7
Max=14
Min=1
Avg=6.4
Max=11
rho 0.905 0.971
Notes: Using different number of integration points does not affect the result using the random effects tobit model. t
statistics are in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10% level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
4.4 “Original Sin” & Currency Mismatch
Currency mismatch is an important mechanism in which emerging markets take on systemic risk (e.g.,
Magud, 2010; Baek, 2013). High dependency on foreign currency-denominated debts is associated with the
risk of currency and debt crisis (e.g., Corsetti and Mackowiak, 2003; Bordo, Meissner and Stuckler, 2010).
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According to Eichengreen et al. (2007), “original sin” is an inducing factor of currency mismatch in
emerging markets. This section will investigate the association between “original sin” and currency
mismatch using available data.
Complete currency mismatch data for all East Asian economies is rare due to data accessibility.
Several studies have examined the currency mismatch problem in the region. For instance, Park (2011)
examined currency mismatches in China, Korea, Taiwan (China), Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and
Malaysia using a measure of currency mismatch developed by Goldstein and Turner (2004).50 Their results
revealed that currency mismatches in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand all deteriorated before
the 1997–1998 financial crisis. The situation was ameliorated significantly from 1999 to 2001; the
Philippines lagged behind but began to have positive net foreign currency assets in 2007. However, Park
found that the currency mismatch stress increased slightly in these emerging markets (except for China) in
2007 and 2008 and the average pressures of currency mismatch in Korea and the Philippines were slightly
higher compared to the other four economies.
Ranciere, Aaron, and Vamvakidis (2010) developed a different measure of aggregate currency
mismatch.51 They measured currency mismatches and systemic risks in a number of emerging markets
around the world. Figure 4.2 plots the relationship between “original sin” and currency mismatches. Due to
missing data, it includes only 4 East Asian economies and 15 other emerging markets. The upper panel
focuses on the East Asian economies from the regional financial crisis to 2005. On average, the currency
mismatch pressure of the Philippines was the highest, followed by Indonesia; the pressure of China was
lower; Thailand was largely free from currency mismatch. The currency mismatch pressure of the four
countries was largely consistent with their degree of “original sin” around this period, i.e., on average,
50 The measure is known as aggregate effective currency mismatch (AECM). It can be expressed as:
AECM = NFCAXGS or IGS × FCTD
where NFCA is net foreign currency assets (positive) or liabilities (negative); XGS is exports of goods and services
(national income account, when NFCA is negative; IGS is imports of goods and services (national income account), when
NFCA is positive; and ୊େ
୘ୈ
is foreign currency share of total debt. A negative number for the AECM resulted from net
foreign currency liabilities indicates a high degree of mismatching.
51 Ranciere et al. (2010)’s measure of currency mismatch is expressed as:Foreign currency denominated net unhedged liabilitiesTotal bank assets
where foreign currency denominated net unhedged liabilities = ( foreign currency foreign liabilities + foreign currency
domestic liabilities – foreign currency foreign assets – foreign currency domestic assets) + (foreign currency lending to
unhedged households +foreign currency lending to unhedged nonfinancial firms). This measure aims to control for bank
lending to unhedged borrowers by explicitly taking into account the indirect exchange rate risk that banks undertake when
they lend to borrowers that will not able to repay in the event of a sharp depreciation.
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higher “original sin” economies had bigger pressure of currency mismatch. However, annual variation of
“original sin” did not seem to be directly associated with the annual variation of currency mismatch
pressure in a particular country. The lower panel plots “original sin” and currency mismatch in the 15 other
emerging markets. Similarly, on average, higher “original sin” economies were likely to have bigger
pressure of currency mismatch. Nevertheless, there was no direct relationship between the annual variation
of “original sin” and the annual variation of currency mismatch pressure in a particular country.
Figure 4.2 "Original Sin” and Currency Mismatch
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Notes: Currency mismatches are measured using the method developed by Ranciere et al. (2010). A negative number
indicates no currency mismatch. Abbreviation (Asia: C-China, I-Indonesia, P-the Philippines, T-Thailand; Other
emerging and developing economies: A-Argentina, B-Brazil, BG-Bulgaria, CR-Croatia, CZ-Czech, E-Egypt,
HG-Hungary, KZ-Kazakhstan, LT-Lithuania, M-Mexico, PL-Poland, R-Russia, TK-Turkey, UK-Ukraine,
UR-Uruguay) and the following number denotes the year. For example, T98 stands for Thailand in 1998.
Source: Author’s calculations based on currency mismatch data from Ranciere et al. (2010).
4.5 “Original Sin” & Monetary Integration in East Asia
According to Eichengreen et al. (2003, 2007), the European monetary integration successfully reduced
“original sin” to an extremely low level, which saved large economic costs to small emerging markets in
the region (table 4.8).
The above analysis found only weak evidence about the relation between “original sin” and currency
mismatch in East Asian emerging markets. After all, the original sin hypothesis admits that “original sin’ is
only one factor in affecting currency mismatch and financial vulnerability in emerging markets. Other
factors include international reserves accumulation by the government and risk management in the banking
sector; however, these two options are costly. A large pile of reserves can become a target of criticism on
global imbalances and currency manipulation. On the other hand, although governments around the world
are working on banking supervision and regulation, the recent global financial crisis illustrated again the
tremendous difficulty of the task. Eichengreen et al. (2007) argued that these two measures are only second
best; economies without “original sin” are in the best position to deal with the risk of currency mismatch
and the associated systemic risk in emerging markets.
Table 4.8 “Original Sin” in Europe before and after the Introduction of the Euro, Simple Average
1993–1998 1999–2001
Euroland 0.53 0.09
Financial centers 0.07 0.08
Other developed 0.78 0.72
Offshore 0.96 0.87
Developing 0.96 0.93
Latin America 0.98 1.00
Middle East and Africa 0.95 0.90
Asia and Pacific 0.99 0.94
Eastern Europe 0.91 0.84
Notes: The number for the 1999–2001 period is not the simple average, but is calculated taking euro area as a whole.
Source: Eichengreen et al. (2007), p.134.
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The empirical test in the previous section suggests that it is rather hard for emerging markets in East
Asia to get free from “original sin” through domestic policies within the short or intermediate term.
Proponents for the original sin hypothesis may argue that the cost of “original sin” is potentially large if the
additional costs of controlling currency mismatch are taken into consideration.
However, the recent crisis in the euro area from 2008 illustrates that this benefit of monetary
integration for an individual economy can only be harvested under certain conditions. According to
Krugman, the introduction of the euro is not the end story of eliminating “original sin” in the euro area:
“The key point is that by joining the euro, Italy took a bite of the apple — it converted its
advanced-country status, as a nation issuing debt in its own currency, into original sin, with
debts in someone else’s currency (Europe’s in principle, Germany’s in practice). That is the
root of its new vulnerability.” (Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal, November 10, 2011)
In other words, Krugman suggested that the institutional weakness in the eurozone erodes the benefit of the
European monetary integration by generating another form of “original sin” that made countries like Italy
financially vulnerable before the recent crisis in the euro area.
4. 6 Chapter Conclusion
The original sin hypothesis may provide a perspective about the benefit of introducing a common currency
to a group of economies. However, the above analysis suggests that we should pause a little before taking
“original sin” as a bonus of monetary integration in East Asia. The investigation on the relationship
between “original sin” and currency mismatch revealed that there was only, if any, a remote association
between “original sin” and currency mismatch in emerging markets. “Original sin” is more of an index
measuring the share of local currency in global portfolio rather than an index measuring currency mismatch
and systemic financial vulnerability.
An alternative explanation might be that the effect of “original sin” on financial vulnerability is
highly nonlinear and have disproportionally large effect at the extreme points. One example is that the US
is largely free from currency mismatch because the US dollar is widely used around the world especially in
the international banking business. However, even if this is true, then the experience from the euro area
crisis showed that the “original sin” outcome of monetary integration highly depends on the institutional
design in the region, particularly in fiscal policy and rescue mechanisms.
Another implication of this essay is that it is necessary for East Asian emerging market to continue to
closely monitor the risk of the accumulation of foreign-currency debts and that it is likely that
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emerging-market governments in the region will continue to hold foreign reserves as a safety bumper for
financial turmoil in the near future.
Chapter Appendix
Appendix 4.1 Size of Local Currency Bond Markets in East Asia (% of GDP)
Notes: Abbreviation (VN-Vietnam, TH-Thailand, SG-Singapore, PH-the Philippines, MY-Myanmar, ID-Indonesia,
HK-Hong Kong SAR, CN-China, KR-Korea, JP-Japan). The number following the abbreviation denotes two
different time periods: (1) stands for average market size of LCY bond market over 2000–2006; (2) stands for
average over 2007–mid 2012.
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Asian Bonds Online.
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5 VERTICAL INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE AND THE CORRELATION
OF BUSINESS CYCLES IN EAST ASIA
5.1 Introduction to Chapter 5
International trade has been growing remarkably in East Asia over the past decades. Changing trade
policies in the region and the proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) facilitated this process (Urata,
2008a and 2008b). Moreover, intra-regional dependence is increasing rapidly in East Asia. Regional
production networks channeled bilateral trade flows and foreign direct investment, closely linking
individual economies together. Trade pattern is increasingly recognized as essential for the understanding
of changing economic landscape in the region.
The pattern of trade integration may exert an influence on the correlation of business cycles among
individual economies (Frankel and Rose, 1998). Correlation of business cycles, or symmetry of shocks, is
an important criterion for evaluating the suitability of monetary integration among a certain group of
economies; the more synchronized the economic disturbances are, the more suitable different economies
are for monetary integration (e.g., Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969).
This essay sets out to explore the impact of trade integration on the correlation of business cycles in
East Asia, paying close attention to the role of vertical intra-industry trade. The emergence of international
production networks and the rise of vertical intra-industry trade are important economic phenomena in the
region from the 1990s. Urata (2008a) found that East Asia’s exports had a higher share of parts in its
intra-regional trade compared with its trade with the United States and the European Union using data over
1990–2004 and suggested that East Asia became a factory for the world and China became an increasingly
important country for the location of importing parts from other East Asian economies, assembling finished
products and exporting to the outside world. Kimura, Takahashi and, Hayakawa (2007) also suggested that
the emergence of vertical international production sharing contributed to the rapid increase of vertical
intra-industry trade in the region.
This analysis uses a different approach that can both distinguish intra-industry trade from
inter-industry trade and separate vertical intra-industry trade from horizontal intra-industry trade. Unlike
previous empirical studies that re-organized trade data following industry classifications (e.g., Shin and
Wang, 2003; Rana, Cheng, and Chia, 2012), the method is able to further distinguish the two types of
intra-industry trade and incorporate the new features of regional trade integration into the framework. This
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essay is supposed to complement the literature on economic and monetary integration in the region. It may
also illuminate the economic linkages in the region.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. Section 5.2 is the literature review. Section 5.3
provides a descriptive analysis. Section 5.4 introduces the methodology and data. Section 5.5 outputs the
regression results. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature Review to Chapter 5
The pioneering work of Frankel and Rose (1998, hereafter F&R) suggested that trade integration could
have ambiguous effect on cross-country correlation of business cycles based on a simple theoretical
framework. They conjectured that business cycles might become more asymmetric if closer trade ties led to
inter-industry trade (or specialization) but, on contrary, become more correlated if intra-industry trade (IIT)
dominated.52 Their conjecture was based on the assumption that a large share of inter-industry trade made
industry-specific shocks dominate and thus disturbances became more country-specific while a large
portion of intra-industry trade made countries exposed to common industry-specific shocks and thus shocks
(or disturbances) became more symmetric. F&R also argued that trade integration might increase the
correlation of the country-specific shocks through the spill-over effect of aggregate demand shocks and the
spread of productivity shocks. The relationship between trade pattern and the correlation of economic
disturbances is the so-called “endogeneity of OCA criteria”. F&R empirically showed that higher levels of
bilateral trade intensity were associated with more correlated business cycles using data from 21
industrialized countries.
As East Asian trade integration accelerated, its impact on the correlation of business cycles began to
receive focused attention. Shin and Wang (2003) made an empirical test using data from 10 East Asian
economies and two other Asian economies over 1976 to 1997.53 They re-organized trade data by industry,
following the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) provided by the United Nations
Statistics Division. Based on a fixed effects model, their results demonstrated that intra-industry trade,
rather than inter-industry trade or the volume of trade itself, induced the synchronization of business cycles.
52 Grubel (1967) pragmatically defined intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade: “…because of the similarity of these
products they are commonly accounted for in the same statistical ‘industry’ classification, and the resultant international
pattern of production and trade can conveniently be described as ‘intra-industry specialization’ as contrasted with
‘inter-industry specialization’ which results when countries produce and export but do not import the output of some
industries while they import but do not produce or export the output of some other industries” (p. 36).
53 The 10 East Asian economies were China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand. The two other Asian economies were Bangladesh and India.
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Rana et al. (2012) followed exactly the method of Shin and Wang (2003) in measuring intra-industry trade
intensity. By dividing the sample data over 1986–2007 into two periods, they obtained similar results. They
also compared East Asia to the Europe and asserted that the relationship between trade intensity and output
co-movements was stronger in East Asia. These studies matched trade data with industry classifications and
used the Grubel & Lloyd index to calculate the intra-industry trade intensity.54
Another approach to separate intra-industry trade from inter-industry trade is to use unit-value (UV)
differentials between exported and imported goods. What’s more, this method is able to distinguish vertical
intra-industry trade from horizontal intra-industry trade. A number of important studies contributed to the
wide use of this method. In 1991, Abd-el-Rahman made an attempt to distinguish vertical intra-industry
trade from horizontal intra-industry trade. Abd-el-Rahman used unit-value (UV) differentials between
exported and imported goods. The approach was based on the assumption that the gap between the unit
value of imports and the unit value of exports for each commodity revealed the difference in the quality of
products exported and imported between the two economies. This is the so-called “the threshold method”.
Subsequent studies on intra-industry trade such as Greenaway, Hine, and Milner (1995) and Fontagné,
Freudenberg, and Péridy (1997) adapted the threshold method to the Grubel & Lloyd index.
A growing number of studies on East Asian trade integration have followed this strategy. Fukao,
Ishido, and Ito (2003) showed that the share of vertical intra-industry trade in total intra-regional trade
experienced an explosive increase from 1996 to 2000, the rate of which far exceeded that of the European
Union during the same period. They also mentioned that although the share of inter-industry trade still
accounted for the majority of the overall trade, the share of intra-industry trade increased rapidly using data
over 1996–2000. Ando (2006) used the threshold method to examine the international trade patterns in the
region based on data of year 1990, 1996 and 2000. They provided additional evidence on the drastic
increase of vertical intra-industry trade and showed that vertical international production sharing became an
essential part of each East Asian economy.
The existing literature has showed that the expansion of intra-industry trade, which is comprised of
vertical intra-industry trade and horizontal intra-industry trade, is likely to increase the synchronization of
business cycles (Shin and Wang, 2003; Rana et al., 2012). However, recent evidence on the share of
54 Grubel and Lloyd (1971). The Grubel & Lloyd index in percentage form is:
ܫܶܫ ௜௝ = ෍ ൫ൣܺ ௜௝௞ +ܯ௜௝௞൯− หܺ ௜௝௞ − ܯ௜௝௞ห൧௡௞ୀଵ
෍ ൫ܺ ௜௝௞ + ܯ௜௝௞൯௡
௞ୀଵ
× 100
where Xijk and Mijk are the value of exports from i to j and imports from j to i respectively in industry k.
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intra-industry trade versus inter-industry trade in East Asia is mixed. For example, Moon and Rhee (2012)
showed that the share of intra-industry trade in the region grew quickly from 1990 to 2000 but changed in
different directions and varied in magnitude by comparing 2009 with 2000 based on the Grubel & Lloyd
index. What’s more, there are voices that the growth of parts and components trade in the region began to
slow down. The mixed evidence on the importance of intra-industry trade in the overall trade of the region
in recent years motivates this writing.
This essay also adopts the threshold method to distinguish intra-industry trade from inter-industry
trade and to separate vertical intra-industry trade from horizontal intra-industry trade. The essay is intended
to contribute to the literature on the impact of vertical intra-industry trade on the correlation of business
cycles in the region. This research may complement the existing literature on trade integration and
economic linkages in the region.
This essay is also related to the existing literature on the examination of the economic disturbances in
the region. For instance, Lee and Koh (2012) assessed the desirability of forming a monetary union in the
region by decomposing shocks into demand and supply shock following the structural VAR model
developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). They found an increased symmetry of shocks among
economies after the 1997–1998 financial crisis. Lee and Azali (2012) studied the economic shocks in the
region by considering a model of an economy in which output was influenced by global, regional and
country-specific shock. They found a rising role of the regional factor in influencing the output using the
Bayesian State-Space Based approach. This essay looked into the impact of the recent global financial
crisis on the asymmetry of shocks among economies in the region.
5.3 Trade Integration in East Asia
East Asian economies became important players in global trade in recent decades. The trading boom since
the 1990s was accompanied by a changing trade pattern inside the region. It has been increasingly
recognized that East Asian trade integration has new properties that differed from foreign trade between
industrial countries or between industrial and developing countries in the 20th century. Table 5.1 shows
trade growth in the region. Hanson (2012) suggested that falling trade barriers, expanding global
production networks and perhaps a much finer degree of international specialization might explain the
rapid expansion of trade relative to GDP in the low- and middle-income economies that were integrated
into the global economy in recent decades including those in East Asia.
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Table 5.1 Trade (% of GDP), East Asian Economies, 1994–2013
Economy 1994 1999 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Brunei 99.5 104.2 100.6 95.8 105.9 108.6 114.3 108.2 112.5 108.6
Cambodia 64.5 94.2 134.5 138.3 133.3 105.1 113.6 113.6 131.3 139.5
China 41.2 38.0 65.5 68.0 62.3 49.0 55.0 54.6 51.8 50.3
Hong Kong SAR 266.7 248.9 364.6 396.8 407.4 374.6 432.9 447.1 450.0 458.3
Indonesia 51.9 62.9 59.8 54.8 58.6 45.5 47.5 51.3 50.1 49.5
Japan 16.0 18.8 24.5 33.8 35.2 25.0 29.1 31.2 31.3 35.1
Korea, Rep. 49.9 65.4 72.8 77.2 99.9 90.4 95.7 110.0 109.9 102.8
Lao PDR 64.8 80.1 77.5 82.5 76.2 71.0 73.5 80.3 87.5 83.4
Macao SAR 143.4 148.7 173.7 159.4 160.3 143.7 155.8 165.3 159.7 152.5
Malaysia 179.9 217.6 210.4 192.5 176.7 162.6 169.7 166.6 158.9 154.1
Myanmar 2.9 1.1 0.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Philippines 74.0 94.9 102.6 86.6 76.3 65.6 71.4 67.7 64.7 59.9
Singapore 315.8 337.5 406.3 398.7 439.7 360.2 372.1 374.0 367.7 358.0
Thailand 82.6 104.0 136.5 138.5 150.3 126.2 135.1 149.4 148.8 143.8
Vietnam 77.5 102.8 122.3 154.6 154.3 136.3 152.2 162.9 156.6 163.7
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Rapid trade growth is a common phenomenon for East Asian economies from the 1990s. Due to
divergence in resources and development stages, economies vary in trade structure. Figure 5.1 examines
foreign trade in individual economies. As for Brunei, the increase of exports overwhelmed that of imports
and a large share of trade surplus belongs to trade in primary goods and processed goods. Cambodia is a net
importer of processed goods but net exporter of consumption goods; trade in the two categories of products
increased sharply from 2001 to 2012.
Trade boom has also swept other ASEAN countries. Foreign trade grew tremendously in Indonesia.
A large share of trade surplus is due to trade in primary goods and consumption goods. Noticeably, imports
of processed goods, parts and components and capital goods increased rapidly during the last few years,
which indicates the rising role of Indonesia in participating in the international production network. In the
case of Malaysia, a significant share of trade growth is due to trade in processed goods and parts and
components goods. The Philippines also witnessed a rising share of trade in processed goods and parts and
components from the 1990s; however, the share declined slightly from 2006 to 2012. It is now a net
exporter of parts and components but net importer of processed goods. Foreign trade of Singapore also
achieved major increase during this period. Trade in processed goods and parts and components contributed
a large share of trade growth. As for Thailand, trade increased at a high rate for years. It is now a net
importer of processed goods and parts and components goods and net exporter of consumption goods.
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International trade in Vietnam also ballooned over the past few years. Trade in processed goods increased at
an amazing rate from the 2000s. It is now a net importer of processed goods and parts and components
goods and net exporter of consumption goods and capital goods.
China becomes a big trading and exporting country during decades of time. It is now a big exporter
of consumption goods and capital goods and big importer of primary goods. Trade in parts and components
rocketed and grew as quickly as trade in final goods. Imports of processed goods and parts and components
goods to Hong Kong SAR also increased steadily. This is in line with the fact that a considerable amount of
imports to Hong Kong SAR were re-imported to mainland China for production. Taiwan (China) has been
accumulating trade surpluses in consumption goods and capital goods. Its trade in processed goods and
parts and components goods in recent years multiplied very quickly. The two categories of goods combine
to occupy a large share in its total trade. Taiwan (China) now is a net exporter of processed goods and parts
and components and net importer of primary goods.
Japan is one of the largest trading countries in the region. It is a big net importer of primary goods
and net exporter of parts and components goods and capital goods. Its trade in processed goods and parts
and components goods grew steadily from the 1990s. Trade in Korea multiplied quickly, too. It is now a net
importer of primary goods and net exporter of processed goods, parts and components goods and capital
goods. Trade in processed goods and parts and components increased quickly in Korea.
Individual economies have different trading composition in primary goods, intermediate goods and
final goods. Nevertheless, an overview of figure 5.1 points to the fact that these economies commonly
achieved great trade expansion over the previous decades and trade in processed goods and parts and
components goods became more important.
Trade increase in intermediate goods for an individual economy is distributed unevenly among
trading partners. The Appendix lists the share of exports and imports of individual East Asian economies by
production stage and by partner (ASEAN, East Asia, European Union–27, and the United States). The
share of intra-regional exports and imports in parts and components increased to varying degrees for Brunei,
Cambodia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan (China). The share of intra-regional exports
in parts and components increased rapidly for Singapore and Thailand and at a lesser rate for Indonesia.
Although the share of intra-regional trade in parts and components and processed goods declined for China,
Hong Kong SAR, and Vietnam, it remains high compared to trade with the European Union and the United
States.
The dynamic trade integration process in East Asia has new properties that differ from industrial
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countries in the 20th century. The mixed evidence on intra-industry trade intensity in East Asia in the
literature raises the question about how vertical intra-industry trade and intra-industry trade as a whole
changed over the last decade and what kind of implications they have for the correlation of business cycles
in the region. This essay sets out to answer this question.
Figure 5.1 Exports and Imports by Production Stage, East Asian Economies, 1991–2012
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Figure 5.1 Continued
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Figure 5.1 Continued
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Figure 5.1 Continued
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Figure 5.1 Continued
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
5.4 Methodology and Data
This analysis separate trade into three types: (i) inter-industry trade; (ii) horizontal intra-industry trade; (iii)
vertical intra-industry trade based on the following method.
Trade intensity index of trade type Z for pairs of economies i and j is:
ℎܵ ܽ݁ݎ ݋݂ ݐܽݎ ݀ ݁ݐݕ݌݁ ܼ = ∑ ൫ܯ௜௝௞ +ܯ௝௜௞൯௞∈௓
∑ ൫ܯ௜௝௞ +ܯ௝௜௞൯௞
where Z is any of the three types of trade defined by table 5.2; and Mijk and Mjik are imports values from j to
i and imports from i to j respectively in industry k. For example, the intra-industry trade intensity between
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economy i and j is to divide the intra-industry trade value by the total bilateral trade value, i.e.,
ܫܶܫ ௜௝ = ∑ ൫ெ ೔ೕೖାெ ೕ೔ೖ൯ೕ∈ೋ∗∑ ൫ெ ೔ೕೖାெ ೕ೔ೖ൯ೕ ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ ܼ ∗ = ൜ݖ∈ ܼ∗ | ெ ௜௡൫ெ ೔ೕ೥,ெ ೕ೔೥൯ெ ௔௫൫ெ ೔ೕ೥,ெ ೕ೔೥൯> 0.1ൠ.
Table 5.2 Method to Separate Different Types of Trade
Trade types CriteriaDegree of overlap Unit value differentials
Inter-industry trade
ܯ ݅݊ ൫ܯ௜௝௞,ܯ௝௜௞൯
ܯ ܽݔ൫ܯ௜௝௞,ܯ௝௜௞൯≤ 0.1
Horizontal intra-industry trade
ܯ ݅݊ ൫ܯ௜௝௞,ܯ௝௜௞൯
ܯ ܽݔ൫ܯ௜௝௞,ܯ௝௜௞൯> 0.1
11 + ߙ ≤ ܷ ௜ܸ௝௞ܷ ௝ܸ௜௞ ≤ 1 + ߙ
Vertical intra-industry trade
ܷ ௜ܸ௝௞
ܷ ௝ܸ௜௞
< 11 + ߙ ݋ݎ ܷ ௜ܸ௝௞ܷ ௝ܸ௜௞ > 1 + ߙ
Notes: Most previous studies used only import data. Mijk and Mjik are imports values from j to i and imports values from i
to j respectively in industry k. Previous studies used different threshold values (ߙ=15% or 25%) to differentiate
horizontal intra-industry trade and vertical intra-industry trade.
Source: Adapted by the author based on table 2.5 in Fukao et al. (2003), p. 474.
This analysis constructed a new variable, i.e., the share of vertical intra-industry trade in total
intra-industry trade. The formula is expressed as follows:
ܸܫܶܫ ௜௝ ( ℎܵ ܽ݁ݎ ݋݂ ݁ݒ ݎ݅ݐܿܽ ݈ܫܶܫ ݅݊ ܫܶܫ ) = ∑ ൫ܯ௜௝௞ +ܯ௝௜௞൯௞∈௓భ∗
∑ ൫ܯ௜௝௞ +ܯ௝௜௞൯௞∈௓∗
where the intra-industry trade set ܼ∗ is already defined and the vertical intra-industry set is ଵܼ∗ =
൜ݖ∈ ଵܼ
∗ |݁݅ ݐℎ ݁ݎெ ௜௡൫ெ ೔ೕ೥,ெ ೕ೔೥൯
ெ ௔௫൫ெ ೔ೕ೥,ெ ೕ೔೥൯> 0.1ܽ݊݀௎௏೔ೕ೥௎௏ೕ೔೥ < ଵଵାఈ ,݋ݎெ ௜௡൫ெ ೔ೕ೥,ெ ೕ೔೥൯ெ ௔௫൫ெ ೔ೕ೥,ெ ೕ೔೥൯> 0.1ܽ݊݀௎௏೔ೕ೥௎௏ೕ೔೥ > 1 + ߙൠ.
The two variables, IITij and VIITij, are supposed to capture the intensity of intra-industry trade in total
trade and the intensity of vertical intra-industry trade in total intra-industry trade respectively. Aside from
the two variables, the estimating equation also tests a bilateral trade intensity variable.
Trade intensity between economy i and j is:
ܶܫ௜௝ = ܯ௜௝+ ܯ௝௜ܺ௜+ ܯ௜+ ௝ܺ+ ܯ௝
90
where ܺ௜ denotes the total export of economy i to the world and ܯ௜ the total import of economy i from
the world; ௝ܺ and ܯ௝ are the respective exports and imports of economy j.
The estimating equation is:
ܥ݋ݎݎ௜௝ఛ = ߙ+ ߚଵܫܶܫ ௜௝ఛ+ ߚଶܸܫܶܫ ௜௝ఛ+ ߚଷܶܫ௜௝ఛ+ ߝ௜௝ఛ (1)
where Corrijτ is the correlation of business cycles over time span τ; IITijt is the intra-industry trade intensity;
VIITijt is the share of vertical intra-industry trade in total intra-industry trade; TIijt is the bilateral trade
intensity; εijτ represents other influences on the correlation of business cycles.
Data are available for 12 East Asian economies: Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong SAR,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Macao SAR, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Two proxies for correlation of business cycles are used. One is the correlation of output. Output is
measured as the logarithm form of real gross domestic product (GDP). Real GDP is by deflating the
nominal GDP data using the GDP deflator indices. The nominal GDP data and the GDP deflator data are
taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. Quarterly data ranges from 1989Q1 to
2014Q3.
The other proxy for correlation of business cycles used cycle series produced by filtering quarterly
log real GDP based on the Hodrick-Prescott method. The value for the parameter lamda is set to be 1600
following Hodrick and Prescott (1997). Appendix 5.2 plots the Hodrick-Prescott filtered results.
As for the independent variables, data are taken from United Nations Comtrade database (at 3-digit
level, SITC Rev. 3). Annual data ranges from 1989 to 2013. The annual trade intensity indices that are
calculated from the raw data failed to exhibit much variation. Therefore, data are divided into four
sub-periods: (i) from 1989 to 1993; (ii) from 1994 to 2001 (excluding year 1997, 1998 and 1999); (iii) from
2002 to 2006; (iv) from 2007 to 2013. Since the regional financial crisis at the end of the 20th century
greatly distorted the growth movements in individual economies, data from 1997 to 1999 are dropped.
Annual trade data are averaged over each period. The correlation coefficients of output and the correlation
coefficients of Hodrick-Prescott filtered cycles are calculated over each period respectively. Table 5.3
presents a summary.
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Table 5.3 Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description
IIT value 251 6.47E+09 1.97E+10 3305 2.02E+11 US$
VIIT value (15% threshold) 251 2.22E+09 6.49E+09 3305 6.67E+10 US$
VIIT value (25% threshold) 251 1.96E+09 5.80E+09 3305 6.29E+10 US$
HIIT value (15% threshold) 251 4.64E+08 1.56E+09 0 1.35E+10 US$
HIIT value (25% threshold) 251 7.21E+08 2.25E+09 0 2.15E+10 US$
IIT share in total trade 251 27.06 26.61 0.01 87.56 Percentage
VIIT share in total trade (15% threshold) 251 10.22 10.26 0.00 50.91 Percentage
VIIT share in total trade (25% threshold) 251 9.04 9.11 0.00 50.91 Percentage
HIIT share in total trade (15% threshold) 251 2.04 3.43 0.00 18.55 Percentage
HIIT share in total trade (25% threshold) 251 3.20 4.78 0.00 33.55 Percentage
Inter-industry trade in total trade 251 72.94 26.61 12.44 99.99 Percentage
VIIT share in total IIT (15% threshold) 251 46.21 24.57 0.65 100.00 Percentage
VIIT share in total IIT (25% threshold) 251 42.89 24.34 0.65 100.00 Percentage
HIIT share in total IIT (15% threshold) 251 5.86 9.29 0.00 88.83 Percentage
HIIT share in total IIT (25% threshold) 251 9.17 11.31 0.00 88.83 Percentage
Bilateral trade share 251 1.08 1.52 0.00 8.38 Percentage
Correlation of log GDP 143 0.71 0.30 -0.37 1.00 [-1, 1]
Correlation of cycles filtered using the
Hodrick-Prescott method
143 0.28 0.42 -0.88 1.00
[-1, 1]
Notes: IIT is the abbreviation of intra-industry trade. HIIT is the abbreviation of horizontal intra-industry trade. VIIT is
the abbreviation of vertical intra-industry trade.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 5.2 plots the mean values of the correlation coefficients of output, the mean values of
intra-industry trade share in total trade and the mean values of vertical intra-industry trade share in total
trade by periods. The first panel shows that on average, the correlation of business cycles and the
intra-industry trade intensity moved in tandem. Intra-industry trade share in total trade grew slowly from
period 1 to period 2 but increased sharply from period 2 to period 3. The average intra-industry trade share
in total trade increased by about 10% over the first three periods and reached the peak in the third period
from 2002 to 2006. However, it fell in the fourth period when the global financial crisis cast a shadow on
the world economy.
The second panel of figure 5.2 shows the mean values of intra-industry trade share in total trade and
the mean values of vertical intra-industry trade share in total trade by periods. The vertical intra-industry
trade curve using 15% as the threshold to separate horizontal intra-industry trade from vertical
intra-industry trade is slightly above that using 25% as the threshold because a lower value of threshold
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means a larger portion of bilateral trade flows are categorized as vertical intra-industry trade. The vertical
intra-industry trade in total trade curve moved in a slightly different way and changed more over time than
the intra-industry trade curve. Vertical intra-industry trade share in total trade decreased in large scale in the
fourth period from 2007 to 2013. The world economy was enmeshed in a recession during this period and
figure 5.2 suggests that it had an impact on the intra-regional trade flows.
The independent variables in the estimating equation (1) capture the demand side of shocks to
economies. Real business cycles theories suggest that apart from demand shocks, there are a variety of
other factors that influence business cycles. In order to control for these unobserved characteristics, this
analysis considers both the fixed-effects (FE) model and the random effects (RE) model.
The equation for the fixed-effects model is: ௜ܻ௧= ࢼܺ௜௧+ ߙ௜+ ߝ௜௧, where ࢼ is 1 × n matrix, ܺ௜௧ is
n × 1 matrix, ߙ௜ denotes the fixed effects for each group of observations, and ߝ௜௧ is the error term. Thus
the slope coefficients using the fixed-effects model are the same as the slope coefficients using ordinary
least squares model with q-1 binary dummies (where q is the number of cross section units). The equation
for the random-effects model is: ௜ܻ௧= ߙ+ ࢼܺ௜௧+ ݑ௜௧+ ߝ௜௧, where ࢼ is 1 × n matrix, ܺ௜௧ is n × 1 matrix,
ݑ௜௧ is the between-group error term which is assumed to be uncorrelated with regressors ܺ௜௧, and ߝ௜௧ is
the within-group error term. In order to choose between the fixed effects and the random effects, Hausman
test is conducted.
Figure 5.2 Correlation of Output, Intra-Industry Trade Share and Vertical Intra-Industry Trade Share in Total
Trade
Notes: IIT is the abbreviation of intra-industry trade. VIIT is the abbreviation of vertical intra-industry trade. The left axis
in the first panel indicates the correlation of output and the right axis is the IIT share in total trade. The left axis in
the second panel denotes IIT share in total trade and the right axis is the VIIT share in total trade.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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5.5 Estimation
Regression is first done including the two regressors, IIT and VIIT. Table 5.4 presents the estimating results.
The first group of the regression uses the correlation of output as the dependent variable. The coefficients
of the IIT variable are statistically significant but the coefficients of the VIIT variable are not statistically
significant. Thus it cannot be rejected that the share of vertical intra-industry trade in intra-industry trade
does not affect the correlation of output between pairs of economies after controlling for the effect of
intra-industry trade share in total trade.
The second group of the regression uses the correlation of Hodrick-Prescott filtered cycles (hereafter
HP cycles) as the proxy for the correlation of business cycles. Figure 5.3 plots the mean values of the HP
cycles, the mean values of intra-industry trade share in total trade and the mean values of vertical
intra-industry trade share in intra-industry trade.
Figure 5.3 Correlation of Hodrick-Prescott Filtered Cycles, Intra-Industry Trade Share in Total Trade and
Vertical Intra-Industry Trade Share in Intra-Industry Trade
Notes: IIT is the abbreviation of intra-industry trade. VIIT is the abbreviation of vertical intra-industry trade. The left axis
in the first panel indicates correlation of the HP cycles and the right axis is the intra-industry trade share in total
trade. Similarly, the left axis in the second panel denotes intra-industry trade share in total trade and the right axis
is the vertical intra-industry trade share in intra-industry trade.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Unlike the close co-movements of the average correlation of output and the average share of
intra-industry trade in total trade in the first panel of figure 5.2, there is a big difference in the movements
of the average correlation of the HP cycles and the average share of intra-industry trade in total trade.
Although both series grew slightly from period 1 to period 2, they moved in opposite directions from
period 3. In fact, the correlation of the HP cycles showed a V-shaped recovery from period 2 to period 4;
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different from the correlation of output, correlation of the HP cycles actually increased rapidly from period
3 to period 4. The second panel of figure 5.3 depicts the mean values of intra-industry trade share in total
trade and the mean values of vertical intra-industry trade share in intra-industry trade. A comparison to
figure 5.2 shows clearly that although on average vertical intra-industry trade volume increased rapidly
over the first three periods until 2006, the long-run movement of the vertical intra-industry trade share in
intra-industry trade is a gradual decline. Besides, the average share of vertical intra-industry trade in
intra-industry trade decreased by more than 10% over the four periods.
Table 5.4 also presents the Hausman test results. In the case of using the correlation of output as the
proxy for the correlation of business cycles, the null hypothesis that random effects could adequately model
the specific factors of each pair of economies is rejected at the 5 percent level. On contrary, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected when the correlation of HP cycles is used as the dependent variable. However,
the chosen models from the two groups of the regression yield similar results.
The last two columns in table 5.4 list the estimates after controlling for heteroskedasticity. The
adjusted standard errors for the IIT variable and the VIIT variable are smaller after controlling for
heteroskedasticity. Nevertheless, controlling for heteroskedasticity does not change the essential results
about the impact of vertical intra-industry trade on the correlation of business cycles. In both cases, the
coefficients of the IIT variable (intra-industry trade share in total trade) are statistically significant at the 1
percent level while the coefficients of the VIIT variable (vertical intra-industry trade share in intra-industry
trade) are statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. The scale of the estimated effect of intra-industry
trade intensity variable, IIT, is slightly different using two proxies for the correlation of business cycles.
The coefficient of the IIT variable is much smaller when the cycles data based on the Hodrick-Prescott
filtering method are used as the proxy.
The results indicate that on average the correlation of business cycles increased by about 0.3–0.7, if
the share of intra-industry trade in total trade grew from 0 to 100%. The magnitude of such effects is
considerable taken into account the fact that the dependent variable falls into the interval [-1, 1] and that the
model examines only the demand side that affect business cycles.
Next, this analysis re-examines the possible role of bilateral trade intensity. F&R originally used the
TI variable to investigate the impact of trade integration on the correlation of business cycles. Later work
such as Shin and Wang (2003) and Rana et al. (2012) added the intra-industry trade intensity variable and
treated the TI variable as a useful measure of demand spillovers. Empirical tests are also conducted by
adding the bilateral trade intensity variable, TI, as the third regressor. Table 5.5 presents the results.
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Table 5.4 Fixed Effects Model and Random Effects Model Estimates, 25% Threshold
Independent variable: correlation of output or HP cycles
(1) (2) (3) Controlling for heteroskedasticity
FE RE FE RE FE RE
IIT 0.007
(2.79)***
0.004
(3.35)***
0.004
(1.37)
0.003
(2.20)**
0.007
(3.46)***
0.003
(2.59)***
VIIT -0.001
(-0.31)
0.002
(1.36)
-0.001
(-0.28)
-0.001
(-0.51)
-0.001
(-0.38)
-0.001
(-0.55)
_cons 0.496
(3.82)***
0.513
(6.47)***
0.172
(1.22)
0.185
(1.73)*
0.496
(4.99)***
0.185
(2.16)**
Rho 0.528 0.258 0.637 0.583 0.528 0.583
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143
Groups 54 54 54 54 54 54
Obs. per
group
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Prob>F 0.011 0.297 0.003
Prob>chi2 0.004 0.038 0.025
Hausman
test
Prob > chi2 = 0.019 Prob > chi2 = 0.954
Notes: t statistics (FE) or z statisitcs (RE) in parentheses. Rho statistics indicate the fraction of variance due to difference
between groups.
***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 5.5 Coefficients of the Bilateral Trade Intensity Variable, 25% Threshold
Independent variable: correlation of output or HP cycles
(1) (2) (3) Controlling for heteroskedasticity
FE RE FE RE FE RE
IIT 0.003
(1.15)
0.005
(3.60)***
0.002
(0.66)
0.004
(2.17)**
0.003
(1.42)
0.004
(2.46)**
VIIT -0.001
(-0.35)
0.002
(1.29)
-0.001
(-0.28)
-0.001
(-0.50)
-0.001
(-0.41)
-0.001
(-0.55)
TI 0.274
(3.40)***
-0.035
(-1.52)
0.121
(-1.31)
-0.022
(-0.63)
0.274
(2.73)***
-0.022
(-0.79)
_cons 0.265
(1.89)*
0.518
(6.50)***
0.070
(0.44)
0.190
(1.77)*
0.265
(1.90)*
0.190
(2.22)**
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Table 5.5 Continued
Independent variable: correlation of output or HP cycles
(1) (2) (3) Controlling for heteroskedasticity
FE RE FE RE FE RE
Rho 0.846 0.294 0.709 0.581 0.846 0.581
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143
Groups 54 54 54 54 54 54
Obs. Per
group
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Prob>F 0.000 0.250 0.001
Prob>chi2 0.004 0.074 0.060
Hausman
test
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Prob > chi2 = 0.395
Notes: t statistics (FE) or z statisitcs (RE) in parentheses. Rho statistics indicate the fraction of variance due to difference
between groups.
***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
The first group of the regression in table 5.5 uses the correlation of output as the dependent variable.
Using the FE model, the coefficient of the TI variable is economically and statistically significant. The
inclusion of the bilateral trade intensity variable made the coefficient of the IIT variable statistically
insignificant. Using the RE model, the TI variable is economically and statistically insignificant and it does
not change the significance levels of the IIT variable or the VIIT variable. The Hausman test rejects the null
hypothesis that random effects could adequately model the specific factors that belong to each pair of
economies.
The second group of the regression uses the correlation of the HP cycles as the dependent variable.
Using the FE model, all coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. Using the RE
model, the TI variable is statistically insignificant and it does not change the significance levels of the IIT
variable or the VIIT variable. The Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis that random effects could
adequately model the specific factors of each pair of economies thus the RE model is chosen.
The last two columns of the table show the regression results after controlling for heteroskedasticity.
It is clear that controlling for heteroskedasticity only yielded similar results. In sum, the empirical results
are ambivalent in terms of the coefficients of the bilateral trade intensity variable, TI. When the correlation
of the HP cycles is used as the proxy for the correlation of business cycles, no evidence is found about the
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impact of bilateral trade intensity.
The above analysis uses 25% as the threshold to divide intra-industry trade into horizontal and
vertical intra-industry trade following the practice of Fukao et al. (2003). Preceding studies such as
Abd-el-Rahman (1991), Greenaway et al. (1995) and Fontagné et al. (1997) mainly used 15% as the
threshold. To examine whether the choice of ߙ changes the basic results about the impact of vertical
intra-industry trade on the correlation of business cycles, this section also runs regression using 15% as the
threshold. Table 5.6 presents the estimates. Table 5.7 tests the bilateral trade intensity variable. In each table,
the first group of the regression uses the correlation of output as dependent variable and the second group
of the regression uses the correlation of the HP cycles as the proxy for the correlation of business cycles.
The tables also list the Hausman test results and the results after controlling for heteroskedasticity. It can be
seen that replacing the 25% threshold by the 15% threshold does not change the conclusions about the
impact of vertical intra-industry trade and raise doubts about the effect of the bilateral trade intensity
variable.
Table 5.6 Fixed Effects Model and Random Effects Model Estimates, 15% Threshold
Independent variable: correlation of output or HP cycles
(1) (2) (3) Controlling for heteroskedasticity
FE RE FE RE FE RE
IIT 0.007
(2.82)***
0.003
(3.35)***
0.004
(1.38)
0.003
(2.16)**
0.007
(3.55)***
0.003
(2.46)**
VIIT -0.000
(-0.24)
0.002
(1.38)
-0.000
(-0.24)
-0.001
(-0.75)
-0.000
(-0.29)
-0.001
(-0.83)
_cons 0.490
(3.67)***
0.508
(6.26)***
0.170
(1.17)
0.208
(1.90)*
0.490
(4.84)***
0.208
(2.33)*
Rho 0.528 0.255 0.637 0.579 0.528 0.579
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143
Groups 54 54 54 54 54 54
Obs. per
group
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Prob>F 0.012 0.300 0.003
Prob>chi2 0.004 0.032 0.025
Hausman
test
Prob > chi2 = 0.021 Prob > chi2 = 0.795
Notes: t statistics (FE) or z statisitcs (RE) in parentheses. Rho statistics indicate the fraction of variance due to difference
between groups.
***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 5.7 Coefficients of the Bilateral Trade Intensity Variable, 15% Threshold
Independent variable: correlation of output or HP cycles
(1) (2) (3) Controlling for heteroskedasticity
FE RE FE RE FE RE
IIT 0.003
(1.16)
0.005
(3.62)***
0.002
(0.66)
0.004
(2.13)**
0.003
(1.47)
0.004
(2.35)**
VIIT -0.001
(-0.31)
0.002
(1.35)
-0.000
(-0.26)
-0.001
(-0.74)
-0.001
(-0.35)
-0.001
(-0.81)
TI 0.274
(3.40)***
-0.035
(-1.55)
0.121
(1.31)
-0.022
(-0.63)
0.274
(2.73)***
-0.022
(-0.78)
_cons 0.262
(1.83)*
0.511
(6.28)***
0.069
(0.42)
0.212
(1.93)*
0.262
(1.86)*
0.212
(2.38)**
Rho 0.846 0.289 0.709 0.577 0.846 0.577
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143
Groups 54 54 54 54 54 54
Obs. per
group
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Min = 1
Avg = 2.6
Max = 4
Prob>F 0.000 0.251 0.001
Prob>chi2 0.003 0.064 0.058
Hausman
test
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Prob > chi2 = 0.334
Notes: t statistics (FE) or z statisitcs (RE) in parentheses. Rho statistics indicate the fraction of variance due to difference
between groups.
***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
To summarize, the results are three-fold. First, the share of vertical intra-industry trade in total
intra-industry trade does not affect the correlation of business cycles between pairs of economies after
controlling for the effect of the intra-industry trade share in total trade. Using different proxies for the
correlation of business cycles, either the correlation of real output or the correlation of the HP cycles, does
not change the conclusions about the impact of vertical intra-industry trade or intra-industry trade on the
correlation of business cycles.
Nevertheless, switching to the HP cycles data from real output data may change the relationship
between the individual-level characteristics with the independent variables. The cycle series using the
Hodrick-Prescott method tend to describe the deviations from long-run output trends. As mentioned, real
business cycles theories suggest that there are a variety of other factors that lead to output fluctuation apart
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from demand shocks. Examples of supply shocks include shocks in technology and human capital. When
nominal rigidity is present, monetary policies can also influence output deviations from long-run trends.
What’s more, economies vary significantly from each other in the mechanisms of absorbing shocks. Factors
such as policies and financial friction may have a considerable impact on real business cycles in emerging
markets (e.g., García-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe, 2010). These studies revealed a variety of influencing
factors besides intra-industry trade. Results in this essay tend to support that the variety of other shocks can
be adequately modeled using the random-effects model.
The results are also robust to the adoption of a different threshold (15%). The basic implication
remain unchanged, i.e., intra-industry trade intensity tend to increase the synchronization of business cycles
but the share of vertical intra-industry trade in total intra-industry trade is unlikely to affect the correlation
of business cycles.
Second, the impact of intra-industry trade on the correlation of business cycles is economically
important. The results show that on average, the correlation of output increased by about 0.3–0.7 if the
share of intra-industry trade in total trade grew from 0 to 100%. The magnitude of increase cannot be
underestimated taken into account that the correlation coefficients fall into the interval [-1, 1] and the
model only captures the demand side of business cycles.
Third, the results show that the bilateral trade intensity variable, TI, became redundant when the
intra-industry trade intensity variable is included in the regression when the correlation of the HP cycles is
used as the proxy for the correlation of business cycles.
5.6 Discussion
East Asian economies were affected by the 1997–1998 regional financial crisis and the recent global
financial crisis that started from 2008. Figure 5.4 shows that the annual GDP growth rates in the fifteen
East Asian economies over the last two decades. It is clear that economic growth was frustrated from 2008
to 2009. Japan and Thailand had the lowest growth rates in 2008. Economies recovered in 2010. However,
a number of economies including Japan, Thailand, Macao SAR, Brunei, Hong Kong SAR and Singapore
were again under pressure with varied degrees from 2011 to 2012.
The recent global financial crisis brought a halt to the strengthened synchronization of business
cycles among East Asian economies. Table 5.8 lists the average correlation coefficients of the HP cycles
over a 3-year time window. Each row shows the change of average correlation coefficients for a particular
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economy over time. For example, the first number -0.20 denotes the simple average of the 10 pairwise
correlation coefficients between Brunei and the other 10 economies from 2003 to 2005. The last row of the
table calculates the average numbers of the correlation coefficients among the total eleven economies.55
The total average correlation coefficients of the East Asian economies increased steadily before the recent
global financial crisis from 0.27 to 0.41. However, the average number decreased sharply when the crisis
shocked the region around 2007 and 2008. The decrease signifies the different performance of the East
Asian economies at the initial stage of the global financial crisis. The total average correlation coefficients
rebounded quickly. Noticeably, the total average of pairwise correlation coefficients in the middle of the
recent global crisis was even higher than the pre-crisis level. Nevertheless, divergence seemed to re-emerge
entering into year 2012. As showed by figure 5.4, economic recovery was rather weak in a number of
economies while the rest maintained stable growth.
Figure 5.4 GDP Growth Rates in East Asia (Annual %), 1994–2013
Notes: The vertical lines mark the start of the 1997–1998 financial crisis and the recent global financial crisis respectively.
Source: Author’s calculations.
55 The number of pairwise correlation coefficients is ୬×(୬ିଵ)
ଶ
= ଵଵ×ଵ଴
ଶ
.
-1
0
0
10
20
30
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Brunei Cambodia China Hong Kong SAR Indonesia
Japan Korea, Rep. Lao PDR Macao SAR Malaysia
Myanmar Philippine Singapore Thailand Vietnam
101
What’s more, table 5.8 shows that several economies were more correlated with other economies in
the region. The average correlation coefficients of Hong Kong SAR, China, Macao SAR, Singapore,
Malaysia and Korea were among the highest on the dawn of the recent global financial crisis. On the other
hand, the business cycles of Malaysia, Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR, Korea, and Japan were more
synchronized with the rest of the region in the middle of the crisis. It should be reminded that this approach
ignored the influence of economic size by giving equal weights to each pair of economies.
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 reveal richer information about the correlation of business cycles between pairs
of economies. The business cycles of a group of six economies (Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Macao SAR,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore) were closely correlated with each other. Members of the six
economies also had relatively high business synchronization with China or Japan. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show
a clear picture about the connections between economies and illustrate the degree and the pattern of East
Asian economies before and during the recent global crisis. Interestingly, the correlation coefficients
between China and Japan were low.
Table 5.8 Average Correlation Coefficients, Cycles Filtered Using the Hodrick-Prescott Method, 2004–2011
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Brunei -0.20 -0.04 0.13 -0.03 0.33 0.30 0.41 0.29
China 0.46 0.52 0.57 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.47 0.45
Hong Kong
SAR
0.50 0.51 0.59 0.41 0.65 0.59 0.61 0.41
Indonesia -0.40 -0.27 -0.23 -0.09 0.07 0.06 0.00 -0.08
Japan 0.27 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.54 0.50 0.56 0.14
Korea 0.39 0.45 0.52 0.36 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.42
Macao SAR 0.46 0.40 0.57 0.28 0.52 0.48 0.60 0.43
Malaysia 0.41 0.40 0.53 0.37 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.42
Philippine 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.23 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.31
Singapore 0.47 0.49 0.57 0.30 0.55 0.43 0.45 -0.13
Thailand 0.23 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.49 0.36 0.09 -0.24
Total average 0.27 0.30 0.41 0.23 0.46 0.42 0.44 0.22
Notes: Correlation coefficients are calculated using quarterly data of the current year, the previous year and the following
year. For example, year 2004 denotes correlation coefficient using data from 2003Q1 to 2005Q4; Cambodia is
dropped from this analysis due to missing data from 2008. Numbers above 0.50 are in bold type.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 5.9 Pairwise Correlation Coefficients over 2003–2007
BRN KHM CHN HKG IDN JPN KOR MAC MYS PHL SGP THA
BRN 1.00
KHM 0.71 1.00
CHN 0.04 0.13 1.00
HKG 0.21 0.24 0.77 1.00
IDN -0.41 -0.59 -0.45 -0.14 1.00
JPN 0.24 0.11 0.27 0.55 -0.15 1.00
KOR -0.23 -0.15 0.90 0.66 -0.29 0.36 1.00
MAC 0.07 0.10 0.68 0.77 -0.29 0.66 0.61 1.00
MYS -0.10 -0.14 0.69 0.85 0.14 0.50 0.74 0.67 1.00
PHL -0.03 0.07 0.94 0.64 -0.59 0.35 0.91 0.68 0.57 1.00
SGP 0.19 0.22 0.59 0.85 -0.10 0.75 0.57 0.75 0.71 0.51 1.00
THA 0.68 0.72 0.55 0.43 -0.81 0.23 0.25 0.45 0.05 0.54 0.37 1.00
Notes: Abbreviation (BRN-Brunei, KHM-Cambodia, CHN-China, HKG-Hong Kong SAR, IDN-Indonesia, JPN-Japan,
KOR-Korea, MAC-Macao SAR, MYS-Malaysia, PHL-the Philippines, SGP-Singapore, THA-Thailand).
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 5.10 Pairwise Correlation Coefficients over 2008–2012
BRN CHN HKG IDN JPN KOR MAC MYS PHL SGP THA
BRN 1.00
CHN 0.67 1.00
HKG 0.73 0.74 1.00
IDN -0.41 -0.20 0.12 1.00
JPN 0.16 0.05 0.52 0.28 1.00
KOR 0.32 0.81 0.69 0.14 0.38 1.00
MAC 0.19 0.22 0.60 0.28 0.88 0.57 1.00
MYS 0.42 0.59 0.86 0.43 0.66 0.78 0.74 1.00
PHL 0.48 0.83 0.53 -0.35 0.22 0.80 0.31 0.50 1.00
SGP -0.02 0.03 0.43 0.35 0.74 0.46 0.73 0.57 0.14 1.00
THA 0.45 -0.01 0.33 -0.32 0.46 -0.03 0.36 0.25 0.15 0.27 1.00
Notes: Same as the above.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 5.5 Groups of Economies with Correlation Coefficients over 2003–2007 Larger than 0.50
Notes: Solid lines denote correlation coefficients over 0.75. Dash lines denote coefficients between 0.50 and 0.75.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 5.6 Groups of Economies with Correlation Coefficients over 2008–2012 Larger than 0.50
Notes: Solid lines denote correlation coefficients over 0.75. Dash lines denote coefficients between 0.50 and 0.75.
Cambodia is not included due to missing data from 2008.
Source: Author’s calculations.
5.7 Chapter Conclusion
Trade integration has deeply changed the regional economic landscape. On one side, most East Asian
economies recorded high economic growth under the pulling forces of the trade sectors. Expanding trade
also gave great incentives to the growing foreign direct investment in the region. During the process,
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individual economies absorbed technology and managerial know-how. Together with globalization and
various reforms, trade contributed to the robust economic development of regional economies.
This essay analyzed the impact of rising vertical intra-industry trade on the correlation of business
cycles in the region. The findings showed that the average share of vertical intra-industry trade in total
trade enlarged quickly from the 1990s until the recent global financial crisis. The average share of vertical
intra-industry trade and intra-industry trade as a whole in total trade declined in the region during the global
crisis. The results also pointed out that the sharp rise of vertical intra-industry trade from the 1990s
increased the correlation of business cycles in the region because it increased the total intra-industry trade
(not because it increased its share in intra-industry trade).
The recent global financial crisis affected economic growth in the region. Although the consequences
of the recent global crisis is much less than the 1997–1998 regional financial crisis, it brought a halt to the
period of synchronizing business cycles among East Asian economies from 2003 to 2007. Economic
performance diverged in the middle of the recent crisis and until this writing it remains unclear when and
how East Asian economies will enter the next era of sustained trade integration and synchronized business
cycles. This research also showed that the business cycles of a group of six economies (Hong Kong SAR,
Korea, Macao SAR, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore) were more synchronized than others.
Members of the six economies are also closely correlated with China and Japan. However, the correlation
of business cycles between the two largest economies in the region, China and Japan, was low.
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Chapter Appendix
Appendix 5.1 Exports and Imports by Production Stage and by Partner, East Asian Economies
Table A5.1.1
Brunei
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 28.9 31.0 67.3 0.0 16.4 35.3 34.9 27.5
Consumption goods 1.9 2.2 91.1 4.8 45.6 69.6 18.1 7.5
Parts and Components 10.1 44.1 54.2 0.1 14.9 33.4 31.2 34.4
Primary goods 37.9 94.1 0.0 0.2 45.0 50.7 21.6 1.7
Processed goods 0.1 98.6 0.1 1.0 48.6 71.2 20.6 6.4
Total 17.4 86.1 9.9 1.0 35.7 57.2 24.3 15.4
2001
Capital goods 3.4 96.0 2.2 0.1 32.6 47.1 28.2 10.6
Consumption goods 39.0 39.3 3.1 56.9 63.3 83.5 7.2 2.8
Parts and Components 10.8 47.0 35.4 0.4 22.4 29.8 34.1 34.2
Primary goods 29.3 71.9 0.0 12.9 71.1 77.7 1.4 5.2
Processed goods 0.3 99.4 0.0 0.2 60.4 81.7 11.2 4.5
Total 16.9 81.1 0.4 11.7 52.0 69.7 15.5 9.4
2006
Capital goods 18.1 40.2 14.6 0.8 31.5 60.0 16.9 14.4
Consumption goods 33.5 34.9 14.2 45.4 59.6 83.1 8.3 2.5
Parts and Components 11.1 18.2 5.3 1.3 21.7 50.1 22.1 25.7
Primary goods 36.2 65.1 0.0 8.2 43.6 53.1 7.3 2.9
Processed goods 0.1 98.3 1.6 0.0 54.4 84.0 6.3 7.3
Total 25.7 73.4 1.0 7.2 48.2 75.1 10.8 9.1
2012
Capital goods 78.7 81.4 15.7 0.1 32.4 65.9 14.2 16.3
Consumption goods 40.6 45.5 39.3 4.2 55.4 80.1 9.9 3.2
Parts and Components 73.5 77.4 14.6 3.0 29.0 46.4 21.3 27.9
Primary goods 22.3 53.9 0.0 1.1 67.6 73.4 1.7 1.8
Processed goods 2.1 98.9 0.8 0.1 61.3 87.5 6.3 4.3
Total 12.9 75.8 0.8 0.6 52.4 77.7 10.0 7.9
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.2
Cambodia
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
2001
Capital goods 50.5 93.9 2.4 0.6 26.8 81.3 11.3 2.7
Consumption goods 2.4 7.1 29.3 61.7 39.9 77.7 15.0 2.7
Parts and Components 67.9 80.4 2.9 2.2 31.3 71.8 23.1 0.8
Primary goods 65.9 86.1 8.1 3.0 14.1 80.8 6.4 7.5
Processed goods 44.2 90.6 0.6 6.1 40.5 95.6 2.5 0.3
Total 6.3 13.6 27.2 57.2 38.1 89.6 6.5 1.2
2007
Capital goods 51.0 56.6 5.6 1.9 38.0 89.2 5.1 2.8
Consumption goods 2.3 6.2 25.2 61.3 46.0 86.6 6.8 2.0
Parts and Components 40.3 41.5 13.5 13.4 36.8 77.8 17.4 1.3
Primary goods 79.8 98.2 0.4 1.0 21.3 82.5 5.2 3.8
Processed goods 63.5 77.3 7.5 6.4 31.0 95.4 2.3 0.3
Total 7.8 12.7 23.5 56.7 34.4 92.4 3.9 1.0
2012
Capital goods 65.2 95.9 1.5 1.1 17.6 88.8 4.6 3.6
Consumption goods 7.1 15.4 37.2 33.8 45.7 79.1 8.7 7.3
Parts and Components 71.1 91.0 2.5 0.5 12.8 91.3 4.6 0.9
Primary goods 78.6 95.3 0.6 0.9 42.4 82.5 0.8 5.1
Processed goods 74.8 88.2 2.8 5.3 34.3 93.5 1.3 0.3
Total 15.5 24.7 32.9 30.1 33.1 90.2 3.0 2.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.3
China
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 4.9 62.8 13.2 16.5 0.6 43.0 28.3 23.4
Consumption goods 1.4 48.4 20.3 24.4 5.7 64.6 18.1 10.5
Parts and Components 5.6 68.2 10.0 13.7 2.8 73.1 16.1 7.8
Primary goods 12.7 74.4 12.7 9.1 18.6 21.9 5.9 29.5
Processed goods 10.5 71.2 12.9 8.9 8.8 60.0 13.3 12.3
Total 4.9 57.7 17.0 18.5 6.1 55.2 17.5 15.6
2001
Capital goods 5.3 38.5 21.8 29.5 5.8 39.7 30.0 21.8
Consumption goods 1.7 42.4 16.4 30.9 8.4 42.7 23.4 13.8
Parts and Components 9.9 52.9 17.3 20.3 15.6 62.6 20.9 11.3
Primary goods 8.9 70.0 14.3 7.2 9.6 15.1 5.9 10.7
Processed goods 8.0 48.8 15.8 18.8 11.5 59.6 11.2 8.1
Total 4.7 44.8 17.4 26.5 10.9 49.2 17.3 12.4
2006
Capital goods 5.9 28.8 25.5 28.4 11.3 58.5 25.4 12.7
Consumption goods 2.0 28.3 24.6 32.5 12.9 42.6 29.0 12.9
Parts and Components 11.4 50.4 18.2 17.4 21.5 75.4 12.8 8.2
Primary goods 10.2 65.3 14.3 9.9 6.1 9.0 3.6 7.0
Processed goods 9.8 42.4 18.3 19.0 11.4 59.6 11.0 7.3
Total 6.4 35.6 22.3 25.8 13.1 52.4 13.3 8.7
2012
Capital goods 7.9 30.4 19.8 24.6 13.2 58.7 25.4 11.7
Consumption goods 3.1 26.1 24.6 26.9 8.1 24.8 45.4 13.2
Parts and Components 11.3 46.0 16.7 15.1 20.9 72.9 15.8 6.8
Primary goods 9.3 55.5 18.7 9.9 6.6 8.9 2.8 7.1
Processed goods 13.9 41.8 15.2 13.4 13.7 50.4 11.2 7.7
Total 8.4 34.7 19.6 21.0 12.2 40.2 13.7 8.2
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.4
Hong Kong SAR
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 6.1 56.6 20.1 14.1 6.8 78.3 9.0 11.8
Consumption goods 4.2 21.8 36.3 31.0 5.3 83.8 9.0 5.1
Parts and Components 11.8 78.5 8.4 9.1 13.5 77.1 9.1 12.7
Primary goods 17.9 75.5 8.5 3.5 10.6 57.9 9.9 16.8
Processed goods 12.4 74.4 7.1 5.2 8.4 74.0 11.3 8.2
Total 8.1 51.3 21.1 17.7 7.8 78.0 9.9 8.5
2001
Capital goods 19.9 45.4 35.3 8.8 9.0 78.4 11.3 7.9
Consumption goods 6.6 17.4 39.0 30.6 4.2 82.2 7.6 4.0
Parts and Components 22.3 58.0 24.8 8.5 18.1 81.2 8.6 8.3
Primary goods 4.1 55.5 13.7 4.5 11.2 44.3 20.6 11.9
Processed goods 19.1 54.5 13.5 9.1 9.4 74.4 8.9 5.0
Total 14.6 39.4 29.1 17.4 10.0 78.4 9.1 6.2
2006
Capital goods 21.3 39.3 35.9 8.1 11.4 87.9 5.9 4.3
Consumption goods 9.7 21.1 37.5 25.7 4.3 79.5 8.5 3.9
Parts and Components 34.3 66.2 20.4 3.9 18.2 88.4 4.8 4.9
Primary goods 3.7 67.0 5.3 1.1 12.2 41.3 23.2 11.4
Processed goods 25.3 54.2 13.5 6.4 12.5 73.5 8.6 4.5
Total 21.2 44.6 26.3 11.9 12.7 81.9 7.0 4.6
2012
Capital goods 23.3 35.1 34.7 6.5 9.3 83.9 7.0 5.6
Consumption goods 13.9 26.4 29.1 9.9 5.4 59.6 15.1 7.2
Parts and Components 43.3 65.1 18.8 3.7 21.7 89.3 4.1 4.4
Primary goods 3.4 84.9 2.2 0.5 15.4 48.2 22.0 6.3
Processed goods 23.8 46.7 13.7 3.7 10.6 61.0 6.5 8.3
Total 22.5 47.5 19.9 5.2 13.1 74.0 7.7 6.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.5
Indonesia
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 33.7 47.0 14.8 27.9 3.9 45.4 33.6 16.3
Consumption goods 11.0 34.8 32.0 25.1 9.0 65.3 16.8 8.2
Parts and Components 17.2 69.6 8.3 10.7 6.2 59.7 19.4 15.5
Primary goods 7.4 77.2 6.0 10.5 11.5 21.8 5.4 12.6
Processed goods 13.0 78.3 11.2 4.8 15.7 54.9 16.2 10.4
Total 11.2 68.2 14.2 11.1 9.9 49.1 20.4 13.1
2001
Capital goods 21.6 43.1 20.2 25.2 17.0 53.0 28.0 10.3
Consumption goods 9.0 26.2 28.3 35.7 23.2 56.4 15.6 9.6
Parts and Components 42.6 66.7 10.5 15.7 12.4 69.3 13.7 10.7
Primary goods 13.9 65.9 12.6 8.7 10.2 18.4 4.4 15.0
Processed goods 13.0 67.6 10.8 5.8 21.0 57.3 11.1 8.1
Total 15.6 55.4 16.0 15.9 17.3 51.0 13.1 10.2
2006
Capital goods 26.9 55.1 18.8 13.9 21.4 59.4 23.6 11.4
Consumption goods 12.9 25.4 27.7 35.8 35.7 67.6 14.8 4.8
Parts and Components 47.3 72.2 11.1 9.0 20.1 67.1 15.2 9.9
Primary goods 11.3 64.8 11.8 7.5 29.8 37.8 2.2 8.0
Processed goods 19.4 71.9 8.7 4.6 35.1 65.5 6.7 4.1
Total 19.4 60.8 13.8 11.9 30.5 59.7 9.8 6.6
2012
Capital goods 28.3 55.4 13.9 13.0 16.2 66.6 14.4 12.4
Consumption goods 20.1 36.0 20.6 27.5 39.8 75.0 7.7 4.9
Parts and Components 38.7 65.0 10.6 10.5 25.0 79.1 10.3 6.3
Primary goods 17.4 75.2 4.6 4.1 10.0 15.7 2.8 10.3
Processed goods 18.9 63.5 10.7 3.3 36.1 70.0 4.3 3.0
Total 20.2 62.5 10.5 8.6 28.3 65.0 7.0 6.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.6
Japan
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 13.2 33.1 25.4 28.1 7.9 19.8 25.6 49.0
Consumption goods 5.3 13.8 28.9 39.3 10.0 41.7 25.1 19.4
Parts and Components 17.2 39.5 19.0 31.0 10.5 28.5 17.1 50.0
Primary goods 13.9 66.2 14.2 7.1 13.8 20.5 1.2 15.6
Processed goods 19.4 58.8 13.8 16.9 18.2 31.8 15.1 18.3
Total 13.5 35.1 22.4 29.3 13.6 30.0 14.7 22.5
2001
Capital goods 10.5 36.1 22.4 26.7 19.8 50.3 17.3 28.4
Consumption goods 4.5 12.4 19.6 49.6 11.0 51.6 19.3 15.5
Parts and Components 18.3 46.3 16.9 25.8 20.5 53.7 10.8 32.4
Primary goods 10.6 77.3 7.6 5.6 8.4 13.5 1.1 9.7
Processed goods 16.7 61.5 12.2 15.8 20.7 40.6 14.3 14.2
Total 13.1 40.0 17.9 28.8 15.4 41.4 13.0 18.1
2006
Capital goods 9.5 45.4 18.6 20.3 12.9 60.8 13.5 22.1
Consumption goods 4.3 12.9 20.8 41.3 9.3 54.3 20.0 11.6
Parts and Components 15.4 54.0 16.2 18.8 18.6 64.2 11.2 21.6
Primary goods 6.3 86.8 5.3 3.7 8.3 11.1 0.6 4.8
Processed goods 15.8 70.5 9.7 10.9 20.1 44.6 11.2 10.3
Total 11.8 48.0 16.1 21.6 13.5 42.1 10.4 12.0
2012
Capital goods 15.3 52.1 13.4 16.3 11.1 69.9 11.4 15.0
Consumption goods 6.1 21.3 13.2 34.4 12.6 55.1 21.0 10.0
Parts and Components 18.2 57.2 11.7 17.0 19.1 68.6 11.8 16.4
Primary goods 5.4 87.8 4.8 2.1 9.4 11.1 0.5 4.5
Processed goods 19.5 71.9 8.2 8.9 19.9 43.9 8.7 7.6
Total 15.7 54.8 11.2 17.1 14.3 41.9 9.5 8.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.7
Korea
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 11.0 27.1 25.1 33.4 2.2 44.6 24.3 27.1
Consumption goods 2.3 28.5 23.2 37.8 7.4 35.2 16.3 30.6
Parts and Components 13.8 40.6 16.9 30.2 3.8 54.0 11.2 32.6
Primary goods 3.6 80.9 12.6 2.0 13.2 20.5 2.8 19.9
Processed goods 19.5 67.6 7.0 12.1 9.0 45.2 14.7 17.2
Total 10.4 42.3 17.6 28.0 7.6 40.4 13.5 23.2
2001
Capital goods 8.3 33.8 21.0 28.4 9.0 52.1 18.9 24.0
Consumption goods 3.5 20.5 18.2 41.7 9.3 48.4 20.3 21.2
Parts and Components 12.6 50.9 14.1 21.5 15.9 61.2 11.3 24.5
Primary goods 19.0 74.2 11.3 5.7 8.7 15.1 1.0 8.1
Processed goods 12.5 67.0 6.4 10.3 11.7 46.0 11.7 10.9
Total 9.8 46.4 14.0 23.2 11.3 43.2 10.9 16.0
2006
Capital goods 6.1 38.9 26.5 13.5 6.1 56.0 18.2 20.7
Consumption goods 2.9 14.6 30.9 28.8 7.9 53.9 21.6 11.9
Parts and Components 12.4 65.1 12.6 10.3 13.7 65.4 12.8 18.4
Primary goods 10.3 75.7 9.6 4.1 8.3 14.1 1.0 4.5
Processed goods 12.7 68.6 6.1 10.8 10.6 52.9 8.5 7.8
Total 9.7 52.9 16.5 13.8 9.6 45.4 9.8 11.0
2012
Capital goods 8.8 47.1 18.9 12.8 6.4 58.6 19.7 15.4
Consumption goods 4.3 19.5 15.3 24.9 12.7 47.0 24.3 14.8
Parts and Components 14.0 65.9 8.9 9.7 11.5 67.5 14.0 13.9
Primary goods 29.8 79.6 4.5 2.7 7.2 10.3 2.6 4.4
Processed goods 19.6 69.3 6.4 7.6 12.2 49.8 7.9 6.1
Total 14.0 58.3 10.7 11.2 9.9 40.4 9.7 8.4
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.8
Malaysia
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 30.1 44.2 12.9 37.2 11.5 55.5 17.5 22.9
Consumption goods 34.8 46.2 21.5 22.7 18.2 67.1 14.0 6.7
Parts and Components 34.1 54.7 19.8 23.5 22.8 59.3 14.7 24.0
Primary goods 29.4 81.8 5.4 3.4 17.5 33.1 10.2 10.1
Processed goods 26.2 66.0 16.7 5.2 25.4 60.5 16.6 6.4
Total 30.7 60.4 15.4 16.0 20.4 58.4 15.7 15.6
2001
Capital goods 15.6 35.3 19.0 34.9 18.0 59.4 18.6 18.4
Consumption goods 27.8 46.8 14.4 28.3 20.4 59.8 13.9 9.4
Parts and Components 29.7 60.0 13.3 19.7 22.3 59.3 13.8 22.6
Primary goods 22.6 66.0 6.2 4.8 23.0 30.8 3.6 7.5
Processed goods 22.8 68.4 10.0 7.0 28.2 65.3 10.9 8.0
Total 24.2 54.3 13.9 21.2 23.0 59.3 13.3 16.4
2006
Capital goods 12.8 29.1 15.8 39.5 16.8 66.1 15.6 15.3
Consumption goods 29.4 44.0 15.6 25.7 23.7 65.7 14.3 6.2
Parts and Components 26.6 61.9 12.9 17.0 21.6 64.8 13.1 19.6
Primary goods 29.3 56.5 5.5 2.8 32.6 36.4 2.2 5.8
Processed goods 27.2 71.4 9.0 5.6 32.5 66.0 9.1 5.4
Total 24.0 54.8 12.3 19.1 25.0 63.2 11.6 12.8
2012
Capital goods 21.7 51.3 13.9 16.7 16.5 68.5 18.6 9.3
Consumption goods 31.3 49.0 12.4 15.3 27.6 61.8 16.7 5.4
Parts and Components 21.1 73.0 9.5 9.9 23.5 67.6 12.2 14.6
Primary goods 25.0 56.2 5.1 0.8 29.6 32.1 1.3 3.6
Processed goods 29.8 75.8 5.9 3.4 36.6 67.9 7.5 4.4
Total 25.8 67.9 8.6 8.0 28.0 63.4 10.8 8.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.9
Philippine
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 3.4 35.4 15.2 43.1 4.6 47.5 18.9 29.7
Consumption goods 1.4 27.3 21.5 45.1 4.9 56.0 16.5 13.5
Parts and Components 14.1 38.1 16.4 42.8 7.6 51.8 12.8 31.9
Primary goods 2.2 78.7 9.5 7.4 18.4 23.0 1.1 15.3
Processed goods 10.9 55.1 21.3 18.2 8.2 55.9 12.4 14.3
Total 6.2 40.0 19.0 35.8 9.4 47.6 11.3 20.1
2001
Capital goods 8.9 41.6 23.9 29.2 15.2 74.1 10.3 12.4
Consumption goods 2.8 25.7 12.1 55.0 24.1 56.9 13.8 10.8
Parts and Components 18.7 60.2 12.8 21.1 13.7 60.6 11.0 24.2
Primary goods 5.6 76.0 7.9 9.2 10.6 14.3 0.7 10.6
Processed goods 17.1 59.6 14.2 19.1 18.3 65.9 8.5 9.2
Total 13.7 50.9 15.2 27.9 15.5 56.6 9.1 16.2
2006
Capital goods 9.8 59.7 16.9 16.7 18.8 64.7 18.2 12.1
Consumption goods 7.1 34.6 12.6 43.5 41.9 65.6 12.0 6.6
Parts and Components 18.4 74.2 11.8 8.8 15.1 62.1 10.0 26.0
Primary goods 16.7 87.0 3.0 2.1 9.7 12.9 0.6 6.4
Processed goods 23.9 68.4 13.0 12.4 26.5 76.4 6.1 5.7
Total 16.2 67.4 12.4 14.0 19.6 59.7 8.5 15.9
2012
Capital goods 8.5 63.7 13.5 13.2 17.8 65.4 15.0 15.8
Consumption goods 10.0 46.4 11.9 30.1 37.9 67.5 9.0 7.0
Parts and Components 23.3 75.4 8.2 9.6 20.5 68.0 9.7 20.5
Primary goods 7.8 89.2 4.3 3.1 15.6 19.1 0.4 5.7
Processed goods 16.5 68.9 11.7 13.6 21.3 79.8 5.4 5.8
Total 16.5 69.5 9.9 12.9 21.8 63.5 7.1 11.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.10
Singapore
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 10.9 28.5 23.8 38.3 13.1 58.2 15.3 21.6
Consumption goods 8.4 29.5 32.2 24.7 33.8 63.3 14.6 11.6
Parts and Components 31.5 49.8 17.7 27.5 22.6 63.7 12.5 21.4
Primary goods 21.7 53.9 10.2 5.7 27.3 34.2 0.5 1.0
Processed goods 41.2 80.5 5.7 5.3 20.5 53.3 15.1 13.4
Total 25.4 50.9 17.5 22.7 22.6 56.1 12.6 15.2
2001
Capital goods 12.9 38.1 22.3 28.1 26.8 60.2 12.7 24.3
Consumption goods 16.4 43.9 15.9 15.5 32.9 60.7 16.0 9.6
Parts and Components 21.9 57.6 18.5 16.0 33.1 65.4 11.3 18.1
Primary goods 27.4 49.5 16.5 1.5 21.4 22.8 0.4 0.5
Processed goods 39.2 70.2 8.7 5.9 22.9 49.2 13.1 11.5
Total 23.5 54.1 16.8 16.8 28.8 57.2 11.7 15.6
2006
Capital goods 15.1 41.6 20.8 18.8 22.0 66.2 12.0 18.2
Consumption goods 19.4 44.6 13.1 27.6 28.8 59.6 18.6 8.1
Parts and Components 18.7 66.6 15.7 9.4 29.5 65.6 12.7 18.1
Primary goods 32.8 68.8 7.7 1.3 17.1 18.8 0.5 0.2
Processed goods 36.5 63.7 14.0 3.2 26.2 52.8 11.4 8.7
Total 25.3 59.3 15.7 9.9 26.2 57.4 11.6 13.0
2012
Capital goods 20.7 52.0 13.7 13.3 16.9 64.8 14.3 13.5
Consumption goods 19.1 46.9 18.1 7.2 29.1 51.0 24.4 7.8
Parts and Components 22.0 81.2 7.5 5.0 22.1 64.6 14.1 17.1
Primary goods 33.0 60.7 6.0 2.8 18.2 18.9 0.2 0.6
Processed goods 37.3 61.6 13.9 5.1 21.6 47.9 11.3 7.8
Total 29.5 64.6 12.3 6.4 21.4 51.2 12.1 10.2
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.11
Thailand
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 14.9 37.9 13.8 42.7 3.6 59.8 24.7 10.4
Consumption goods 5.3 29.8 33.7 26.1 6.9 50.1 22.6 16.0
Parts and Components 36.4 64.5 13.1 19.6 12.6 66.1 16.8 14.9
Primary goods 15.6 68.8 14.8 10.3 24.4 31.0 8.2 8.9
Processed goods 13.5 56.1 17.3 14.7 15.8 57.5 13.9 7.1
Total 12.6 42.7 24.7 23.6 13.0 56.7 16.7 10.4
2001
Capital goods 12.9 39.0 25.2 23.1 10.3 59.0 21.6 15.7
Consumption goods 7.1 30.2 22.0 35.1 15.6 51.6 18.6 9.2
Parts and Components 27.1 65.0 13.7 14.4 20.8 67.1 10.8 16.8
Primary goods 17.3 61.7 12.1 11.7 11.0 12.8 3.2 5.7
Processed goods 22.2 64.8 10.8 9.9 14.3 55.6 13.2 8.7
Total 15.9 47.6 18.2 22.2 15.1 52.7 12.9 11.8
2006
Capital goods 9.7 43.0 19.5 19.0 12.3 72.6 15.2 7.4
Consumption goods 12.1 33.0 20.7 29.2 23.6 62.2 14.7 8.9
Parts and Components 24.0 65.8 11.9 11.7 21.0 78.0 7.8 10.7
Primary goods 15.7 68.5 10.4 8.8 12.2 13.2 1.2 2.5
Processed goods 27.8 68.8 8.6 8.8 16.0 61.1 10.2 5.6
Total 18.0 53.0 15.0 17.0 16.4 56.8 8.9 6.7
2012
Capital goods 10.6 45.8 13.0 14.1 14.3 75.8 13.3 6.4
Consumption goods 15.3 41.4 16.4 17.7 20.7 61.5 14.6 7.4
Parts and Components 24.3 63.0 9.9 9.3 16.2 80.9 8.8 6.5
Primary goods 15.0 71.5 6.6 11.0 12.5 13.7 0.8 2.8
Processed goods 30.7 72.3 5.9 4.0 12.3 57.0 7.8 5.0
Total 20.0 56.7 11.0 11.2 14.2 57.1 8.2 5.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.12
Taiwan (China)
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
1991
Capital goods 10.9 29.0 21.7 33.5 4.9 52.8 15.6 22.4
Consumption goods 3.8 30.9 15.2 38.6 5.9 41.4 15.5 25.3
Parts and Components 13.7 37.9 17.9 28.8 8.5 69.5 7.0 18.5
Primary goods 6.7 85.8 4.2 5.7 12.5 17.9 3.4 27.2
Processed goods 14.4 58.4 7.2 16.2 8.3 41.4 12.5 19.1
Total 9.9 40.0 14.5 29.4 8.2 45.0 10.9 21.4
2001
Capital goods 7.1 36.8 22.7 29.5 10.8 56.7 15.4 20.1
Consumption goods 5.9 31.4 17.0 37.0 9.0 42.5 23.2 13.9
Parts and Components 14.2 53.1 16.6 20.0 23.4 64.5 9.0 17.7
Primary goods 11.4 83.0 4.4 8.2 7.0 14.7 2.3 15.3
Processed goods 15.4 64.4 6.1 11.3 14.5 52.5 10.8 11.5
Total 11.7 49.7 15.1 22.0 14.6 51.4 11.6 16.0
2006
Capital goods 6.9 49.9 21.1 18.0 6.4 64.3 14.5 18.4
Consumption goods 7.8 33.0 18.8 35.1 9.1 49.1 24.2 12.1
Parts and Components 15.5 73.2 9.2 11.9 16.7 73.0 7.4 12.4
Primary goods 9.1 86.0 5.9 4.6 6.4 13.8 1.8 7.3
Processed goods 18.8 68.2 6.3 10.3 13.6 60.1 7.5 7.8
Total 14.2 63.2 11.4 14.7 11.6 55.1 8.8 10.9
2012
Capital goods 13.5 55.3 13.0 15.6 11.2 66.5 16.0 13.6
Consumption goods 8.0 38.4 16.6 24.4 9.6 50.0 24.1 11.4
Parts and Components 19.1 78.1 7.0 9.0 16.4 73.9 7.0 9.6
Primary goods 15.8 81.8 6.1 6.0 7.2 10.5 0.7 6.5
Processed goods 24.8 68.8 6.5 7.3 12.2 56.2 6.9 6.6
Total 19.0 66.8 8.9 11.1 11.7 51.0 8.2 8.5
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
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Table A5.1.13
Vietnam
Year Production Stage
Export (%) Import (%)
ASEAN East Asia EU27 US ASEAN East Asia EU27 US
2001
Capital goods 13.3 72.0 16.1 0.8 16.3 69.1 20.7 4.4
Consumption goods 4.8 31.8 47.6 10.0 19.4 75.9 10.4 2.2
Parts and Components 49.4 92.2 4.9 0.5 16.2 80.7 12.1 2.9
Primary goods 24.3 59.7 9.0 7.1 16.0 44.0 8.4 7.0
Processed goods 22.8 70.6 19.4 1.0 32.6 80.2 6.2 1.8
Total 14.4 46.8 31.3 7.8 25.7 76.4 9.8 2.6
2006
Capital goods 14.0 47.4 19.0 19.4 17.4 75.0 17.2 3.6
Consumption goods 5.3 21.7 34.9 32.0 28.1 71.3 14.1 3.7
Parts and Components 25.6 83.6 4.5 5.2 29.0 84.3 10.9 1.8
Primary goods 25.5 50.6 8.7 11.6 29.9 48.3 6.5 6.8
Processed goods 21.7 65.5 14.3 10.4 29.1 80.0 3.3 1.5
Total 14.0 38.4 23.2 22.2 27.4 77.8 7.0 2.2
2012
Capital goods 11.8 34.6 38.0 5.4 7.8 77.3 16.0 3.6
Consumption goods 6.3 29.2 24.2 31.8 26.4 62.5 16.6 4.5
Parts and Components 14.3 81.8 4.3 7.9 16.9 82.8 7.7 6.6
Primary goods 13.8 69.6 11.0 5.7 16.7 26.8 6.0 14.5
Processed goods 28.0 65.4 9.5 10.1 20.5 79.9 4.4 2.5
Total 12.2 47.0 20.9 17.0 18.2 74.8 7.9 4.4
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Appendix 5.2 Hodrick-Prescott Filtering Results
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6 THE SUITABILITY OF MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EAST
ASIA: OTHER EVIDENCE
6.1 Introduction to Chapter 6
An increasing amount of research has paid attention to the desirability of monetary integration in East Asia
after the 1997–1998 financial crisis. Predecessors in monetary integration suggested that a certain number
of conditions including openness of the economy, asymmetric disturbances to output, factor mobility,
product diversification, and the extent of automatic stabilizers are important criteria to measure the
suitability of monetary integration (e.g., Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; and Kenen, 1969). Apart from
openness and correlation of business cycles examined in Chapter 5, the existing literature also considers
other various criteria. Although theoretical and empirical advancement of these other criteria stagnated after
an early flourishing period before the 1970s, they provide useful perspectives.
Another important string of research on the suitability of monetary integration concerns the
cointegration of exchange rates. In 1994, Enders and Hurn developed a G-PPP theory that evaluated the
desirability of monetary integration based on exchange rate behavior. The basic tenets of the theory was
that economic fundamentals shared common trends within a currency area and they were sufficiently
interrelated for the real exchange rates to share a reduced number of common trends. Enders and Hurn
tested the co-integrating relationship using data from the Pacific Rim nations over 1973 to 1989. Their
results suggested that the exchange rates of each of the Pacific Rim nations (Australia, India, Indonesia,
Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) were closely related to the four large countries (Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) but there was only weak evidence, if any, on the
possibility of forming a currency area among the Pacific Rim nations. The idea that the non-stationarity of
real fundamentals led to the general non-stationarity of real exchange rates provided great inspiration to
later research on monetary integration.
Sun and Simons (2011) used real effective exchange rates to explore whether economic fundamentals
in East Asia were stationary or non-stationary. They argued that economies in the region shared similar
patterns of trade from the mid 1970s by trading parts and immediate goods back and forth with each other
and exporting final goods to advanced economies like Japan and the United States. Sun and Simons
asserted that there was a need for East Asian economies to direct their policies toward the relative stability
of their real competitiveness in the world market because they were competitors and inter-dependent during
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this process.
Indeed, effective exchange rates are used extensively as an important proxy for measuring
competitiveness in the literature on exchange rates coordination and monetary integration in the region. For
example, Williamson (1996) believed that it was to the interest of East Asian economies to peg to a
common basket of currencies to maintain intra-regional effective exchange rates stability.56 He showed that
exchange rates of the East Asian currencies in the first half of the 1990s were much more unstable in
nominal effective terms than in terms of the US dollar, and in most cases the instability of the real effective
exchange rates showed greater instability. East Asian Vision Group (2001) recommended that economies in
the region should work out in stages an appropriate exchange rate regime consistent with not only financial
stability but also economic development and stated that real effective exchange rates would be an
appropriate anchor for such a flexible but stable exchange framework. Other works such as Ito (2002) and
Kawai (2008) as well as the literature on Asian Currency Units all made arguments about stabilizing
intra-regional exchange rates so that the change of cross rates among major trading partners would not
cause large swings in the relative real competitiveness among economies. What’s more, Filardo, Ma, and
Milhaljek (2011) showed that and many emerging markets used real effective exchange rates as an
important medium-target and that effective exchange rates were playing an increasingly important role in
the monetary policy frameworks of emerging markets around the world.
This essay sets out to explore the suitability of monetary integration using other evidence.
Specifically, it first examines the recent developments of other optimum currency areas (OCA) criteria in
the region and then focuses on the evidence using the effective exchange rates.
The following of the essay is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the recent developments in
the region using a series of indices that are closely related to the OCA criteria. Section 6.3 starts to pay
attention to real effective exchange rates. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2 Other OCA Criteria
Similarity of inflation rates
The convergence of price level is an important criterion in the literature on the suitability of
monetary integration among a group of economies. Figure 6.1 depicts the movements of consumer prices in
56 Williamson examined the following nine economies in East Asia due to the impression that they are close competitors to
each other: China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and
Thailand.
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the region. Clearly, the 1997–1998 regional financial crisis strongly affected consumer prices. The inflation
rates of Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam hiked in 1998
and 1999. The difference of inflation rates among economies decreased slightly from 2000 until the break
of the recent global financial crisis; dramatic changes of inflation were rare except for Indonesia, Myanmar
and Vietnam. However, prices became volatile again during the recent financial crisis. Cambodia,
Myanmar and Vietnam had usually high inflation rates in 2008. The volatility of consumer prices ended
quickly from 2010 except for Vietnam. The period from 2010 to 2013 was characterized by increased
convergence of price levels among East Asian economies.
Figure 6.1 Inflation Rates in East Asia, Consumer Prices (%), 1994–2013
Note: The graph plots inflation rates of the first ten economies (Brunei, China, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea, Macao
SAR, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) versus time with y-axis labeling on the left and plots
inflation rates of the last five economies (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia and Myanmar) versus time
with y-axis labeling on the right.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Factor mobility
Factor mobility is one of the most important criteria in evaluating the feasibility of monetary
integration among a certain group of economies. In the case of the European monetary integration, capital
mobility and labor mobility remain at the center of research interest and policy making.
A considerable amount of literature examined capital mobility in East Asia. Foreign direct investment
(FDI) increased quickly in the region over the last two decades mainly due to liberalized trade and FDI
0
50
10
0
15
0
-1
0
0
10
20
30
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Brunei China Hong Kong SAR Japan Korea, Rep.
Macao SAR Philippine Singapore Thailand Vietnam
Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar
123
policies as well as high economic growth (e.g., Urata, 2006; Kawai and Urata, 2004). Urata (2008) found
that unlike the pattern observed for international trade, where intra-regional trade accounted for
approximately 40–60 percent of the total trade for all the East Asian economies, dependence on
intra-regional FDI varied widely. Only three economies (Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea) saw increases in
the share of East Asia as a source of FDI inflows out of eight countries (the other five include China, Japan,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore) using data from 1995–2004. Recent studies on Japanese outward
FDI flows revealed that the share of East Asia as a destination increased dramatically from 2005 to 2009
(e.g., Takagi and Shi, 2011).
Equity market integration attracted much research interest. For example, Yu, Fung, and Tam (2010)
showed that equity markets of two groups of economies were more integrated than others (table 6.1). The
first group included the four-dragon bloc and Japan.57 The other group included China, Hong Kong SAR,
and Taiwan (China). Their findings also indicated that the equity markets cycles in the region except for
Japan became highly synchronized from 2007 to 2008.
Research on debt market integration is generally limited. Debt market integration comprises an
indispensible part of capital market integration and becomes increasingly important taken into
consideration that bond markets developed rapidly in the region over the last two decades. The Appendix
roughly describes the degree of debt market integration in the region based on data from the International
Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). The tables list the bilateral asset
holdings of debt securities from 2001 to 2013. Data is incomplete due to accessibility. For example,
bilateral asset holdings between China and other economies are missing.
The ten tables in the Appendix show that debt markets grew dramatically over the past years and
economies varied significantly in terms of the importance in regional debt market integration.
Unsurprisingly, bilateral debts holdings involving Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong SAR were among the
highest. On the other hand, debt securities involving a number of emerging markets including Korea,
Malaysia, and China increased quickly. The degree of debt market integration in the region was increasing
after the 1997–1998 financial crisis until the recent global financial crisis.
57 The four-dragon bloc in Yu et al. (2010) covered Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan (China).
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Table 6.1 Financial Integration in East Asia, Equity Markets
China HK
1 2 1 2 TW SG KR TH MY PH ID JP US R
China
1 1.00 0.92 0.16 0.24 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.12
2 1.00 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.80 0.03 0.11
HK
1 1.00 0.63 0.41 0.66 0.50 0.44 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.48 0.56
2 1.00 0.28 0.46 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.37
TW 1.00 0.43 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.42
SG 1.00 0.48 0.54 0.55 0.48 0.52 0.44 0.42 0.59
KR 1.00 0.42 0.29 0.35 0.31 0.42 0.35 0.54
TH 1.00 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.33 0.29 0.44
MY 1.00 0.40 0.48 0.31 0.29 0.43
PH 1.00 0.48 0.29 0.29 0.37
ID 1.00 0.27 0.24 0.38
JP 1.00 0.33 0.93
US 1.00 0.40
R 1.00
Notes: Abbreviation (HK-Hong Kong SAR, TW-Taiwan (China), SG-Singapore, KR-Korea, TH-Thailand, MY-Malaysia,
PH-the Philippines, ID-Indonesia, JP-Japan, R-Region, US-United States). China 1 denotes Shanghai A-shares;
China 2 denotes Shenzhen A-shares; Hong Kong SAR 1 denotes Hang Seng China Enterprises Index; and Hong
Kong SAR 2 denotes Hang Seng Index. The Dow Jones Industrial Average of the US is used as the proxy for the
external market. The MSCI AC Far East Free Index (Regional MSFE) which consists of indices of the same 10 East
Asian economies listed here is used as the regional benchmark. Numbers denote the pairwise concordance indices
over the full period. Different measures yield slightly different results of the degree of market integration in the
region. For example, correlation coefficients of the Asian emerging equity markets are similar to those in the
four-dragon bloc using the correlation estimated from the dynamic conditional correlation model.
Source: Yu et al. (2010), table 1, p. 2882.
The United States is included in the Appendix for comparison. The share of bilateral debts involving
the United States in most of the East Asian emerging markets decreased between the 1997–1998 crisis and
the recent global crisis, both in bilateral assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, the United States’ share of debt
securities in the total debt holdings remained very high. Noticeably, the recent global financial crisis
strongly affected capital flows in the region. The US residents held a larger share of debt securities issued
by East Asian emerging markets from 2007 to 2013.
Labor mobility comprises another important aspect of factor mobility. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present the
degree of labor mobility in the region using data from the United Nations database on international
migration in 1990 and 2013. Table 6.2 presents the percentage share of bilateral migrants change in total
migrants change to the destination, i.e.,
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change of migrants from economy݅(origin) to economy݆(destination)change of migrants from the world to economy݆ × 100.
Table 6.3 presents the percentage share of bilateral migrants change in total migrants change from the
origin, i.e.,
change of migrants from economy݅(origin) to economy݆(destination)change of migrants from economy݅to the world × 100.
The tables show that the share of intra-regional migrants increased from 1990 and 2013. On the other hand,
economies varied in terms of the importance in intra-regional labor mobility. Besides, bilateral migration
differed significantly across pairs of economies. The rates of the increase in labor mobility among a group
of economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) were relatively higher in the region.
Table 6.2 International Migration in East Asia, Percentage of Total Migrants Change to the Destination over
1990–2013
(A)
Destination Origin
World Brunei Cambodia China Hong Kong
SAR
Macao
SAR
Indonesia Japan
World 8.E+07 0.02 0.97 6.80 0.26 0.05 2.14 0.29
China 5.E+05 0.93 2.55 7.91 0.89
Hong Kong
SAR
6.E+05 105.93 2.26 7.30 0.77
Japan 1.E+06 0.12 37.10 1.87
Macao SAR 1.E+05 79.34 7.55
Korea 1.E+06 1.23 53.61 2.89 1.62
Brunei 1.E+05 -0.35 4.65 -2.24 76.98
Cambodia 4.E+04 2.27 0.17 0.16 0.19
Indonesia -2.E+0
5
114.67 -2.34
Lao PDR -1.E+0
3
18.50 104.32
Malaysia 1.E+06 0.09 0.88 -8.45 46.94 0.58
Myanmar -3.E+0
4
81.09
Philippine 5.E+04 -0.05 0.02 -36.29 0.10 -1.04 20.18
Singapore 2.E+06 14.44 2.56 0.53 8.22
Thailand 3.E+06 21.18 2.87 0.00 -0.10
Vietnam 4.E+04 0.27 -47.31 18.69 2.68 17.68 1.48
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Table 6.2 Continued
(B)
Destination Origin
Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippine Korea Singapore Thailand Vietnam
World 1.02 1.42 2.65 4.07 1.14 0.17 0.70 1.67
China 1.04 19.73 15.70 3.71 2.77
Hong Kong
SAR
0.83 6.40 0.26 0.54 1.04 0.59
Japan 0.33 13.01 0.82 0.12 2.91 2.33
Macao SAR 7.30 -0.71
Korea 0.39 4.12 2.90 10.33
Brunei -29.83 -3.29 7.86 0.59 14.17
Cambodia 0.39 0.26 0.08 0.23 0.08 0.18 46.04 54.46
Indonesia 2.01 -0.03 -10.01 -9.01 -10.71
Lao PDR 11.46 58.69 225.82
Malaysia 16.57 -9.02 0.11 2.24 -2.56 4.60
Myanmar
Philippine 1.01 0.68 11.79 1.28 0.29 -34.23
Singapore 53.23 0.81 1.02
Thailand 23.85 0.00 52.08 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.40
Vietnam 9.48 21.82 -0.31 0.35 0.95 0.96
Notes: The first column of the upper table presents the total migrants to the destination.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the United Nations.
Table 6.3 International Migration in East Asia, Percentage of Total Migrants Change from the Origin over
1990–2013
(A)
Destination Origin
World Brunei Cambodia China Hong Kong
SAR
Macao
SAR
Indonesia Japan
World 77360231 18860 749560 5258968 203295 39970 1655650 226402
China 0.61 2.15 30.18 2.25 1.85
Hong Kong
SAR
0.76 11.81 33.10 2.59 1.99
Japan 1.76 0.21 9.60 1.54
Macao SAR 0.17 2.00 4.93
Korea 1.53 1.94 12.06 2.06 8.45
Brunei 0.17 -0.01 3.04 -0.18 45.21
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Table 6.3 Continued
(A)
Destination Origin
World Brunei Cambodia China Hong Kong
SAR
Macao
SAR
Indonesia Japan
Cambodia 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03
Indonesia -0.22 -3.71 1.76
Lao PDR 0.00 -0.03 -0.02
Malaysia 1.88 6.69 1.71 -2.34 41.25 3.75
Myanmar -0.04 -0.47
Philippine 0.07 -0.15 0.00 -0.37 0.03 -0.03 4.79
Singapore 2.06 4.38 20.13 21.07 7.92
Thailand 4.13 90.23 1.74 0.01 -1.48
Vietnam 0.05 0.57 -2.54 0.14 0.53 0.43 0.26
(B)
Destination Origin
Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar Philippine Korea Singapore Thailand Vietnam
World 788328 1100158 2048963 3152397 883455 131684 538621 1293740
China 0.45 2.96 8.39 3.25 1.01
Hong Kong
SAR
0.44 1.19 0.17 2.39 1.13 0.27
Japan 0.41 5.62 1.26 1.22 7.35 2.45
Macao SAR 0.31 -0.18
Korea 0.23 1.55 6.37 9.45
Brunei -3.61 -0.14 1.18 0.60 3.50
Cambodia 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 3.18 1.57
Indonesia -0.31 0.00 1.93 11.65 3.38
Lao PDR -0.01 -0.12 -0.19
Malaysia 11.77 -4.16 0.18 24.70 -6.91 5.17
Myanmar
Philippine 0.05 0.02 0.72 0.52 0.03 -1.42
Singapore 77.22 0.41 3.01
Thailand 96.59 -0.01 81.16 0.00 0.03 -0.13 -1.00
Vietnam 0.48 0.43 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.07
Notes: The first rows of the two tables present the total migrants from the origin.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the United Nations.
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6.3 Evidence from the REER
This section will use real effective exchange rates to explore whether it is desirable for East Asian
economies to move toward monetary integration. It will test the cointegrating relationships and causality of
real effective exchange rates (REER) among the economies. This research may complement the literature
on the assessment of the suitability of monetary integration in the region.
6.3.1 Methodology
Cointegration tests are used to investigate whether there are any long-run comovements between effective
exchange rates of different East Asian economies. The examination of the cointegrating relationships starts
from a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The VAR model was originally introduced by Sims (1980) and
has been extensively used in the literature to measure the effect of a certain group of variables upon other
variables.
ܺ௧ = ܣଵܺ௧ି ଵ + ܣଶܺ௧ି ଶ+⋯+ ܣ௞ܺ௧ି ௞ + ௧߳
where ܺ௧ is an n × 1 vector at period t; ܺ௧ି ௝ is the j
th order lagged value; ܣ௝ is n × n vector; ௧߳ is an
independently and identically distributed n-dimensional vector with zero mean and variance matrix ∑. 
The model can also be expressed as:
∆ܺ௧ = (ܣଵ− ܫ) ∆ܺ௧ି ଵ + (ܣଶ + ܣଵ− ܫ) ∆ܺ௧ି ଶ+⋯+ (ܣ௞ + ܣ௞ିଵ+⋯+ ܣଵ− ܫ)ܺ ௧ି ௞ + ௧߳
where ܫ is the identity matrix. The model can also be written as:
∆ܺ௧ =෍ ߨ௜∆ܺ௧ି ௜௞ିଵ
௜ୀଵ
+ ߨܺ௧ି ௣ + ௧߳
where ߨ௜= ∑ ܣ௜௜௝ୀଵ − ܫ and ߨ = ∑ ܣ௝௞௝ୀଵ − ܫ. If all the variables in vector X are non-stationary and have
a single unit root, the rank of matrix ߨ determines the number of independent co-integrating vectors.
Johansen and Juselius (1990) introduced the maximum likelihood method to the estimation and the
inference of cointegration. Their method is widely used in various types of literature in economics. They
tested the rank of ߨ using two test statistics:
்ߣ ௥௔௖௘ = −ܶ෍ ln൫1 − ߣప෡൯௡
௜ୀ௥ାଵ
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ߣெ ௔௫ = −ܶ ln൫1 − ߣ௥ାଵ෣ ൯
where ߣ௜ are the eigenvalues obtained from the estimated ߨ; T is the number of observations. The null
hypothesis for the first test ்ߣ ௥௔௖௘ is the number of independent co-integrating vectors is less than or equal
to r. The null hypothesis for the second test ߣெ ௔௫ is the number of independent co-integrating vectors is r
against the alternative r + 1. If r≥ 1, the underlying variables in vector X are cointegrated and share
long-run common trends.
Cointegration is increasingly used as a method to examine long-run movements between variables.
Baak (2008, 2011) used the cointegration tests to study the impact of real exchange rates on trade in East
Asia.
In this analysis, cointegration tests will be conducted between real effective exchange rates of
economies, i.e., ܺ௧ = ൫݁ݎ ݁ݎ௜,௧, ݁ݎ ݁ݎ௝,௧൯். Sun and Simons tested the cointegrating relationships in pairs of
eight East Asian economies. They constructed real effective exchange rates as the trade-weighted average
of the bilateral nominal exchange rates deflated by the price ratios against the country’s 15 largest trading
partners over 1981-2007. However, their method only covered a limited number of trading partners and
trade weights were constant. This analysis used the real effective exchange rates indices provided by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) instead. The BIS indices contained more information because: (i)
52 economies were covered the trade size of which accounted for 93% of total world trade in 2004; (ii) the
trade weights were time-varying to account for changing trade patterns.58
If any pair of real effective exchange rates in East Asia are cointegrated, they have long-run
association with each other. If they are not cointegrated, Granger tests (Granger 1980; Engle and Granger
1987) will be conducted to explore whether one economy’s real effective exchange rates are granger caused
by the other. Thus if real effective exchange rates of the two economies are I(1) and not cointegrated, the
following VAR model using the first-differenced data is estimated:
∆ܺ௧ = ܤଵ∆ܺ௧ି ଵ + ܤଶ∆ܺ௧ି ଶ+⋯+ ܤఛܺ௧ି ఛ+ ௧݁
where ∆ܺ௧ is an 2 × 1 vector at period t; ∆ܺ௧ି ௝ is the j
th order lagged value; ܤ௝ is 2 × 2 vector; ௧݁ is an
independently and identically distributed 2-dimensional vector with zero mean and variance matrix ∑’. Let 
∆ܺ௧ = ൫Δ݁ݎ ݁ݎ௜,௧, Δ݁ݎ ݁ݎ௝,௧൯், then the model can be expressed as:
58 For more information on the BIS effective exchange rates indices, please refer to Klau and Fung (2006).
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∆݁ݎ ݁ݎ௜,௧ = ߚ଴,௜+ ෍ ߚଵଵ,௣ఛ
௣ୀଵ
Δ݁ݎ ݁ݎ௜,௧ି ௣ + ෍ ߚଵଶ,௣ఛ
௣ୀଵ
Δ݁ݎ ݁ݎ௝,௧ି ௣ + ߝ௜,௧
∆݁ݎ ݁ݎ௝,௧ = ߚ଴,௝+ ෍ ߚଶଵ,௣ఛ
௣ୀଵ
Δ݁ݎ ݁ݎ௜,௧ି ௣ + ෍ ߚଶଶ,௣ఛ
௣ୀଵ
Δ݁ݎ ݁ݎ௝,௧ି ௣ + ߝ௝,௧
If the null hypothesis of the granger causality test that all the coefficients of Δ݁ݎ ݁ݎ௜ equals zero, i.e., ߚଶଵ,௣
= 0 for all 1≤p≤τ, cannot be rejected, the real effective exchange rates of economy j is not granger caused
by economy i. Similarly, if the hypothesis that ߚଵଶ,௣ = 0 for all 1≤p≤τ, cannot be rejected, the real 
effective exchange rates of economy i is not granger caused by economy j.
6.3.2 Data
Data are taken from Bank for International Settlements. Real effective exchange rates (REER) are
calculated as geometric weighted averages of bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices.
The weighting pattern is time-varying. Monthly observations of effective exchange rates range from
January 1994 to September 2014. The indices take year 2005 as the base year, i.e., REER at 2005 is 100.
All data are in the logarithm form.
All variables are integrated of order one, i.e., I (1) processes. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
tests cannot reject unit root processes for level data (the logarithm form of REER) but strongly reject the
null hypotheses of unit root processes for first-differenced data.59 Table 6.4 presents the summary.
Therefore, cointegration tests can be used to examine the long-run movements of non-stationary REER in
these economies.
The next step is to select the order of lags. The lag length is chosen using the Akaike information
criterion criteria based on the underlying VAR model using level data. Portmanteau autocorrelation tests for
residuals are done to check whether there is residual autocorrelation in the VAR using 1% as the criteria.
Trace tests and max-eigenvalue tests are used to test whether there are cointegrating relationships between
pairs of real effective exchange rates. If the real effective exchange rates of two economies are cointegrated,
they share long-run movements. Otherwise, our analysis proceeds to the granger causality tests between
pairs of effective exchange rates. Since all the real effective exchange rates series are non-stationary and
I(1), the VAR model using the first-differenced data are used. Similarly, the lag length is chosen using the
Akaike information criterion criteria based on the underlying VAR model. Portmanteau autocorrelation
59 The lag length is chosen automatically by the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) criteria in unit root tests.
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tests for residuals are done to check whether there is residual autocorrelation in the VAR using 1% as the
criteria. The granger causality tests provide one perspective for the examination of the relationships
between exchange rates of different East Asian economies.
Table 6.4 Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ADF
Level data 1st difference
China 213 4.53 0.13 4.18 4.80 (-1.74 ) (-10.75)***
Hong Kong SAR 213 4.74 0.12 4.51 4.99 (-1.27) (-12.02)***
Indonesia 213 4.50 0.14 4.09 4.72 (-1.68) (-10.75)***
Japan 213 4.63 0.16 4.31 5.01 (-1.47) (-10.79)***
Korea 213 4.70 0.11 4.43 4.88 (-2.00) (-9.71)***
Malaysia 213 4.62 0.07 4.50 4.81 (-0.25) (-12.45)***
Philippine 213 4.55 0.12 4.29 4.73 (-0.54) (-10.16)***
Singapore 213 4.59 0.07 4.49 4.75 (0.65) (-4.84)***
Thailand 213 4.55 0.09 4.40 4.73 (-0.64) (-9.92)***
Taiwan (China) 213 4.73 0.12 4.57 4.97 (-1.40) (-14.62)***
United States 213 4.67 0.09 4.53 4.86 (-1.47) (-10.15)***
Euro area 213 4.62 0.08 4.41 4.72 (-2.01) (-11.48)***
Notes: t statistics in parentheses.
***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
6.3.3 Estimation
Table 6.5 presents the cointegration results. Most of the pairs of real effective exchange rates are not
cointegrated. There is only weak evidence that the Philippines and Singapore, and Singapore and Thailand
are cointegrated using the max-eigenvalue tests. However, none of the pairs of East Asian economies
satisfied both the trace test and the max-eigenvalue test.
Since there is little evidence that real effective exchange rates are cointegrated in the region, the VAR
model using the first-differenced data are used to explore the granger causality relationships. The
Portmanteau autocorrelation tests for residuals cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no residual
autocorrelation in the underlying VAR models. Table 6.6 presents the results.
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Table 6.5 Number of Cointegrating Equations
US China Japan Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippine Singapore Thailand
China 1 1
Japan 0 0 - -
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Philippine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0
Singapore 1 1 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0 - - 0 1
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Taiwan
(China) 0 0 0 0 - - 0 0 - - - - - - - - 0 0
Hong
Kong
SAR
- - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: For any pair of economies, the first value shows the result of the trace test and the second value shows the result of
the max-eigenvalue test. For example, in the cointegration test of real effective exchange rates between China and
US, both the trace test and the max-eigenvalue test shows there is one cointegrating equation. “-” stands for
Portmanteau autocorrelation tests for residuals reject there is no residual autocorrelation in the underlying VAR
model with level data.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 6.6 Granger Tests Results, East Asian Economies
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
JAPAN does not Granger Cause CHINA 205 2.52 0.059*
CHINA does not Granger Cause JAPAN 1.14 0.333
KOREA does not Granger Cause CHINA 205 4.02 0.008***
CHINA does not Granger Cause KOREA 3.23 0.023**
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause CHINA 209 0.09 0.759
CHINA does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 1.03 0.311
MALAYSIA does not Granger Cause CHINA 209 0.01 0.936
CHINA does not Granger Cause MALAYSIA 0.10 0.749
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause CHINA 209 3.00 0.085*
CHINA does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 1.44 0.232
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause CHINA 199 1.52 0.174
CHINA does not Granger Cause SINGAPORE 0.42 0.865
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Table 6.6 Continued
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
THAILAND does not Granger Cause CHINA 209 0.00 0.954
CHINA does not Granger Cause THAILAND 0.21 0.650
TAIWAN (CHINA) does not Granger Cause CHINA 205 1.35 0.259
CHINA does not Granger Cause TAIWAN (CHINA) 2.22 0.087*
KOREA does not Granger Cause JAPAN 207 0.58 0.560
JAPAN does not Granger Cause KOREA 0.34 0.712
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause JAPAN 205 2.05 0.107
JAPAN does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 2.21 0.089*
MALAYSIA does not Granger Cause JAPAN 209 0.01 0.908
JAPAN does not Granger Cause MALAYSIA 2.25 0.135
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause JAPAN 209 1.43 0.233
JAPAN does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 1.08 0.299
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause JAPAN 199 0.71 0.639
JAPAN does not Granger Cause SINGAPORE 0.44 0.851
THAILAND does not Granger Cause JAPAN 207 1.49 0.228
JAPAN does not Granger Cause THAILAND 1.35 0.261
TAIWAN (CHINA) does not Granger Cause CHINA 207 1.79 0.170
CHINA does not Granger Cause TAIWAN (CHINA) 1.64 0.196
HK SAR does not Granger Cause JAPAN 209 0.73 0.393
JAPAN does not Granger Cause HK SAR 1.45 0.230
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause KOREA 209 1.32 0.253
KOREA does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 7.81 0.006***
MALAYSIA does not Granger Cause KOREA 207 1.29 0.279
KOREA does not Granger Cause MALAYSIA 1.19 0.305
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause KOREA 209 0.59 0.445
KOREA does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 0.93 0.337
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause KOREA 203 2.84 0.026**
KOREA does not Granger Cause SINGAPORE 0.54 0.704
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Table 6.6 Continued
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
THAILAND does not Granger Cause KOREA 207 3.34 0.037**
KOREA does not Granger Cause THAILAND 2.48 0.086*
TAIWAN (CHINA) does not Granger Cause KOREA 203 1.72 0.146
KOREA does not Granger Cause TAIWAN (CHINA) 2.21 0.070*
HK SAR does not Granger Cause KOREA 207 0.60 0.548
KOREA does not Granger Cause HK SAR 6.33 0.002***
MALAYSIA does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 207 1.67 0.190
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause MALAYSIA 0.91 0.405
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 209 0.89 0.347
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 0.04 0.834
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 199 1.89 0.085*
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause SINGAPORE 0.70 0.651
THAILAND does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 205 2.66 0.050**
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause THAILAND 0.67 0.571
TAIWAN (CHINA) does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 209 5.49 0.020**
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause TAIWAN (CHINA) 1.19 0.277
HK SAR does not Granger Cause INDONESIA 209 0.28 0.599
INDONESIA does not Granger Cause HK SAR 2.91 0.090*
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause MALAYSIA 205 0.79 0.500
MALAYSIA does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 1.24 0.295
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause MALAYSIA 197 0.81 0.582
MALAYSIA does not Granger Cause SINGAPORE 1.02 0.420
THAILAND does not Granger Cause MALAYSIA 205 0.94 0.423
MALAYSIA does not Granger Cause THAILAND 0.61 0.607
HK SAR does not Granger Cause MALAYSIA 209 0.18 0.670
MALAYSIA does not Granger Cause HK SAR 0.00 0.997
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 203 1.12 0.350
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause SINGAPORE 1.76 0.138
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Table 6.6 Continued
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
THAILAND does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 209 0.12 0.733
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause THAILAND 2.94 0.088*
TAIWAN (CHINA) does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 207 0.78 0.461
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause TAIWAN (CHINA) 4.62 0.011**
HK SAR does not Granger Cause PHILIPPINE 209 0.45 0.503
PHILIPPINE does not Granger Cause HK SAR 0.26 0.614
THAILAND does not Granger Cause SINGAPORE 203 0.38 0.825
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause THAILAND 0.50 0.733
TAIWAN (CHINA) does not Granger Cause
SINGAPORE
205 1.37 0.252
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause TAIWAN
(CHINA)
0.32 0.808
HK SAR does not Granger Cause SINGAPORE 209 2.46 0.118
SINGAPORE does not Granger Cause HK SAR 0.00 0.999
TAIWAN (CHINA) does not Granger Cause THAILAND 203 2.70 0.032**
THAILAND does not Granger Cause TAIWAN (CHINA) 2.76 0.029**
HK SAR does not Granger Cause THAILAND 209 3.54 0.061*
THAILAND does not Granger Cause HK SAR 0.13 0.719
Notes: ***significant at the 1 percent level.
**significant at the 5 percent level.
*significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations.
The following hypotheses can be rejected at the 5 percent level: (i) Korea does not granger cause
China; (ii) China does not granger cause Korea; (iii) Korea does not granger cause Indonesia; (iv)
Singapore does not granger cause Indonesia; (v) Thailand does not granger cause Korea; (5) Korea does not
granger cause Hong Kong SAR; (vi) Thailand does not granger cause Indonesia; (vii) Taiwan (China) does
not granger cause Indonesia; (viii) Philippine does not granger cause Taiwan (China); (ix) Taiwan (China)
does not granger cause Thailand; (x) Thailand does not granger cause Taiwan (China).
A few more hypotheses can be rejected at the 10 percent level: (i) Japan does not granger cause
China; (ii) Philippine does not granger cause China; (iii) China does not granger cause Taiwan (China); (iv)
Japan does not granger cause Indonesia; (v) Korea does not granger cause Thailand; (vi) Korea does not
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granger cause Taiwan (China); (vii) Singapore does not granger cause Indonesia; (viii) Indonesia does not
granger cause Hong Kong SAR; (ix) Philippine does not granger cause Thailand; (x) Hong Kong SAR does
not granger cause Thailand. What’s more, granger causality flows in both directions in the three pairs of
economies: China and Korea, Korea and Thailand, and China and Taiwan (China).
The results suggest that the real effective exchange rates of those economies including China, Japan,
Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan (China) are
inter-related in a rather complicated way. The sub-group of Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and Taiwan (China) seem to be more closely associated. The results imply in part that competition
to some extent exists among these economies.
6.4 Chapter Conclusion
Analysis on other OCA criteria found that the variance of inflation among individual economies tends to
decrease and capital mobility has increased considerably since the 1997–1998 financial crisis. Nevertheless,
capital market integration process was strongly affected by the recent global financial crisis. The second
part of this essay evaluated the suitability of monetary integration in the region using real effective
exchange rates.
Real effective exchange rates in most East Asian economies remain rather stable during and after the
recent global financial crisis. Except for China, the results found little evidence about any cointegrating
relationships between East Asian economies. However, real effective exchange rates of East Asian
economies are inter-correlated. In a vector autoregressive model, granger causality tests showed that the
sub-group of economies including Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan
(China) seem to be more closely associated. There is strong evidence suggesting that the real effective
exchange rates in one economy may be included in the policy functions of exchange rate policies in other
East Asian economies. In particular, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan
(China) may have the potential to stabilize their currencies with each other to maintain relative
competitiveness.
137
Chapter Appendix
Appendix 6.1 Bilateral Assets Holdings by Holder, Debt Securities
Table A6.1.1 Asset Holdings of Hong Kong SAR by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BRN 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KHM 0.00
MAC 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.20 0.15
CHN 2.67 1.89 2.21 2.70 3.12 2.53 4.82 4.60 5.60 14.54 24.08 27.25 42.73
IDN 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.17
JPN 6.40 4.55 3.93 2.78 3.62 4.94 4.65 9.24 3.93 5.38 8.74 8.25 4.40
KOR 3.41 4.02 4.81 4.38 4.58 4.70 6.31 4.88 5.11 5.31 4.71 5.33 3.89
LAO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MYS 1.64 1.43 1.67 1.72 1.76 1.56 1.48 1.37 1.34 1.54 2.00 2.82 2.32
MMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHL 1.06 0.36 0.54 0.38 0.46 0.32 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.33 0.19 0.11 0.13
SGP 1.16 1.45 1.77 2.27 2.31 2.41 1.70 1.30 1.32 1.50 1.55 2.13 2.23
TWN 0.55 0.54 0.35 0.40 0.89 0.43 0.54 0.32 0.46 0.49 0.32 0.30 0.24
THA 0.59 0.44 0.35 0.34 0.40 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.25 0.44 0.16
VNM 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.11
USA 25.04 21.55 21.23 23.32 22.18 20.42 19.76 20.66 23.58 20.99 16.93 16.16 13.93
Total 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.43
Notes: Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings
of Hong Kong SAR. The last row is the total assets value; the unit of total assets value is in trillions of US$.
Abbreviation (BRN-Brunei, KHM-Cambodia, CHN-China, HKG-Hong Kong SAR, IDN-Indonesia, JPN-Japan,
LAO-Lao PDR, KOR-Korea, MAC-Macao SAR, MMR-Myanmar, MYS-Malaysia, PHL-the Philippines,
SGP-Singapore, THA-Thailand, TWN-Taiwan (China), VNM-Vietnam, and USA-United States).
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Table A6.1.2 Asset Holdings of Indonesia by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BRN 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
KHM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HKG 13.73 6.71 2.91 4.18 0.02 2.29 4.15 3.61 5.04 2.50 2.19 1.02 0.82
MAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHN 0.00 0.00 9.46 0.26 0.00 1.83 4.41 4.59 3.51
JPN 0.14 0.14 1.58 1.14 3.48 8.66 0.23 0.34 1.21 0.24
KOR 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.98 0.50 0.26 0.32 2.21 2.57 0.09 1.23
LAO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A6.1.2 Continued
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
MYS 0.30 0.35 0.06 0.15 0.61 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.86 0.59 0.10 4.02
MMY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHL 0.53 0.90 1.10 0.42 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
SGP 5.37 2.70 6.96 4.13 14.54 19.15 11.37 11.34 7.83 12.57 7.27 2.84 1.53
TWN 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02
THA 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.10
VNM 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
USA 35.54 32.89 25.04 15.67 10.27 9.22 16.24 12.57 15.31 4.64 4.83 3.05 9.31
Total 0.70 0.85 1.79 1.33 1.08 1.15 1.74 3.82 3.34 5.88 6.76 11.76 12.32
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of Indonesia. The last row is the total assets value (US$ billion).
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Table A6.1.3 Asset Holdings of Japan by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BRN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KHM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HKG 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.11
MAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHN 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05
IDN 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.13
KOR 0.51 0.46 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.57 0.38 0.46 0.65 0.67 0.76
LAO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MYS 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13
MMY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHL 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08
SGP 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.31 0.32
TWN 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
THA 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.10
VNM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
USA 34.52 32.99 33.00 31.50 32.53 31.28 30.33 30.44 30.60 32.57 32.64 31.22 31.98
Total 1.06 1.18 1.45 1.64 1.71 1.83 1.95 1.98 2.25 2.67 2.71 2.84 2.70
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of Japan. The last row is the total assets value; the unit of total
assets value is in trillions of US$.
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
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Table A6.1.4 Asset Holdings of Korea by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BRN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KHM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HKG 4.54 4.74 2.91 0.91 1.47 5.16 3.29 1.95 1.44 1.49 2.48 3.34 3.07
MAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHN 2.11 0.39 0.27 0.35 0.29 0.33 0.38 0.56 0.57 0.65 0.88 0.75 0.87
IDN 0.93 0.80 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.35 0.56 0.55 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.26
JPN 1.11 0.30 0.52 2.55 1.97 1.73 1.03 0.81 2.45 3.74 2.46 0.99 2.52
LAO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MYS 4.88 3.62 1.04 1.10 0.60 0.44 0.45 0.61 0.51 0.70 0.91 0.96 0.99
MMY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHL 1.58 0.84 0.37 0.19 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.64 0.09 0.09 0.06
SGP 2.25 1.48 2.31 1.52 0.87 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.39 0.51 0.33 0.87 1.95
TWN 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02
THA 2.36 0.25 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.57 0.57 0.39
VNM 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
USA 49.14 51.56 50.26 53.29 60.94 54.13 52.56 47.79 48.59 41.93 39.83 31.20 28.77
Total 6.73 9.70 13.93 19.36 29.75 60.95 53.75 27.23 28.83 30.30 31.78 38.57 45.86
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of Korea. The last row is the total assets value (US$ billion).
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Table A6.1.5 Asset Holdings of Macao SAR by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
HKG 19.38 19.46 16.70 19.59 15.30 14.93 14.12 12.52 16.47 17.12 13.37 8.78 6.96
CHN 4.96 0.51 1.05 2.41 3.72 2.94 2.94 3.93 3.14 6.69 20.84 52.78 70.61
IDN 0.00 0.00
JPN 1.91 0.74 0.65 0.29 0.38 0.63 1.33 0.24 0.36 0.40 0.59 0.37 0.07
KOR 1.89 0.81 0.74 1.77 3.27 2.94 3.42 3.03 4.27 2.67 1.47 1.02 1.45
MYS 0.44 0.09 0.09 0.38 0.65 1.41 1.70 1.59 1.63 1.81 1.68 1.18 0.71
PHL 0.00
SGP 1.20 1.06 1.34 1.91 1.66 2.22 1.95 2.09 1.60 1.76 2.26 1.11 2.25
TWN 1.16 0.46 0.15 0.12 0.28 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
THA 0.08 0.20 0.20 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.21 0.18 0.12
USA 11.58 13.16 17.07 17.84 18.69 16.15 17.17 15.60 13.25 14.72 14.02 5.50 3.16
Total 2.30 2.87 3.89 5.34 5.46 6.79 6.71 6.40 6.91 7.00 7.70 16.15 27.47
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of Macao SAR. The last row is the total assets value
(US$ billion).
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
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Table A6.1.6 Asset Holdings of Malaysia by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BRN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KHM
HKG 2.94 5.30 3.29 0.50 1.15 0.87 2.00 1.09 1.45 2.15 3.68 3.12 5.01
MAC
CHN 0.22 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.50 0.93
IDN 0.81 1.06 0.24 0.30 0.77 3.13 3.16 2.31 0.99 2.33 5.11 5.05 3.43
JPN 1.63 0.29 1.35 1.08 0.56 0.04 0.00 0.60 0.45 0.36 0.41
KOR 0.29 7.92 7.05 2.02 1.77 3.83 8.39 18.14 18.77 22.38 14.06 12.51 7.29
LAO
MMY
PHL 4.36 0.59 0.32 0.19 0.40 1.24 4.06 2.83 4.72 1.78 1.14 0.59
SGP 1.08 5.50 1.76 2.02 5.02 2.05 4.01 12.30 9.22 18.36 20.56 28.59 31.83
TWN 1.58 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
THA 2.24 0.70 0.01 0.47 2.59 0.00 0.26 0.04 1.51 1.52 1.20 2.12 1.92
VNM 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
USA 14.79 28.46 30.55 17.38 18.26 17.11 13.11 8.29 15.15 9.65 12.05 10.18 17.18
Total 0.95 0.76 1.01 2.22 2.23 3.43 3.51 4.53 6.90 10.84 13.73 17.84 19.74
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of Malaysia. The last row is the total assets value (US$ billion).
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Table A6.1.7 Asset Holdings of the Philippines by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
HKG 1.24 1.76 4.02 1.21 2.03 3.37 2.45 2.33 1.55 3.77 3.10 3.68 3.59
CHN 0.00 0.00 4.69 5.48 3.67
IDN 0.15 0.00 12.14 17.32 15.26 16.84
JPN 0.25 0.28 0.38 0.25 0.33 0.11 1.31 1.11 2.13 1.11 0.80 0.54 0.87
KOR 0.32 0.54 1.04 2.68 3.66 4.34 2.81 7.15 5.09
MYS 0.44 0.38 0.68 1.13 0.36 0.58 1.01 0.85
SGP 2.94 1.79 0.82 0.48 11.12 8.81 7.85 3.80 0.00 2.41 1.92 1.19 0.99
TWN 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
THA 0.05 0.29 0.36 0.53 0.64 0.36 0.00 0.76 1.31 2.15
VNM 0.00 0.00
USA 86.57 81.19 68.05 64.79 46.71 42.56 36.00 39.62 48.94 31.45 29.05 35.86 31.37
Total 2.02 2.72 3.51 4.74 5.61 7.04 6.33 4.57 5.00 5.75 5.42 6.70 5.53
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of the Philippines. The last row is the total assets value
(US$ billion).
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
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Table A6.1.8 Asset Holdings of Singapore by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BRN 0.00
KHM
HKG 2.14 1.91 1.87 1.57 2.17 2.05 1.97 2.38 1.87 2.25 2.35 3.13 3.26
MAC
CHN 0.71 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.70 0.54 0.50 0.91 0.73 0.51 1.22 1.19 1.41
IDN 0.60 0.93 1.00 1.06 2.35 2.77 2.97 1.83 3.16 5.56 3.29 2.20 1.80
JPN 9.28 3.14 0.60 2.01 3.50 5.39 5.27 4.03
KOR 3.38 3.67 3.92 3.39 4.22 4.52 6.62 8.23 8.89 6.21 8.43 7.00 5.97
LAO
MYS 2.77 3.17 3.06 4.70 3.78 2.90 4.34 2.94 2.37 2.63 3.13 5.35 5.91
MMY 0.00 0.00
PHL 1.21 0.96 0.57 0.44 0.44 0.60 0.59 0.71 0.69 0.87 1.01 0.96 1.04
TWN 0.55 1.11 0.45 0.94 0.43 0.29 0.26 0.68 1.23 2.07 0.83 0.61 0.48
THA 1.13 0.77 0.73 0.54 0.82 0.71 0.66 0.54 0.75 1.57 1.20 1.66 1.52
VNM 0.02 0.05 0.38 0.37 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02
USA 19.43 21.43 25.90 25.44 21.05 17.98 20.07 19.18 20.07 25.47 24.02 26.57
Total 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.43
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of Singapore. The last row is the total assets value; the unit of
total assets value is in trillions of US$.
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Table A6.1.9 Asset Holdings of Thailand by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BRN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KHM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
HKG 16.02 1.36 1.84 0.56 0.50 3.51 0.42 1.07 0.55 1.84 6.06 5.65 15.05
MAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.47 1.46
CHN 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.54 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.14 0.00 0.01 3.14 1.54 1.68
IDN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.07
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.98 0.08 0.39 0.36 0.84 0.62 0.75 0.58 0.21
KOR 0.00 0.62 0.00 3.97 3.11 4.16 4.35 56.78 75.11 62.44 43.52 15.47 13.88
LAO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.44
MYS 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.08 0.42 1.20 0.33 0.78 0.62 0.74 0.34 0.42 0.62
MMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.26 0.02 0.02
SGP 13.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.17 14.68 2.65 1.32 0.43 0.98 1.71 1.17 0.31
TWN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VNM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
USA 37.42 80.38 67.37 45.93 22.91 10.23 6.80 12.53 7.56 9.29 10.41 5.51 2.94
Total 0.74 1.62 2.40 0.93 2.42 3.06 11.94 11.29 20.13 18.00 14.97 21.95 22.54
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of Thailand. The last row is the total assets value (US$ billion).
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
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Table A6.1.10 Asset Holdings of the United States by Partner (%)
Partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BRN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KHM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HKG 0.27 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.26
MAC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHN 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.12
IDN 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.56 0.49
JPN 3.93 4.63 3.45 3.27 2.10 2.56 2.73 2.73 1.75 2.52 4.37 3.03 2.69
KOR 0.71 0.73 0.41 0.58 0.65 0.59 0.53 0.71 0.86 1.23 1.28 1.29 1.33
LAO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MYS 0.24 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.57 0.65 0.65 0.51
MMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHL 0.39 0.41 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.31
SGP 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.43 0.57 0.54 0.47 0.42 0.34 0.36 0.50 0.51 1.00
TWN 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
THA 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.14
VNM 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Total 0.69 0.86 1.05 1.20 1.27 1.64 1.94 1.52 1.96 2.09 2.31 2.61 2.71
Notes: Abbreviations are the same as table A6.1.1. Except for the last row, numbers denote the percentage share of
bilateral asset holdings in the total asset holdings of the US. The last row is the total assets value; the unit of total
assets value is in trillions of US$.
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
East Asian economies recovered quickly from the 1997–1998 financial crisis. Economic development
continues to accelerate in the region in the 21st century. This thesis examined exchange rate regimes and
re-evaluated the desirability of monetary integration in East Asia.
Chapter 3 investigated exchange rate regimes in the region. Unlike previous research that used the
ordinary least squares method to estimate exchange rate regimes economy by economy, this analysis used
the seemingly unrelated regression model to take into account of the possible correlation between East
Asian currencies. Previous research in this line is rare. The empirical results are three-fold: (i) the exchange
rate regimes in the region changed considerably over time; (ii) the role of the US dollar became more
important during the recent global financial crisis; (iii) average correlation among exchange rates of East
Asian currencies increased over time even after controlling for the effect of potentially important
international and regional currencies including the US dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen. The results
imply the important unobserved common factor that influenced daily movements of exchange rates of East
Asian economies, which might serve as another indicator of increased economic linkages in the region.
Chapter 4 examined the original sin hypothesis and analyzed whether the elimination of “original sin”
through monetary integration could be viewed as an appropriate excuse for monetary integration in the
region. Unlike previous research, this analysis used panel data based on a random effects tobit model to
examine the influencing factors of “original sin”. Pooled tobit model was also used for comparison. The
empirical findings showed that it was rather hard for all East Asian emerging markets to get free from
“original sin” through domestic polices within the intermediate term. The relation between “original sin”
and currency mismatch was also checked based on the available data. Although on average economies with
higher levels of “original sin” were likely to have bigger pressure of currency mismatch over the past
decade, there was no direct relationship between the annual variation of “original sin” and the annual
variation of currency mismatch pressure. Combining the experience of the 2008 euro area crisis, this
research suggests that there is no direct relationship between monetary integration and strengthened
financial stability through the elimination of “original sin” in the region.
Chapter 5 explored the impact of sustained trade integration on the correlation of business cycles in the
region. Specifically, this analysis focused on the impact of vertical intra-industry trade on the correlation of
business cycles in the region, rather than simply testing the impact of intra-industry trade. Unlike previous
literature that used the industry classifications to separate intra-industry trade from inter-industry trade, this
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research used the threshold method to divide trade into vertical intra-industry trade, horizontal
intra-industry trade, and inter-industry trade. Using a fixed effects model and a random effects model, the
empirical analysis found that the sharp rise of vertical intra-industry trade in the region from the 1990s until
the recent global financial crisis strengthened the correlation of business cycles because it increased total
intra-industry trade (not because it increased the share of vertical intra-industry trade in intra-industry
trade). The recent global financial crisis strongly affected the region; the average share of vertical
intra-industry trade and intra-industry trade as a whole declined. Moreover, the crisis brought a temporary
halt to the increased synchronization of business cycles among East Asian economies from 2003 to 2007.
Chapter 6 extended the analysis of the suitability of monetary integration in the region to other
evidence by examining other optimum currency areas criteria and real effective exchange rates. Analysis on
other OCA criteria found that capital mobility increased considerably in the region compared to two
decades ago. Nevertheless, capital market integration process was affected by the recent global financial
crisis. The second part of the chapter evaluated the suitability of monetary integration in the region using
real effective exchange rates. In a vector autoregressive model, granger causality tests showed that a
subgroup of East Asian economies seemed to be more closely associated.
The thesis may complement the existing literature on the degree and the pattern of economic
integration in the region and help shed light on how far East Asia is from being economically feasible to
initiate monetary integration.
Analysis on exchange rates in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 showed that no currency inside the region
played a pivotal role in the exchange rate policies of East Asian economies. The US dollar still has a strong
influence on the daily movements of exchange rates in individual economies. Nevertheless, the findings
showed that the era of the US dollar in East Asia had ended. Most economies in the region have either
switched to floating exchange rate regimes or attempted to allow more exchange rate flexibility against the
US dollar through reforms.
On the other hand, analysis on the trading pattern of the region in Chapter 5 (Appendix) showed
that although the United States and the European Union remain two of the most important trading partners,
intra-regional trade becomes more important. China and Japan are large trading partners for other
economies in the region. In studying the 1997–1998 financial crisis, Ito (2002) mentioned that under the
conditions of dollar-peg system and diverse trading partners in the 1990s, third currency fluctuations, for
example the euro or the Japanese yen, had profound effects on export competitiveness among East Asian
economies vis-à-vis their trading partners even though these economies stabilized bilateral exchange rates
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in terms of the US dollar. Following this line of argument, reverting to the dollar-peg system is not in
interest to the region.
Unlike the German mark in the 20th century’s Europe, it is hard to say that there exists an East Asian
currency right now that is ready to be used as the anchoring currency of possible monetary integration. The
Japanese yen is one of the top currencies in international financial transactions from last century. However,
Frankel and Wei (1993) showed that there was little evidence that the Japanese yen could be the anchoring
currency in regional monetary integration. Indeed, the international use of the Japanese yen in trade is
limited even for Japanese firms (e.g., Ito et al., 2012).
Recently, the potential of the renminbi (RMB) as an international currency is widely discussed (e.g.,
Chey, 2012). The RMB has been evolving quickly over years. It is already the world’s ninth most traded
currency and the RMB-denominated bond market is the largest in emerging-market economies (tables 7.1
and 7.2). Report from the Financial Times showed that the RMB had replaced the euro as the second most
heavily used currency in international trade finance.60 Hefeker and Nabor (2005) suggested that the RMB
might assume a dominant role in the regional monetary integration process in the long run.61 Admittedly,
the RMB is hardly a global currency now and there remain a number of hurdles in the short run to the
transformation of the RMB into a global currency in all fronts. Financial reforms and capital market
development take time and involve risks. Nevertheless, the growing stature of the RMB points to the
increased possibility of its important role in regional exchange framework in future.
Table 7.1 Global Foreign Exchange Market Turnover by Currency, Percentage Shares of Average Daily Turnover
in April (Net-Net Basis), 1998–2013
Currency1 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank
Total2 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0
i
USD 86.8 1 89.9 1 88.0 1 85.6 1 84.9 1 87.0 1
EUR ... 32 37.9 2 37.4 2 37.0 2 39.1 2 33.4 2
JPY 21.7 2 23.5 3 20.8 3 17.2 3 19.0 3 23.0 3
GBP 11.0 3 13.0 4 16.5 4 14.9 4 12.9 4 11.8 4
CHF 7.1 4 6.0 5 6.0 5 6.8 5 6.3 6 5.2 6
ii
AUD 3.0 6 4.3 7 6.0 6 6.6 6 7.6 5 8.6 5
60 Financial Times, “Era of Renminbi Dawns as China’s Influence Grows,” January 6, 2014 5:57 AM. Available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f5ba27d2-67f9-11e3-8ada-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2pxMeIRe3 (January 6, 2014).
61 The author proposed to establish a symmetric monetary system, such as a common basket peg with sufficiently wide
margins of fluctuation as the appropriate solution in the short term.
146
Table 7.1 Continued
Currency1
1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank
CAD 3.5 5 4.5 6 4.2 7 4.3 7 5.3 7 4.6 7
NZD³ 0.2 17 0.6 16 1.1 13 1.9 11 1.6 10 2.0 10
SEK 0.3 11 2.5 8 2.2 8 2.7 9 2.2 9 1.8 11
NOK³ 0.2 15 1.5 10 1.4 10 2.1 10 1.3 13 1.4 14
DKK³ 0.3 14 1.2 11 0.9 15 0.8 16 0.6 22 0.8 21
iii
CNY³ 0.0 30 0.0 35 0.1 29 0.5 20 0.9 17 2.2 9
HKD³ 1.0 8 2.2 9 1.8 9 2.7 8 2.4 8 1.4 13
SGD³ 1.1 7 1.1 12 0.9 14 1.2 13 1.4 12 1.4 15
KRW³ 0.2 18 0.8 15 1.1 11 1.2 14 1.5 11 1.2 17
TWD³ 0.1 21 0.3 20 0.4 18 0.4 22 0.5 23 0.5 23
MYR4 0.0 27 0.1 26 0.1 30 0.1 28 0.3 25 0.4 25
THB4 0.1 19 0.2 24 0.2 22 0.2 25 0.2 26 0.3 27
IDR4 0.1 25 0.0 28 0.1 27 0.1 29 0.2 30 0.2 30
PHP4 0.0 29 0.0 29 0.0 31 0.1 31 0.2 28 0.1 31
Notes: Abbreviation (USD-US dollar, EUR-euro, JPY-Japanese yen, GBP-Pound sterling, CHF-Swiss franc,
AUD-Australian dollar, CAD-Canadian dollar, NZD-New Zealand dollar, SEK-Swedish krona, NOK-Norwegian
krone, DKK-Danish krone, CNY-Chinese renminbi, HKD-Hong Kong dollar, SGD-Singapore dollar,
KRW-Korean won, TWD-New Taiwan dollar, MYR-Malaysian ringgit, THB-Thailand baht, IDR-Indonesian
rupiah, and PHP-Philippine peso)
1 Adjusted for local and cross-border inter-dealer double-counting (i.e., “net-net” basis).
2 Because two currencies are involved in each transaction, the sum of the percentage shares of individual currencies
totals 200% instead of 100%.
3Turnover for years prior to 2013 may be underestimated owing to incomplete reporting of offshore trading in
previous surveys. Methodological changes in the 2013 survey ensured more complete coverage of activity in
emerging market and other currencies.
4 Turnover may be underestimated owing to incomplete reporting of offshore trading.
Source: BIS FX report (April 2013), table 2.
Table 7.2 The International Bond Market by Currency as of September, Amount Outstanding (US$ Billion),
2005–2013
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
i
USD 3933.90 4447.65 5251.64 5476.56 5783.63 6240.06 6584.49 7086.04 7781.25
EUR 4867.13 6101.32 8104.59 8834.43 10080.57 9745.91 9728.42 9365.23 9644.60
JPY 478.14 469.46 549.90 649.03 711.85 728.94 760.19 717.68 516.91
GBP 1008.05 1302.63 1693.03 1825.92 2081.20 2037.19 1941.57 1992.97 2037.52
CHF 197.07 231.26 276.55 309.34 356.69 383.65 405.83 377.20 359.40
147
Table 7.2 Continued
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
iii
RMB 0.00 0.27 4.39 8.58 10.31 11.69 33.40 54.37 66.41
HKD 55.19 54.24 60.11 59.13 62.29 61.55 58.77 57.00 55.34
SGD 11.75 15.71 20.80 29.06 26.67 29.79 31.04 37.92 37.75
IDR 0.07 0.59 1.22 2.50 2.87 5.53 9.25 10.97 10.25
THB 1.08 1.49 1.85 2.34 2.73 2.82 3.39 4.18 5.32
MYR 0.44 0.76 1.59 3.61 4.15 5.54 5.60 6.20 4.78
PHP 0.03 0.07 0.23 0.31 0.29 1.41 3.42 3.71 4.17
TWD 2.77 1.97 1.73 1.65 1.57 1.34 1.25 1.17 0.62
KRW 0.60 0.78 0.71 0.46 0.74 1.17 1.19 1.01 0.57
iv
BRL 4.66 8.54 20.89 21.35 22.67 30.68 45.23 45.76 48.35
RUB 0.60 2.48 7.59 11.57 11.55 12.10 17.21 28.86 33.99
MXN 2.07 7.17 16.90 22.30 15.71 18.71 18.39 20.93 30.73
ZAR 16.34 17.91 28.55 31.46 36.51 35.00 30.28 35.59 29.56
INR 0.11 0.12 0.53 0.56 0.62 0.82 2.74 2.74 2.47
Total 10954 13133 16702 17993 19956 20199 20588 20850 21600
Notes: Abbreviation (USD-US dollar, EUR-euro, JPY-Japanese yen, GBP-Pound sterling, CHF-Swiss franc,
CNY-Chinese renminbi, HKD-Hong Kong dollar, SGD-Singapore dollar, IDR-Indonesian rupiah, THB-Thailand
baht, MYR-Malaysian ringgit, PHP-Philippine peso, TWD-New Taiwan dollar, KRW-Korean won,
BRL-Brazilian real, RUB-Russian rouble, MXN-Mexican peso, ZAR-South African rand, and INR-Indian
rupee).
Source: BIS securities statistics (December 2013), table 13b.
The absence of a pivotal currency or international currency has serious implications for monetary
integration in the region. Kawai (2008) believed that there must be some convergence of exchange rate
regimes in the region to achieve intra-regional exchange rate stability, given the limited degree of the
Japanese yen’s internationalization and the lack of the Chinese renminbi’s full convertibility. He suggested
that a combination of some form of national inflation targeting and voluntary currency baskets in individual
economies could give rise to a relative high level of intra-regional exchange rate stability. Other works such
as Taniguchi (2012) expressed that monetary cooperation between the yen and the renminbi was worth
expecting.
This thesis is limited in that it only focuses on the economics of monetary integration in the region.
Admittedly, the region’s future exchange rate framework or its path toward monetary integration highly
depends on political factors. Future research can be furthered in this direction.
The recent euro area crisis from 2008 has implications for the possible monetary integration in East
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Asia. Chapter 4 showed that although previous research argued that having an extensively used common
currency through monetary integration might disincentive the piling of foreign currency debts in emerging
markets, whether this benefit could be harvested relied heavily on institutional designs in the monetary
union.
Several crises overlapped in the euro area crisis. The banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis
frustrated the economy and member countries struggled to walk out an economic recession in the ensuing
years. The crisis revealed the institutional weakness in the euro area. Greece piled a large stock of debt,
especially short-term debt, in the public sector (e.g., Oxford Economics, 2010). Ireland had its fiscal
revenue vulnerable to cyclical pressures and had a property bubble prior to the crisis (e.g., Honohan, 2009;
Bénétrix and Lane, 2012). Neal and Garcia-Iglesias (2013) studied the crisis in Spain and demonstrated that
the euro area needed a euro-bond backed by credible commitment of regionwide revenues. Furthermore,
current account imbalances were enlarging in the first decade after the introduction of the euro (e.g.,
Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002; Schmitz and Hagen, 2011; Obstfeld, 2012), suggesting a divergence of
macro-fundamentals in the euro area. The escalation of financial integration after 1999 also played a role in
the fermentation of the crisis (e.g., Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). The break of the euro area crisis
ignited discussion about the symbiotic relationship between economic integration and monetary integration.
Governments of member countries conducted taxation and spending polices largely independently in the
euro area. However, they could not rescue themselves using monetary policies when crises were looming.
Researchers have discussed the way toward a fiscal union in the euro area (e.g., De Grauwe, 2006; Bordo,
Markiewicz and Jonung, 2011).
On the way toward the European monetary integration, crises happened and market speculation was
not rare. European countries chose to move further into integration more often than the alternative.
However, as suggested by many researchers, East Asian economies lacked such political coherence. Given
the various factors including the absence of a pivotal currency and political coherence, East Asian
economies still have a long way toward any explicit forms of exchange rate coordination.
Although the idea of monetary integration is only a long-term goal of coordination mechanism of
macroeconomic policies, recent economic developments after the 1997–1998 financial crisis comprised
important steps toward it. Economic integration is deepening.62 Intra-regional trade is growing. Capital
mobility in the region is increasing. Chapter 5 revealed that the emergence of regional production networks
and vertical intra-industry trade increased the synchronization of business cycles in the region. Chapter 3
62 Urata (2008) introduced the institutionalization of economic integration in East Asia.
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revealed that correlation of exchange rates increased after controlling the effect of major international and
regional currencies, implying the common factor that increasingly influenced daily exchange rates of
individual economies. In addition, exchange rates analysis both in Chapter 3 and the second part of Chapter
6 domonstrated that a number of economies might have the potential to be more economically ready for
monetary integration. These economies include Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and
Thailand.
The economic history of the 20th century illustrates that economic forces often break down national
borders. The very initial idea of the European monetary integration originated from the agricultural sector.
Time after the 1997–1998 financial crisis proves that economic linkages strengthened rapidly in East Asia.
As economic and trade integration continue to accelerate, the prospect of monetary integration is nearer.
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